Thompson v. Nguyen
| Docket Number: | 2009-CA-01147-COA Linked Case(s): 2009-CA-01147-COA ; 2009-CT-01147-SCT ; 2009-CT-01147-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 02-01-2011 Opinion Author: King, C.J. Holding: Reversed, rendered and remanded. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Directed verdict - M.R.C.P. 50 - Additur - Jury instructions - M.R.C.P. 49(b) Judge(s) Concurring: Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Irving, Ishee and Carlton, JJ. Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Griffis, Roberts and Maxwell, JJ., without separate written opinion Concurs in Result Only: Barnes, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 05-13-2009 Appealed from: JACKSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: DALE HARKEY Disposition: VERDICT FOR PLAINTIFF FOR $9,131 Case Number: 2004-00162(3) |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Karen R. Thompson |
KRISTOPHER W. CARTER |
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| Appellee: | Dung Thi Hoang Nguyen | H. BENJAMIN MULLEN, JESSICA B. MCNEEL | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Directed verdict - M.R.C.P. 50 - Additur - Jury instructions - M.R.C.P. 49(b) |
| Summary of the Facts: | Karen Thompson was rear-ended at a stop light by Dung Thi Hoang Nguyen. Thompson filed suit against Nguyen seeking compensatory damages for injuries that allegedly resulted from the collision. A jury found in favor of Thompson but awarded only a fraction of the requested damages. Thompson filed a motion to reconsider and to vacate the judgment, which was denied. Thompson appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Directed verdict Thompson argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict on the issue of liability. M.R.C.P. 50 requires the trial court to grant a directed verdict if any verdict other than the one directed would be erroneous as a matter of law. Thompson’s claim is a negligence action. The elements of negligence include duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages. Thompson presented evidence that when the accident occurred, she was stopped at a red light, and Nguyen collided with her rear bumper. Nguyen testified that her negligence caused the accident and that she was willing to accept responsibility for her negligence. Because Nguyen testified that her negligence caused the collision, the trial court erred in denying Thompson’s motion for a directed verdict on the issue of Nguyen’s liability. Where a jury verdict on the point at issue provides the appealing party the most favorable result he could have received had the trial court handled the point correctly, errors in failing to provide a directed verdict or peremptory instruction regarding liability should be deemed harmless. Here, it is not possible to say that Thompson received the most favorable result. There is a substantial discrepancy between the amount of damages proven by Thompson and the amount of damages awarded by the jury. The jury found in favor of Thompson but only awarded a portion of Thompson’s proven medical expenses. Thompson is entitled to all past, present and future medical damages and compensation for pain and suffering proximately caused by Nguyen’s negligence. Accordingly, the trial court’s error in denying Thompson’s request for a directed verdict on the issue of liability cannot be considered harmless. Issue 2: Additur Thompson argues that the damages awarded were insufficient compensation for her injuries suffered and that the trial court erred in failing to grant a motion for additur or, in the alternative, a new trial on the sole issue of damages. Awards set by jury are not merely advisory and generally will not be set aside unless so unreasonable as to strike mankind at first blush as being beyond all measure, unreasonable in amount and outrageous. Thompson sought an additur claiming that the jury incorrectly awarded her only a portion of her reasonable and necessary medical bills and that the jury failed to include an award for pain and suffering. Thompson submitted medical bills equal to $234,316.49, but the jury only awarded Thompson $9,131. During the trial, Thompson’s credibility was drawn into question because her testimony at trial and her deposition differed. Additionally, pictures of the vehicle, taken after the accident, were introduced into evidence and documented no damage. Thompson further testified that she had been in a previous accident, but she believed concealing that fact to be appropriate because she found the previous accident to be irrelevant in regard to the consequences of the accident with Nguyen. Even so, the jury’s award is unreasonable. The behavior of the jury during deliberation suggests that the jury was confused by the jury instructions. While in deliberation, the jury requested a copy of the police report, transcripts of the video testimony, a medical dictionary, and a private meeting with the judge. The jury awarded the exact amount Thompson requested as compensation for her physical-therapy treatments. The amount requested for physical therapy combined two prescribed treatment sessions. The verdict does not suggest that damages were awarded for visits to either doctor who would have had to prescribe the physical therapy, as compensation for any medical treatments besides physical therapy, or as compensation for pain and suffering. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying Thompson’s motion for a new trial on the sole issue of damages. Issue 3: Jury instructions Thompson argues the trial court erred by failing to grant a peremptory jury instruction regarding liability and/or a jury instruction explaining how to calculate medical damages. Thompson is entitled to have jury instructions given which present her theory of the case. The law is clear in that the jury must award compensatory damages, inclusive of reasonable and necessary medical expenses and pain and suffering, proximately caused by the act of negligence. Thompson argues that the trial court erred in refusing jury instruction P11A, which provided the jury with a special-verdict form. An instruction pursuant to M.R.C.P. 49(b) may have eliminated any confusion as to how to calculate damages. Considering the facts of this case and in reading the instructions as a whole, the trial court erred by refusing a peremptory jury instruction regarding liability and refusing a jury instruction explaining how to calculate damages. Furthermore, the jury continuously posing questions to the court during deliberation suggests that the jurors were confused by the instructions. |
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