Thompson v. Nguyen
| Docket Number: | 2009-CT-01147-SCT Linked Case(s): 2009-CA-01147-COA ; 2009-CA-01147-COA ; 2009-CT-01147-SCT |
|
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 04-19-2012 Opinion Author: Dickinson, P.J. Holding: The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson County is Reinstated and Affirmed. |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Directed verdict - Causation - Additur - Section 11-1-55 - Peremptory instruction - Special verdict - M.R.C.P. 49(a) Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson, P.J., Randolph, Lamar and Chandler, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): King, J. Dissenting Author : Kitchens, J. Dissent Joined By : Pierce, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY Writ of Certiorari: Granted Appealed from Court of Appeals |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 05-13-2009 Appealed from: Jackson County Circuit Court Judge: Dale Harkey Disposition: VERDICT FOR PLAINTIFF FOR $9,131 Case Number: 2004-00162(3) |
|
| Note: | The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals finding that even if the Appellee admitted liability, the Appellant was still required to prove proximate cause of damages being the underlying tort. | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Karen R. Thompson |
KRISTOPHER W. CARTER |
||
| Appellee: | Dung Thi Hoang Nguyen | H. BENJAMIN MULLEN JESSICA B. MCNEEL |
|
|
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Personal injury - Directed verdict - Causation - Additur - Section 11-1-55 - Peremptory instruction - Special verdict - M.R.C.P. 49(a) |
| Summary of the Facts: | In 2002, Dung Thi Hoang Nguyen – who had stopped behind Karen Thompson at a red light – reached for her purse, causing her foot to slip off the brake and her car to bump into Thompson’s. Neither car was damaged. Thompson – who did not, at the time of the accident, claim to be injured – testified that it felt as if her car had stalled. Nguyen and Thompson exchanged information and left the scene without calling the police. But after Thompson arrived at her parents’ home, her father told her to get a police report for her insurance provider, so Thompson called Nguyen, who agreed to meet her at the police station that night. A few days later, Thompson visited her physician, Dr. James Martin, complaining of neck pain. Dr. Martin, who already was treating Thompson for migraine headaches, ordered an x-ray and ultrasound. He prescribed pain medication, and referred Thompson to a physical therapist. An MRI of Thompson’s spine revealed a preexisting degenerative-disc disease associated with disc bulges. In 2005, Thompson underwent surgery to treat her abnormal discs. Thompson filed suit against Nguyen, seeking $234,316.49 in compensation. Nguyen admitted liability but contested that the accident had caused Thompson that much damage. When Nguyen rested, Thompson moved for a directed verdict as to causation. The circuit court denied Thompson’s motion and held that material facts were in dispute as to whether all or part of Thompson’s damages were causally related to the accident. The jury awarded Thompson $9,131– the exact amount of her physical therapy bills. Thompson filed a motion for additur or a new trial on damages alone, which the circuit court denied. Thompson appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a trial on damages. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Directed verdict Thompson argues that she offered uncontradicted expert testimony that her neck-pain symptoms happened after the accident, and that three experts testified that – in terms of a reasonable medical probability – her symptoms were caused, or at least aggravated by, the accident. Therefore, according to Thompson, a directed verdict on causation was appropriate, and the jury should have considered damages only. The burden was on Thompson to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Nguyen’s negligence proximately caused her damages. While it is true that three of Thompson’s experts testified that the accident caused or contributed to Thompson’s symptoms, these opinions were not obligatory or binding on triers of fact but were advisory in nature. Also, cross examination of Thompson’s experts produced evidence in Nguyen’s favor. First, the accident itself was minor - neither vehicle was damaged - and Thompson testified that it had felt as if her car had stalled. Second, Thompson admitted to a previous, more serious, wreck with a drunken driver. Third, Thompson had preexisting degenerative-disc disease and, although her experts did testify that the accident caused her symptoms, they also admitted that the accident may have only aggravated her disease. Thus, the circuit judge correctly denied Thompson’s motion for a directed verdict. Issue 2: Additur Thompson argues that an additur was appropriate because the jury awarded only a portion of her reasonable and necessary medical bills, and the jury failed to render an award for pain and suffering. Under section 11-1-55, an additur may be granted when the court finds that the damages awarded were excessive or inadequate because the jury was influenced by bias, prejudice, or passion, or the award was contrary to the overwhelming weight of credible evidence. According to the Court of Appeals, the length of deliberations and the jury’s questions to the judge demonstrated its confusion. The jury deliberated for two and a half hours after closing arguments and one hour and fifteen minutes the following day and asked five questions of the judge. The questions did not show confusion but suggest the jurors diligently and seriously pursued their duty. The first three questions related to evidence and testimony, and the fourth was asked at 7:25 p.m. – after the first two and a half hours of deliberation. Thus, the court did not err in denying the motion for additur. Issue 3: Jury instructions Thompson argued, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the trial court erred by refusing Thompson’s proposed peremptory jury instructions on liability, jury instructions on damages, and request for a special verdict. As long as the instructions given by the court fairly present the applicable law, reversal is not warranted. Here, the jury was instructed that Nguyen had admitted liability. Although Nguyen admitted liability, she contested causation. The jury was free to find that the accident did not proximately cause any of Thompson’s injuries. The jury was instructed that liability was not at issue, but proximate cause was. Thus, there was no error in the instructions. With regard to a special-verdict form, special-verdict forms are not required. M.R.C.P. 49(a) states that “jury determination[s] shall be by general verdict.” Trial judges have broad discretion to use special verdicts, which are appropriate in unusual or complicated cases, or in cases where there is a possibility of juror bias or prejudice. Thompson’s case involved a simple car accident in which liability was admitted. Thus, there was no error. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
