Sullivan, et al. v. Maddox


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Docket Number: 2011-CA-00820-COA
Linked Case(s): 2011-CA-00820-COA ; 2011-CA-00820-COA ; 2011-CT-00820-SCT ; 2017-CA-00418-COA CONSOLIDATED WITH NO. 2011-CT-00820-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 01-22-2013
Opinion Author: Carlton, J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Real property - Jurisdiction - Quiet Title Act - 28 U.S.C. § 2409a - Adverse possession - 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(n) - Motion for recusal - Uniform Chancery Court Rule 1.11 - Sanctions - M.R.C.P. 11 - Litigation Accountability Act
Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, Maxwell and Fair, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): James, J.
Procedural History: Summary Judgment
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 05-25-2011
Appealed from: Simpson County Chancery Court
Judge: David Shoemake
Disposition: SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED IN FAVOR OF APPELLEES; APPELLANT AND COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT SANCTIONED $42,922.91
Case Number: 2005-0256(1)

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Dempsey Sullivan and Terrell Stubbs




W. TERRELL STUBBS



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief
  • Appellant #1 Reply Brief

  • Appellee: Samuel Maddox and Steve Maddox JAMES BURVON SYKES III L. WESLEY BROADHEAD  

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    Topic: Real property - Jurisdiction - Quiet Title Act - 28 U.S.C. § 2409a - Adverse possession - 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(n) - Motion for recusal - Uniform Chancery Court Rule 1.11 - Sanctions - M.R.C.P. 11 - Litigation Accountability Act

    Summary of the Facts: Dempsey Sullivan and Terrell Stubbs (Sullivan) filed a complaint seeking to confirm and quiet title to approximately eleven acres of real property by adverse possession. Samuel Maddox and Steve Maddox had claimed the same parcel of land. The court granted Sullivan a temporary injunction requiring the Maddoxes to remain on their side of the fence. The Maddoxes then filed a counterclaim and third-party complaint. They later filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that title to the property was vested in the United States. Sullivan responded and also filed a motion for the chancellor’s recusal. The chancellor denied the motion to recuse. The chancellor granted summary judgment and dismissed the claims of all parties with prejudice. The Maddoxes filed a motion for sanctions under M.R.C.P. 11 and the Litigation Accountability Act. The chancellor entered a final judgment imposing sanctions by awarding the Maddoxes attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs in the amount of $42,922.91, to be paid jointly by Sullivan and his attorney. Sullivan appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Jurisdiction Sullivan argues that the chancellor erred in granting summary judgment, because the Maddoxes did not show that there was no genuine issue of material fact. Sullivan also argues that the Maddoxes did not have proper standing to assert that title to the property at issue was vested in the United States. The Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a, establishes a limited waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity for action to acquire title from the federal government. However, a state court does not have jurisdiction to decide quiet-title actions against the United States. In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(n) provides that “Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit suits against the United States based upon adverse possession.” Thus, the chancery court lacked jurisdiction in this matter and properly granted summary judgment. Issue 2: Motion for recusal Sullivan argues that the chancellor erred by refusing to allow him to present any evidence in support of his motion for recusal. Uniform Chancery Court Rule 1.11 provides that a motion for recusal must be filed with an affidavit “setting forth the factual basis underlying the asserted grounds for recusal and declaring that the motion is filed in good faith and that the affiant truly believes the facts underlying the grounds stated to be true.” The test for recusal is whether a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality. In this case, the chancellor denied Sullivan’s motion for recusal because it failed to comply with Rule 1.11. In addition, the basis for Sullivan’s motion for recusal was the professional relationship of the Maddoxes’ attorney in the representation of the husband of the court administrator in a separate criminal proceeding, and the chancellor reminded Sullivan that the husband of the court administrator was not a party in the case at issue. Because Sullivan failed to present evidence in support of his motion for recusal raising a question as to the chancellor’s impartiality, there is no error. Issue 3: Sanctions Sullivan argues that the chancellor erred in finding Sullivan’s complaint and motion for recusal frivolous and awarding sanctions on that basis. M.R.C.P. 11 and the Litigation Accountability Act authorize an award of attorneys' fees and expenses as a sanction for filings which are frivolous or are filed for the purpose of harassment or delay. A claim is frivolous when objectively speaking, the movant has no hope of success. In this case, the record shows uncontradicted and clear evidence showing that Sullivan and his attorney were aware before commencing the action that their claim had no hope of success. Thus, the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in awarding sanctions. Sullivan also argues that he was denied due process, because the chancellor failed to provide the parties with proper notice of the chancellor’s intention to “reopen the case sua sponte” and rule on the issue of sanctions. However, both parties received notice of a hearing on the Maddoxes’ motion for sanctions. In addition, the order granting summary judgment provided that a hearing would be held on the motion for sanctions. Thus, the parties were provided with sufficient notice.


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