Decker v. State
| Docket Number: | 2008-CT-01621-SCT Linked Case(s): 2008-KA-01621-COA2008-KA-01621-COA2008-CT-01621-SCT2008-CT-01621-SCT2008-CT-01621-SCT2008-CT-01621-SCT |
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| Oral Argument: | 05-11-2011 | |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 06-16-2011 Opinion Author: Dickinson, P.J. Holding: Reversed and rendered |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Violation of Mississippi Vulnerable Adults Act - Section 43-47-5(i) - Conflict between indictment and jury instructions - Illegal or improper use of money - Constitutionality of Act Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson, P.J., Randolph, Lamar, Kitchens and Pierce, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Chandler and King, JJ. Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY Writ of Certiorari: Granted Appealed from Court of Appeals |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 08-01-2008 Appealed from: Clay County Circuit Court Judge: Lee J. Howard Disposition: Decker was convicted by the Clay County Circuit Court and sentenced to serve a term of four years. District Attorney: Forrest Allgood Case Number: 9092 |
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| Note: | The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and rendered the judgment of the Court of Appeals finding that the trial judge gave a jury instruction that materially changed the charge made by the grand jury in the indictment. On June 30, 2011, on the Court's own motion, the Court's opinion in this case filed June 16, 2011 is withdrawn. A new opinion will issue in due course. | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Vanessa Decker a/k/a Vanessa Francis Decker a/k/a Vanessa Frances Decker a/k/a Fran |
JIM WAIDE |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Violation of Mississippi Vulnerable Adults Act - Section 43-47-5(i) - Conflict between indictment and jury instructions - Illegal or improper use of money - Constitutionality of Act |
| Summary of the Facts: | The grand jury indicted Vanessa Decker under the Mississippi Vulnerable Adults Act of 1986, for using her mother’s money “without her consent.” But at trial, the evidence established that she had obtained her mother’s consent to use the money, so the State requested – and the trial judge granted – a jury instruction that allowed the jury to find Decker guilty, even if her mother had given her permission to use the money. Decker was convicted and sentenced to four years. She appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Decker argues that the wording of the indictment led her to believe that having her mother’s permission – which the evidence produced at trial indicates she had – was a complete defense to the charges. She further argues that she relied on the indictment’s wording in preparing to defend the charge at trial; and she points out that she did not learn until the trial that the jury would be instructed that she could be found guilty, even if she had permission to use her mother’s money. This right to notice through an indictment requires more than a bare assertion of the name of the crime. The accused must also be reasonably informed of the material facts, details, and conduct the grand jury believes constituted the crime. And once the grand jury hands down a true bill that alleges an accused committed a particular crime by engaging in certain conduct – absent waiver or a request for a lesser included offense – the accused must be prosecuted for that crime, and no other. The indictment charged exploitation, a term that, according to section 43-47-5(i), requires “illegal or improper use” of the money. So the grand jury was required to believe that Decker had used the money for an improper purpose. In describing the improper use of the money, the grand jury charged that Decker had used the money without her mother’s consent. There is no indication that the grand jury believed Decker’s use of her mother’s money with her mother’s consent was an improper use. At trial, the State produced no evidence that Decker had used her mother’s money without her consent. And several witnesses testified that Decker, in fact, had obtained her mother’s consent. Where, as here, the discrepancy between the language of an indictment and the proof at trial or the jury instructions is material and prejudices an accused’s ability to defend; or where the jury instructions deviate in a material and substantive way from the conduct considered by the grand jury to constitute the crime, reversal is required. Although Decker’s indictment sufficiently informed her of the crime and the conduct the grand jury believed constituted the crime, the trial judge erroneously issued a jury instruction that materially conflicted with the indictment’s language. And because the error was not cleared up in other instructions, the jury instructions, when taken as a whole, created injustice by expanding, beyond the charges in the indictment, the bases on which Decker could be convicted. Decker also argues that the portion of the Act under which she was prosecuted is unconstitutionally vague. The statute under which Decker was indicted, states that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to . . . Exploit any vulnerable adult.” Mental impairment is not required for one to qualify under this statute as a “vulnerable adult.” Indeed, the statute’s broad definition of a vulnerable adult includes a person with completely normal mental capacity, but whose ability to perform the normal activities of daily living is impaired because of a physical limitation, such as blindness or the inability to walk. Decker argues that the statute robs such persons of their right to decide what they wish to do with their own money by imposing someone else’s view of what is an “improper use.” Because the case has been decided on the conflict between the language of the indictment and the jury instruction, the constitutionality of the statute will not be addressed. |
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