Kimble v. State
| Docket Number: | 2007-CP-00152-COA Linked Case(s): 2007-CP-00152-COA |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 02-26-2008 Opinion Author: CARLTON, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Post-conviction relief - Factual basis - Ineffective assistance of counsel - Evidentiary hearing Judge(s) Concurring: KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE AND ROBERTS, JJ. Procedural History: Dismissal; PCR Nature of the Case: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 01-09-2007 Appealed from: LEE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: Paul S. Funderburk Disposition: MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISMISSED Case Number: CV06-209(PF)L |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | JUNIOR KIMBLE A/K/A JUNIOR LEE KIMBLE |
JUNIOR KIMBLE (PRO SE) |
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| Appellee: | STATE OF MISSISSIPPI | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: JOHN R. HENRY | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Post-conviction relief - Factual basis - Ineffective assistance of counsel - Evidentiary hearing |
| Summary of the Facts: | Junior Kimble pled guilty to two counts of sexual battery and one count of obstruction of justice. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of twenty years, with ten years suspended on each of the sexual battery charges, followed by five years of post-release supervision. He filed a motion for post-conviction relief which was dismissed. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Factual basis Kimble argues that because he pleaded guilty in a group hearing along with several other defendants, who were unrelated to his case, the judge did not determine whether there was a factual basis for his plea. The trial judge explained, in detail, the rights the defendants would have if they did not plead guilty; and each defendant, including Kimble, responded, in turn, that he understood. The trial judge asked each defendant separately whether his plea was voluntary, and Kimble responded that his plea was voluntary. It was not necessary for the trial judge to question Kimble about the specifics of his crimes. A guilty plea by its very nature is an admission of guilt. When it is specific, an indictment or information can serve as the only source for factual basis of the guilty plea. The indictments against Kimble clearly stated the specific acts that constituted the sexual battery charges and the obstruction of justice charge and were read to him at the plea hearing. Issue 2: Ineffective assistance of counsel Kimble argues that his trial counsel was ineffective, because he told Kimble that if he went to trial and was found guilty, he would be sentenced to two consecutive life sentences plus ten years. Kimble also argues that his lawyer was deficient because he allowed Kimble to plead guilty to a faulty indictment. It is true that there are three indictments against Kimble for sexual battery in the record signed only by the assistant district attorney which lack the signature of a grand jury foreman and are not stamped filed by the Lee County Circuit Clerk. The State acknowledges that it does not know how the unsigned and unfiled indictments came to be made a part of the record. However, Kimble’s claim is without merit since the record also contains two indictments from the November 2005 term of the Lee County Circuit Court charging Kimble with committing sexual battery upon two separate female victims. Each of these indictments bears a signature of the grand jury foreman and each was stamped filed on October 20, 2005, by the Lee County Circuit Clerk. Kimble’s argument that his counsel was ineffective because he advised him he would get life sentences if he went to trial is also without merit. The affidavits he attached to his pleading to support his argument contained nothing more than hearsay. Issue 3: Evidentiary hearing Kimble argues that it was plain from the trial court’s order that the judge only made a perfunctory consideration of his post-conviction motion, because the judge referred to Kimble’s filing as a “Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence” when in fact his pleading was styled “Motion to Vacate Judgment and Sentence.” It is inconsequential that the trial judge denominated Kimble’s filing as a “Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence” instead of a “Motion to Vacate Judgment and Sentence,” since each of Kimble’s alleged errors was addressed in the order. |
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