Harness v. State
| Docket Number: | 2007-CT-01415-SCT Linked Case(s): 2007-KA-01415-COA ; 2007-KA-01415-COA ; 2007-CT-01415-SCT ; 2007-CT-01415-SCT ; 2007-CT-01415-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 01-20-2011 Opinion Author: Larmar, J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Aggravated DUI - Preservation of evidence - Blood sample - URCCC 9.04 - Exculpatory value Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson, P.J., Randolph and Pierce, JJ. Dissenting Author : Kitchens, J. With Separate Written Opinion Dissent Joined By : Graves, P.J., Dickinson and Chandler, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 06-18-2007 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: Bobby DeLaughter Disposition: Jaison Harness was convicted of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and sentenced to twenty-five years’ incarceration with ten years suspended and five years of supervised probation. Harness appealed his conviction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. District Attorney: Robert Shuler Smith |
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| Note: | The State's motion for rehearing was granted. The previous opinions were withdrawn and this opinion was substituted therefor. | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Jaison O. Harness |
IMHOTEP ALKEBU-LAN, JAISON O. HARNESS (PRO SE), VIRGINIA L. WATKINS, WILLIAM R. LABARRE |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: LADONNA C. HOLLAND |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Aggravated DUI - Preservation of evidence - Blood sample - URCCC 9.04 - Exculpatory value |
| Summary of the Facts: | The State’s motion for rehearing is granted, and these opinions are substituted for the original opinions. Jaison Harness was convicted of aggravated DUI and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison, with ten years suspended and five years of supervised probation. Harness appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | A defendant has a constitutionally protected privilege to request and obtain from the prosecution evidence that is either material to the guilt of the defendant or relevant to the punishment to be imposed. Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve evidence, that duty must be limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense. In order to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense, the evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. Unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law. Here, Harness had a right under URCCC 9.04 to test the blood sample taken by the State. But now that the blood sample has been destroyed, Harness must show that it had exculpatory value which was apparent before it was destroyed, that he would be unable reasonably to obtain comparable evidence, and that the State acted in bad faith in order to prevail on his due-process claim. He has not made the first showing – that the blood sample had exculpatory value before it was destroyed. The crime laboratory tested Harness’s blood sample four times on two occasions. The first two tests resulted in blood-alcohol readings of .1176 and .1234. These results were not reported to the State because the results were outside the standard deviation set by the lab’s internal operating procedures. A week later, the lab conducted two more tests which resulted in blood-alcohol readings of .1175 and .1170. Harness’s blood sample was tested four times; and, even giving him the benefit of the lowest result – .1170 – his blood-alcohol level was well over the legal limit. The mere possibility the evidence might aid the defense does not satisfy the constitutional materiality standard. Thus, the trial court did not err when it denied Harness’s motion to dismiss the indictment. |
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