Trejo v. State
| Docket Number: | 2008-KA-02133-COA Linked Case(s): 2008-KA-02133-COA ; 2008-KA-02133-COA ; 2008-CT-02133-SCT ; 2008-CT-02133-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 06-08-2010 Opinion Author: Barnes, J. Holding: The judgment of the Circuit Court of Madison County is reversed, a judgment of acquittal is rendered, and the appellant is discharged. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Possession of cocaine with intent to sell - Unreasonable search - Probable cause - Section 63-3-603(d) Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Griffis, Ishee, Roberts and Maxwell, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Carlton, J. Dissenting Author : Irving, J., without separate written opinion. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 12-12-2008 Appealed from: MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: Samac Richardson Disposition: CONVICTED OF POSSESSION OF COCAINE WITH THE INTENT TO SELL AND SENTENCED TO SIXTY YEARS AS A HABITUAL OFFENDER IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS District Attorney: Michael Guest Case Number: 2006-0210-R |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | David Trejo |
HUNTER NOLAN AIKENS |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: LAURA HOGAN TEDDER | ||
| Appellee #2: | ||||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Possession of cocaine with intent to sell - Unreasonable search - Probable cause - Section 63-3-603(d) |
| Summary of the Facts: | David Trejo was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to sell and sentenced to sixty years as a habitual offender. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Trejo argues that the cocaine should not have been admitted as evidence, because the officer lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop Trejo’s vehicle. However, the State argues that since the drugs were found on the passenger’s person and not in Trejo’s vehicle, Trejo had no standing to object to the search of her person. Both the State and the circuit court failed to acknowledge the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine which states that all evidence acquired as a result of an unreasonable search, including that evidence that is subsequently or indirectly acquired from the search, is inadmissible. The cocaine was obtained from the passenger’s person as a result of the traffic stop, which resulted in a “seizure” of Trejo. Consequently, if the initial traffic stop was a violation of Trejo’s constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment, the cocaine is the “fruit” of that illegal seizure, and Trejo, as driver of the vehicle, has standing to assert the violation. An officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, make a brief, investigatory detention without a warrant when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. To determine whether probable cause exists, the totality of the circumstances, viewing the evidence in light of the observations, knowledge, and training of the law enforcement officers involved in the warrantless search. In making an investigatory stop, an officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts that justify the intrusion. There must be an objective basis for the stop. If it is clear that what the police observed did not constitute a violation of the cited traffic law, there is no objective basis for the stop, and the stop is illegal. Here, the officer stated that his subjective basis for stopping Trejo was a “concern” that Trejo was tired or impaired based solely upon his failure to move over into the right lane when the officer flashed his high-beam lights into Trejo’s vehicle. He later admitted that he also took into consideration the fact that Trejo’s vehicle had a Texas license plate, furthering his suspicion that Trejo might be “fatigued” from traveling. However, the record does not demonstrate that the officer ever suspected Trejo of any traffic violation. Trejo was not weaving or driving erratically, and there is no indication that Trejo was even aware that he was being followed by law enforcement; the record merely reflects that a vehicle flashed its high-beam lights into Trejo’s vehicle three times. This lack of awareness is supported by the fact that when the officer turned on his flashing blue lights, Trejo promptly responded and pulled over to the side of the road. The officer’s suspicion that Trejo was tired or impaired is not sufficient to constitute a reasonable basis for the traffic stop. At the suppression hearing, it was additionally argued that Trejo may have violated statutory authority which requires slower traffic to remain in the right lane of the highway. However, both the officer and the circuit court judge acknowledged that the traffic signs were merely advisory and that no statute prohibited Trejo from driving in the left lane. On appeal, the State claims Trejo violated section 63-3-603(d) which requires “vehicle[s] proceeding at less than the normal speed of traffic” to be driven in the right-hand lane if available for traffic. However, the officer testified that Trejo was driving at an “appropriate range of speed for that particular area.” The State’s belated justification for the stop is insufficient. Thus, the circuit court erred in denying Trejo’s motion to suppress the evidence of the cocaine. Without the cocaine, there is no remaining evidence to uphold Trejo’s conviction. |
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