Holman v. Howard Wilson Chrysler Jeep, Inc.
| Docket Number: | 2005-CT-01154-SCT Linked Case(s): 2005-CA-01154-COA ; 2005-CA-01154-COA ; 2005-CT-01154-SCT ; 2005-CT-01154-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: |
Opinion Date: 09-27-2007 Opinion Author: Waller, P.J. Holding: Reversed and Remanded. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Contract - Duty to disclose - Adequacy of notice - Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Regulation One Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Diaz, P.J., Easley, Carlson, Dickinson, Randolph and Lamar, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Graves, J. |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 06-01-2005 Appealed from: Rankin Circuit Court Judge: Samac Richardson Case Number: 2003-272 |
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| Note: | Link Inactive | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Coye A. Holman and Ted Holman |
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| Appellee: | Howard Wilson Chrysler Jeep, Inc. |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Contract - Duty to disclose - Adequacy of notice - Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Regulation One |
| Summary of the Facts: | Coye and Ted Holman filed suit against Howard Wilson Chrysler Jeep, Inc., seeking actual and punitive damages for claims related to their purchase of a 2002 Jeep Grand Cherokee. Howard Wilson filed a motion for summary judgment. At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the Holmans expressed their desire to amend their complaint to add a claim that Howard Wilson violated Mississippi’s Consumer Protection Act when selling them the Jeep. The court allowed the Holmans to amend their complaint, and entered its order granting summary judgment in favor of Howard Wilson on all claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Howard Wilson argues that it owed the Holmans no duty to disclose the damage to them due to Regulation One of the Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission; it had, in fact, disclosed the possibility of damage to them within the terms of the purchase contract; and the Holmans suffered no damages due to the failure to disclose. The duty to disclose is based upon a theory of fraud that recognizes that the failure of a party to a business transaction to speak may amount to the suppression of a material fact which should have been disclosed and is, in effect, fraud. The Holmans state in their affidavit that they intended to buy a new vehicle when they purchased the Jeep, and expressed this intention to the salesperson at Howard Wilson. Giving the Holmans the benefit of the doubt and all favorable inferences, their affidavit reflects that the salesperson told them the Jeep was new as indicated in the title and sales documents. There is enough evidence in the record to find a genuine issue of material fact exists whether Howard Wilson owed the Holmans a duty to disclose the damage prior to the consummation of the sale of the Jeep. Howard Wilson argues the language within the purchase contract met its duty to disclose: “The Vehicle may have suffered damages and may have had repairs performed on it during prior ownership or usage, during transit or while in the control or possession of Howard Wilson.” The Holmans bear the burden at trial of proving this language did not put them on notice of the damage to the vehicle done in the automobile accident and the further burden of demonstrating the knowledge of the damage would be material to their purchase of the automobile. The adequacy of this notice is a question for the jury. Howard Wilson also argues it was under no duty to disclose the vehicle’s prior damage to the Holmans at the time of purchase due to Mississippi Motor Vehicle Commission Regulation One. By its own terms, the regulation required Howard Wilson to disclose to the Holmans in writing this damage, unless some of the costs are excluded from the calculation. The exception within the regulation simply removes the requirement imposed by the regulation that dealers and customers are to be notified in writing of corrected damage repairs performed on a particular vehicle. Nothing in the regulation indicates Howard Wilson is relieved from its potential duty to disclose. Howard Wilson identifies the purpose of Regulation One as protecting automobile dealers from being forced to disclose minor damage to vehicles “sustained in transit.” Assuming this is the purpose of Regulation One, the damage done to the Holmans’ Jeep, which was corrected by repairs performed by Howard Wilson, falls outside the purpose of the regulation, because their vehicle was involved in an automobile accident. At the hearing, the Holmans argued the Consumer Protection Act permitted them to recover damages because Howard Wilson sold them a car it represented as “new” when it was, in fact, “used” or “reconditioned.” Howard Wilson denied it sold them the demonstrator car as a new car. These arguments, on their face, suggest a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning whether Howard Wilson sold the Holmans the demonstrator Jeep as a new vehicle. Although Howard Wilson claims it did not sell the Holmans the demonstrator Jeep as new, the purchase contract indicates otherwise. Thus, there exist genuine issues of material fact in this case that should be presented to a jury. |
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