Sullivan v. Estate of Maddox
| Docket Number: | 2017-CA-00418-COA CONSOLIDATED WITH NO. 2011-CT-00820-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 07-30-2019 Opinion Author: Carlton, P.J. Holding: DA - Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part; CA - Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Real property - Dismissal of complaint - M.R.C.P. 41(b) - Dismissal for failure to prosecute sua sponte - Clear record of delay - Lesser sanctions - Special master's report - M.R.C.P. 53(g)(2) - Suggestions of death - M.R.C.P. 25 - Substitution of parties - Section 91-7-233 - Termination of claims - Attorney's fees - Easement by implied grant - Easement by necessity Judge(s) Concurring: Barnes, C.J., Westbrooks, Tindell and Lawrence, JJ., concur. Greenlee, J., specially concurs with separate written opinion, joined by Tindell and Lawrence, JJ.; McCarty, J., joins in part. JWilson, P.J., concurs in part and in the result without separate written opinion. Judge(s) Concurring Separately: Greenlee, J. joined by Tindell and Lawrence, JJ.; McCarty, J., joins in part. Non Participating Judge(s): CWilson, J. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: McCarty, J. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part Joined By 1: McDonald, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 02-23-2017 Appealed from: SIMPSON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT Judge: HON. GERALD MARION MARTIN Disposition: Ratified and adopted the special master’s report, dismissed the Maddoxes’ counterclaim with prejudice after finding that no easement existed, affirmed and ratified all prior orders and judgments filed in the matter, and assessed the costs of the special master to the Maddoxes Case Number: 2010-0133-P1 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Dempsey Sullivan, Billie Joyce Sullivan, and Terrell Stubbs, Individually |
W. TERRELL STUBBS, JAMES LAWTON ROBERTSON |
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| Appellee: | Estate of Samuel Maddox | JAMES BURVON SYKES III, L. WESLEY BROADHEAD |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Real property - Dismissal of complaint - M.R.C.P. 41(b) - Dismissal for failure to prosecute sua sponte - Clear record of delay - Lesser sanctions - Special master's report - M.R.C.P. 53(g)(2) - Suggestions of death - M.R.C.P. 25 - Substitution of parties - Section 91-7-233 - Termination of claims - Attorney's fees - Easement by implied grant - Easement by necessity |
| Summary of the Facts: | Dempsey Sullivan and Billie Joyce Sullivan filed a complaint in 2010 seeking an injunction to prohibit their neighbors Steve Maddox and Samuel Maddox from entering their property. The Maddoxes filed a counterclaim asserting that they possessed an easement across the Sullivans’ property. The chancellor entered an order dismissing the Sullivans’ complaint for an injunction with prejudice and issuing sanctions against their attorney, Terrell Stubbs. The chancellor appointed a special master to determine the issue of the easement. The special master submitted a report, finding that the Maddoxes did not possess a valid easement over the Sullivans’ property and recommending that the chancellor dismiss the Maddoxes’ counterclaim with prejudice. The chancellor ultimately entered a final judgment that, among other things, ratified and adopted the special master’s report, dismissed the Maddoxes’ counterclaim with prejudice after finding that no easement existed, affirmed and ratified all prior orders and judgments filed in the matter, and assessed the costs of the special master to the Maddoxes. The Sullivans appeal, and the Maddoxes cross-appeal. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Dismissal of complaint The Sullivans argue that they failed to receive notice that they were at risk of having their complaint dismissed pursuant to M.R.C.P. 41(b). They also argue that the Maddoxes never filed a Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss the complaint and that as a result, the chancellor erred in dismissing the complaint sua sponte. The power to dismiss for failure to prosecute can be exercised sua sponte where a motion by a party is lacking. Therefore, the chancellor’s judgment dismissing the Sullivans’ complaint without notice to the Sullivans did not violate due process. The Sullivans also argue that the chancellor was not authorized to dismiss their complaint and grant sanctions pursuant to Rule 41(b). The Supreme Court has provided considerations to be weighed in determining whether to affirm a Rule 41(b) dismissal with prejudice: whether there was a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff; whether lesser sanctions may have better served the interests of justice; and the existence of other aggravating factors. There is no set time limit on the prosecution of an action once it has been filed. However, if the record shows that a plaintiff has been guilty of dilatory or contumacious conduct, or has repeatedly disregarded the procedural directives of the court, such a dismissal is likely to be upheld. Here, the chancellor observed that the Sullivans filed their complaint on March 30, 2010 and they “have not sought to prosecute their [c]omplaint since the one day of trial on May 4, 2011.” There was no effort by the Sullivans to set the case for trial after May 4, 2011, when it was continued. In October 2012, Stubbs wrote an email to the Maddoxes’ attorney informing counsel that he was unavailable and that “this case does not need to be set to complete trial” until after the Court of Appeals renders its decision in Sullivan I. The chancellor’s judgment clearly reflects that he did in fact consider lesser sanctions. The chancellor found that the Sullivans intentionally tried to delay the case from moving forward. In his judgment, the chancellor stated that when the Maddoxes informed Stubbs that they intended to put the case on the docket in October 2012, “the [Sullivans] objected. Instead of moving the case, doing anything with the case, it turned into well, let’s get rid of the judge,” referring to the Sullivans’ 2013 motion to recuse. Given these findings, the chancellor did not abuse his discretion by dismissing the complaint and imposing monetary sanctions. Issue 2: Special master’s report The Sullivans argue that the chancellor should have adopted the special master’s report in full and not included additional language outside of the report—specifically, language affirming and ratifying prior orders of the court. M.R.C.P. 53 allows the court to appoint a special master to hear matters. Rule 53(g)(2) states that “[t]he court shall accept the master’s findings of fact unless manifestly wrong.” A master’s report has no effect until it is either accepted or rejected by the chancellor. Here, the special master’s report clearly states that his only role was to determine whether the Maddoxes possessed an easement. Additionally, a review of the special master’s report shows that all of the claims in the present action were not resolved by the special master’s report. Thus, the Sullivans were incorrect in their belief that the special master’s report addressed all of the claims between all of the parties. And the chancellor was within his discretion to ratify and affirm the prior orders and judgments of the court. Issue 3: Suggestions of death The Sullivans argue that the suggestions of death for both Steve and Samuel Maddox terminated their claims in the matter, including their award of sanctions against the Sullivans. They also argue that the Estate of Samuel Maddox was improperly substituted as a party because M.R.C.P. 25 does not allow for an extension of time to substitute a party. The record shows that Samuel Jr. timely petitioned the court for an extension to file a substitution of parties. The chancellor allowed the extension, and the chancellor later entered an order substituting Samuel’s estate as a party. Regarding the Sullivans’ claims that the Maddoxes’ deaths terminated their claims in the matter and that sanctions cannot be assigned to heirs, section 91-7-233 states that “[e]xecutors . . . may commence and prosecute any personal action whatever, at law or in equity, which the testator or intestate might have commenced and prosecuted.” The term ‘personal action’ as used in this section means an action for recovery of personal property, for breach of contract, or for injury to person or property. Thus, there was no abuse of discretion by the chancellor in allowing substitution of the Estate of Samuel Maddox as a party. In the chancellor’s September 17, 2013 hearing on sanctions, he ordered Stubbs to pay $19,617.32 to Steve Maddox and Samuel Maddox as reimbursement for attorney’s fees and expenses. No party was ever substituted upon Steve Maddox’s death. It does not appear that the chancellor ever dismissed the action as to Steve Maddox. Therefore, the chancellor’s award of attorney’s fees and expenses is reversed and remanded. Issue 4: Easement On cross-appeal, the Maddoxes argue that the special master erred in determining that they did not have a valid easement across the Sullivans’ property. They claim they have an easement to access their property across the Sullivans’ property by way of the 1981 easement and an additional easement. The Maddoxes specifically claim that the 1981 easement is valid, that it did not terminate, and that they have an easement by implied grant. The record shows that Collier sold the land on which the 1981 easement existed to the Sullivans. Several years later, the Maddoxes purchased the pieshaped portion. The land was no longer commonly owned. The special master also found that Collier’s land did not originally abut or front the public road. The 1981 easement did not connect to the pie-shaped portion. The special master stated that when the Maddoxes purchased their property from Collier, “they knew, or should have known, that they would only have access to the lot through the adjoining land they owned and not the Sullivans[’] land.” Thus, the Maddoxes did not possess an easement of record. The Maddoxes also claim that when Collier conveyed part of the dominant estate to Sullivan, she retained an easement by implication to the property she retained and that “[w]ith the Okatoma River to the West and otherwise being landlocked, this easement by [implication] was necessary at the time of the initial severance and remains necessary.” To establish an easement by necessity, a claimant is required to prove that the easement is necessary; the dominant and servient estates were once part of a commonly owned parcel; the implicit right-of-way arose at the time of severance from the common owner. To satisfy this burden, the claimants must show strict necessity; that they possess no other means of access to their property. In this case, no easement of necessity exists. The land with the easement was no longer commonly owned when the Maddoxes bought their pieshaped portion. The record and the special master’s report show that the Maddoxes can access the pie-shaped portion from the other land they own. |
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