Holman v. Howard Wilson Chrysler Jeep, Inc.


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Docket Number: 2005-CT-01154-SCT
Linked Case(s): 2005-CA-01154-COA ; 2005-CA-01154-COA ; 2005-CT-01154-SCT ; 2005-CT-01154-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 01-10-2008
Opinion Author: Waller, P.J.
Holding: The motion for rehearing filed by appellee is denied. The original opinion is withdrawn and this opinion substituted therefor. Reversed and Remanded.

Additional Case Information: Topic: Contract - Duty to disclose - Consumer Protection Act
Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Diaz, P.J., Easley, Carlson, Dickinson, Randolph and Lamar, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Graves, J.
Procedural History: Motion for Rehearing; Summary Judgment
Nature of the Case: Motion for Rehearing; CIVIL - CONTRACT
Writ of Certiorari: yes
Appealed from Court of Appeals

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 06-01-2005
Appealed from: Rankin County Circuit Court
Judge: Samac Richardson
Disposition: The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Howard Wilson on all claims. The Court of Appeals aiffrmed the judgment.
Case Number: 2003-272

Note: This opinion reverses and remands the Court of Appeals' judgment. The COA opinion may be viewed at: http://www.mssc.state.ms.us/Images/Opinions/CO37607.pdf

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Coye A. Holman and Ted Holman




MARK W. PREWITT



 

Appellee: Howard Wilson Chrysler Jeep, Inc. JEFFREY P. HUBBARD, SUSAN D. McNAMARA  

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Topic: Contract - Duty to disclose - Consumer Protection Act

Summary of the Facts: The motion for rehearing is denied, and this opinion is substituted for the original opinion. Coye and Ted Holman filed suit against Howard Wilson Chrysler Jeep, Inc., seeking actual and punitive damages for claims related to their purchase of a 2002 Jeep Grand Cherokee. They alleged that Howard Wilson negligently failed to notify them the vehicle they purchased had previously been damaged in an automobile accident; concealed or misrepresented the fact the vehicle had sustained damage; and committed fraud. Howard Wilson filed a motion for summary judgment. At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the Holmans expressed their desire to amend their complaint to add a claim that Howard Wilson violated Mississippi’s Consumer Protection Act when selling them the Jeep. The circuit court allowed the Holmans to amend their complaint, and shortly thereafter entered its order granting summary judgment in favor of Howard Wilson on all claims. The Holmans appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Duty to disclose The duty to disclose is based upon a theory of fraud that recognizes that the failure of a party to a business transaction to speak may amount to the suppression of a material fact which should have been disclosed and is, in effect, fraud. Howard Wilson indicated that its policy was to disclose whether a vehicle had been stolen, had flood damage, or had wreck damage. The Holmans state in their affidavit that they intended to buy a new vehicle when they purchased the Jeep and that they expressed this intention to the salesperson at Howard Wilson. Giving the Holmans the benefit of the doubt and all favorable inferences, their affidavit reflects that the salesperson told them the Jeep was new, as indicated in the title and sales documents. There is enough evidence in the record to find a genuine issue of material fact exists whether Howard Wilson owed the Holmans a duty to disclose the damage prior to the consummation of the sale of the Jeep. The adequacy of the notice provided in the purchase contract is a question for the jury. Howard Wilson argues it was under no duty to disclose the vehicle’s prior damage to the Holmans at the time of purchase, due to Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Regulation One. By its own terms, the regulation required Howard Wilson to disclose this damage to the Holmans in writing, unless some of the costs were excluded from the calculation. The exception within the regulation simply removes the requirement imposed by the regulation that dealers and customers are to be notified in writing of corrected damage repairs performed on a particular vehicle. Nothing in the regulation indicates that Howard Wilson is relieved from its potential duty to disclose. In addition, the exception in the regulation which removes the requirement that a purchaser be notified in writing of corrected damage does not relieve Howard Wilson of any other requirement under Mississippi law. The circuit court erred in relying on this regulation to grant summary judgment for Howard Wilson. Issue 2: Consumer Protection Act At the summary judgment hearing, the Holmans argued that the Consumer Protection Act permitted them to recover damages because Howard Wilson sold them a car it represented as “new” when it was, in fact, “used” or “reconditioned.” Howard Wilson denied it sold them the demonstrator car as a new car. Because there is factual support for the Holmans’ argument in the record, summary judgment is inappropriate. The area immediately adjacent to the “new vehicle” box was marked on the Holmans’ purchase contract. These facts stand in opposition to Howard Wilson’s claim it did not sell the Holmans the demonstrator Jeep as new.


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