Harness v. State


<- Return to Search Results


Docket Number: 2007-CT-01415-SCT
Linked Case(s): 2007-KA-01415-COA ; 2007-KA-01415-COA ; 2007-CT-01415-SCT ; 2007-CT-01415-SCT ; 2007-CT-01415-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 05-27-2010
Opinion Author: Kitchens, J.
Holding: Reversed and remanded

Additional Case Information: Topic: Aggravated DUI - Preservation of evidence - Request for independent blood test - Section 63-11-13 - Mississippi Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(d)
Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson and Graves, P.JJ., Dickinson, Randolph, Lamar and Chandler, JJ.
Dissenting Author : Pierce, J., With Separate Written Opinion.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY
Writ of Certiorari: yes
Appealed from Court of Appeals

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 06-18-2007
Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court
Judge: Bobby DeLaughter
Disposition: Jaison Harness was convicted of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and sentenced to twenty-five years’ incarceration with ten years suspended and five years of supervised probation. Harness appealed his conviction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
District Attorney: Robert Shuler Smith
Case Number: 04-0-335

Note: This opinion reverses and remands a previous opinion by the Court of Appeals. See the COA opinion at: http://www.mssc.state.ms.us/Images/Opinions/CO55577.pdf

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Jaison O. Harness




IMHOTEP ALKEBU-LAN, WILLIAM R. LABARRE, VIRGINIA LYNN WATKINS, PRO SE



 

Appellee: State of Mississippi OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: LADONNA C. HOLLAND  

Synopsis provided by:

If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office.

Topic: Aggravated DUI - Preservation of evidence - Request for independent blood test - Section 63-11-13 - Mississippi Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(d)

Summary of the Facts: Jaison Harness was convicted of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol and sentenced to twenty-five years’ incarceration with ten years suspended and five years of supervised probation. Harness appealed his conviction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: The issue in this case is whether the State had wrongfully disregarded Harness’s request for an independent blood test before the sample was destroyed by the state crime laboratory. When preservation of evidence is at issue, due process of law is denied only where the destroyed evidence was expected to play a significant role in the defense. Evidence plays a significant role in the defense only where the evidence possessed exculpatory value prior to its destruction, the evidence was of such a nature that the defendant could not have used other comparable evidence to mount a defense, and the State acted in bad faith in failing to preserve the evidence in question. The Court of Appeals found that because the lowest test result of Harness’s blood-alcohol level was 0.1170, well over the legal limit, the blood sample lacked any exculpatory value. This logic presupposes that this result was accurate, notwithstanding the state crime lab’s determination that its first attempt to analyze the evidence had produced an inconclusive result. The preservation of evidence is especially important when the evidence in question is a blood sample taken from a person suspected of driving under the influence. In such cases, the defendant has a statutory right under section 63-11-13 to independently test the sample for blood-alcohol content. The unreasonable denial of a defendant’s request for an independent blood test pursuant to section 63-11-13 amounts to a denial of due process of law. Harness was unreasonably denied his right to an independent blood test. Harness complied with all of the procedures required to protect his right to an independent test. He timely filed a motion for discovery of the blood sample on July 22, 2004, and when the State failed to respond, he followed with a motion to compel on September 30, 2004. Even though the State was on notice from Harness’s motions that he desired to exercise his right to independent testing, the district attorney’s office did not communicate with the crime lab until October 22, 2004, fifteen days after the blood had been destroyed. The crime lab personnel were under no compulsion to heed a request to preserve the evidence from anyone but the prosecutor. That the crime laboratory’s first test was inconclusive renders the State’s disregard of Harness’s request even more disturbing. Mississippi Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(d) makes clear that in all criminal cases the prosecutor shall make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense. Though the prosecutor in this case may not have deliberately set out to deprive the accused of his right to independent testing, his error in failing to undertake steps to preserve the defendant’s right to such testing produced the same result as if he had purposely caused the evidence to be destroyed without the defendant’s being allowed to test it. Harness’s conviction is reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. If, upon retrial, the State’s blood analysis is deemed admissible, the jury shall be given a negative-inference instruction.


Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court