Trejo v. State


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Docket Number: 2008-CT-02133-SCT
Linked Case(s): 2008-KA-02133-COA ; 2008-KA-02133-COA ; 2008-KA-02133-COA ; 2008-CT-02133-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 12-15-2011
Opinion Author: Lamar, J.
Holding: Court of Appeals affirmed; Circuit court reversed and rendered.

Additional Case Information: Topic: Possession of controlled substance with intent to distribute - Motion to suppress - Community caretaking function - Investigatory stop
Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., and Carlson, P.J.
Judge(s) Concurring Separately: Kitchens, J., Concurs in Result Only With Separate Written Opinion Joined by Dickinson, P.J.
Non Participating Judge(s): Chandler and King, JJ.
Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Dickinson, P.J., Concurs in Part and in Result Without Separate Written Opinion
Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: Randolph, J.
Concur in Part, Dissent in Part Joined By 1: Pierce, J.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY
Writ of Certiorari: Granted
Appealed from Court of Appeals

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 12-12-2008
Appealed from: Madison County Circuit Court
Judge: Samac Richardson
Disposition: CONVICTED OF POSSESSION OF COCAINE WITH THE INTENT TO SELL AND SENTENCED TO SIXTY YEARS AS A HABITUAL OFFENDER IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
District Attorney: Michael Guest
Case Number: 2006-0210-R

Note: The Court of Appeals reversed Trejo’s conviction and sentence for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, finding the State had violated Trejo's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure. The Court of Appeals held that the arresting officer lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to make the traffic stop that led to the discovery of cocaine; thus, the trial court should have suppressed the cocaine as fruit of the poisonous tree. The Supreme Court agreed that the officer lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop Trejo’s vehicle, and reviewed the case to determine whether the stop was reasonable under the community caretaking function first pronounced in Cady v. Dombrowski. The Supreme Court found the stop unreasonable under that doctrine also, and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ reversal of Trejo’s conviction and sentence.

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: David Trejo




OFFICE OF INDIGENT APPEALS: HUNTER NOLAN AIKENS LESLIE S. LEE



 

Appellee: State of Mississippi OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: LAURA HOGAN TEDDER  

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Topic: Possession of controlled substance with intent to distribute - Motion to suppress - Community caretaking function - Investigatory stop

Summary of the Facts: The Court of Appeals reversed David Trejo’s conviction and sentence for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, finding the State had violated David Trejo’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: The State argues that the Court should adopt the community caretaking function, as the officer was acting in his duty to protect the public’s safety when he stopped Trejo’s vehicle. It argues that the officer reasonably developed suspicion of criminal activity after effecting the stop. The community caretaking function may apply in contexts other than inventory searches, as the police provide many functions apart from investigating criminal activity. But only under appropriate circumstances may a law enforcement officer be fully justified in stopping a vehicle to provide assistance, without needing any reasonable basis to suspect criminal activity. In applying the community caretaking function, the ultimate standard is reasonableness. The question becomes whether a reasonable person, given the totality of the circumstances, would believe the individual is in need of help or that the safety of the public is endangered. Courts must carefully analyze the totality of the circumstances, so that the community caretaking function is cautiously and narrowly applied in order to minimize the risk that it will be abused or used as a pretext for conducting an investigatory stop and search for criminal evidence. In this case, the trial judge erred in finding the stop was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. A reasonable person would not have believed Trejo was in need of help or that the public was endangered. While it would be reasonable for a police officer to stop an individual who appears to be falling asleep while driving, the facts presented here simply do not support such an inference. There was no evidence of erratic driving. Trejo was traveling approximately 10-12 miles per hour below the maximum speed limit of 70 miles per hour and well above the minimum speed limit of 45 miles per hour in the left-hand lane around 1:00 a.m. Trejo’s failure to change lanes after the officer flashed his bright lights was not necessarily indicative of distress, nor was it so when considered with the other facts. The officer flashed his bright lights in quick succession on a deserted stretch of interstate. And no traffic prevented the officer from passing Trejo in the right lane. As such, the trial court should have granted Trejo’s motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals’ judgment to reverse and render Trejo’s conviction and sentence is affirmed.


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