Evans v. Evans
| Docket Number: | 2007-CP-00920-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-20-2008 Opinion Author: Easley, J. Holding: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Modification of child support - Material change in circumstances - College expenses Judge(s) Concurring: Waller and Diaz, P.JJ., Graves, Randolph and Lamar, JJ.; Carlson and Dickinson, JJ., Concur in Part. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: Smith, C.J. with separate written opinion. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part Joined By 1: Carlson and Dickinson, JJ. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 04-10-2007 Appealed from: WASHINGTON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT Judge: Billy G. Bridges Disposition: The Chancellor denied Robert Evans's request for downward modification of his child-support obligation. Case Number: 98-0997 |
|
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Robert D. Evans |
Robert D. Evans (Pro Se) |
|
|
| Appellee: | Beverly B. Evans | Susan Carole Smith | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Modification of child support - Material change in circumstances - College expenses |
| Summary of the Facts: | Robert Evans filed a counter-complaint to a claim filed by his former wife, Beverly Evans, in which she requested an increase in the monthly child-support obligation, payment of all college expenses for their daughter, payment of back child support, and attorneys’ fees from Evans. Evans sought modification based on a material change in circumstances due to their daughter’s upcoming emancipation, her enrollment in college, and the fact that their son stays at Evans’s home six months out of the year. Evans also requested that Beverly be held in contempt for violating telephone privileges, and that she be held responsible for Evans’s attorneys’ fees. The chancellor denied both parties’ requests for modification, including Beverly’s plea for back child support, as well as Evans’s request that Beverly be held in contempt of court, and held that each party was responsible for his and her own attorney costs. The chancellor ordered Evans to resume paying Beverly the lump sum of $2,000 per month for child support in the manner set forth in the decreed settlement. The chancellor ordered that the son should be provided with an automobile, and that both parties were to pay for his future college expenses. The parties were ordered to share proportionately in all the expenses thereof; seventy-five percent to be paid by Evans, and the remaining twenty-five percent by Beverly. The chancery court later granted a clarification request, and ruled that Evans and Beverly are to pay for both children’s car expenses as well as college expenses, seventy-five percent/twenty-five percent, respectively. The chancellor reaffirmed that neither party would be required to pay for such expenses upon each child reaching emancipation. Evans appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Child support Evans argues that the court erred in refusing to modify the $2,000 child support obligation despite what Evans claims was a material change in circumstances in his favor. This change was that the couple’s daughter would soon reach the age of twenty-one, that she was no longer incurring private-school tuition, and that their son lives with Evans much of the year. No party obligated by a judicial decree to provide support for minor children may resort to self help and modify his or her obligation with impunity. In a situation where a supporting parent claiming to have made payments directly to the child can prove such payment, the parent may receive credit for having paid child support, where to hold otherwise would unjustly enrich the non-supporting parent. For global child-support payments providing for two or more children, the emancipation of one child does not automatically reduce the lump-sum payment. There can be no modification of a child support decree absent a substantial and material change in the circumstances of one of the interested parties arising subsequent to the entry of the decree sought to be modified. Standing alone, the fact that the couple’s daughter no longer needs private-school tuition is not an unanticipated change in circumstances. Morever, the judicially approved child-support agreement mentions only that Beverly is to pay for each child’s private-school tuition from the global child-support payment. Further, the record reveals that, prior to reducing the amount, Evans remitted the full payment (minus the house note) each month, even during periods when both children were not in school and incurring the need for tuition. This was a judicially approved arrangement, freely and voluntarily entered into by the parties at the time of the their divorce. The fact that the couple’s son lives in Evans’s home half of the time is not an unforeseeable change in circumstances. Evans and Beverly agreed to share in the joint physical and legal custody of both minor children, and they formulated the amount of child support with this in mind. Thus, the chancellor’s decision to deny Evans’s modification request was not manifestly wrong. Issue 2: College expenses Evans argues that the chancellor erred by requiring him to pay seventy-five percent of his son’s future college expenses, because Beverly made no request for college expenses in her pleadings, and no evidence was adduced at trial regarding his plan to go to college, his aptitude for college, or Evans’s ability to pay. When a parent’s financial ability is ample to provide a college education and the child shows an aptitude for such, the court may in its discretion, after hearing, require the parent to provide such education. But the parental duty to send a child to college is not absolute; rather it is dependent upon the proof and circumstances of each case. Though there was clear evidence demonstrating a good relationship between Evans and his son, and, arguably, some evidence indicating that the son possesses the aptitude for college, no evidence was presented as to when, where, or if he may go to college. Further, the chancellor’s award of college expenses was not specific as to what it encompassed. The decreed settlement in this case does not mention anything about providing a college education for the two minor children. Therefore, ordering the payment of college expenses requires modification of the decreed settlement agreement, premised on a finding that there has been a substantial and material change in circumstances since the original decree. Because the evidence did not reveal a substantial and material change in circumstances warranting a decree modification, the modification was manifest error. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
