Decker v. State
Docket Number: | 2008-KA-01621-COA Linked Case(s): 2008-KA-01621-COA2008-CT-01621-SCT2008-CT-01621-SCT2008-CT-01621-SCT2008-CT-01621-SCT2008-CT-01621-SCT |
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Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 08-31-2010 Opinion Author: Lee, P.J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Exploitation of vulnerable adult - Indictment - Constitutionality of section 43-47-5(i) Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Myers, P.J., Irving, Griffis, Ishee, Roberts, Carlton and Maxwell, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Barnes, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 08-01-2008 Appealed from: Clay County Circuit Court Judge: Lee J. Howard Disposition: CONVICTED OF FELONY EXPLOITATION OF A VULNERABLE ADULT AND SENTENCED TO FOUR YEARS IN THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, WITH FOUR YEARS SUSPENDED, AND TO PAY $4,120 IN RESTITUTION AND A $250 FINE District Attorney: Forrest Allgood Case Number: 9092 |
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Note: | The decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed and rndered by the Mississippi Supreme Court on Jun 16, 2011 at http://www.mssc.state.ms.us/Images/HDList/..%5COpinions%5CCO71078.pdf |
Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
Appellant: | Vanessa Decker a/k/a Vanessa Francis Decker a/k/a Vanessa Frances Decker a/k/a Fran |
JIM WAIDE |
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Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: STEPHANIE BRELAND WOOD |
Synopsis provided by: If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
Topic: | Exploitation of vulnerable adult - Indictment - Constitutionality of section 43-47-5(i) |
Summary of the Facts: | Vanessa Decker was indicted on four counts of exploitation of a vulnerable adult. She was found guilty of Count IV, which stated that she used $4,120 of her mother’s money without her mother’s consent at a time when her mother was a vulnerable adult. Count I was voluntarily dismissed, and she was found not guilty of Counts II and III. Decker was ordered to serve a four-year suspended sentence. She appeals. |
Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Indictment Decker argues that she was denied the constitutional right to know the specific charge against her because the jury instructions did not follow the language of the charge in the indictment. Specifically, the indictment charges that Decker obtained $4,120 of her mother’s money “without” her mother’s consent. The jury instruction, however, states that Decker should be found guilty if she exploited her mother by using her resources “with or without” her mother’s consent. Decker is correct that the jury instruction failed to follow the language of the indictment. However, the jury instruction follows the definition of exploitation set out in section 43-47-5(i). The testimony implied, but did not directly state, that Decker’s use of the money was for her son’s benefit with her mother’s consent. Regardless, the statute makes clear that any improper use of a vulnerable adult’s resources for another’s advantage is exploitation. Decker was put on notice by the terms of the statute that the charge of exploitation could be proven regardless of whether or not Decker’s mother consented to the use of the money. Issue 2: Constitutionality of section 43-47-5(i) Decker argues that section 43-47-5(i) is unconstitutionally vague because there is no explanation of the terms “illegal or improper” and the statute makes it impossible to determine whether a financial transaction is criminal. In Boatner v. State, 754 So. 2d 1184 (Miss. 2000), the Supreme Court found that this very statute was not unconstitutionally vague. Decker was found to have used her mother’s money for the advantage of someone other than her mother during a time period in which she was not caring for her mother. It was not disputed that Decker’s mother was a vulnerable adult. Under the statute, Decker’s actions constituted exploitation. The statute is not unconstitutionally vague. |
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