Hayden v. State
| Docket Number: | 2006-KA-00854-SCT Linked Case(s): 2006-KA-00854-SCT ; 2006-KA-00854-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-15-2007 Opinion Author: Dickinson, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Possession of stolen vehicle - Attorney-client privilege - M.R.E. 401 - M.R.E 901 - M.R.E. 502(a)(5) - M.R.E. 502(d)(1) - M.R.E. 102 - M.R.E. 501(1) - Right to counsel Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Easley, Randolph and Lamar, JJ. Judge(s) Concurring Separately: Randolph, J., Specially Concurs with Separate Written Opinion Joined by Smith, C.J., Dickinson and Lamar, JJ. Dissenting Author : Carlson, J., Dissents with Separate Written Opinion Dissent Joined By : Waller and Diaz, P.JJ., and in Part by Graves, J. Dissenting Author : Graves, J., Dissents With Separate Written Opinion Dissent Joined By : Diaz, P.J., and in Part by Waller, P.J., and Carlson, J. Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 05-15-2006 Appealed from: LOWNDES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: James T. Kitchens, Jr. Disposition: Conviction of possession of stolen property over $500.00 and sentence of ten (10) years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, as an habitual offender, and pay a fine in the amount of $10,000.00. District Attorney: Forrest Allgood Case Number: 2004-0645-CR1 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Alphonso Hayden |
MICHAEL R. FARROW,
PHILLIP BROADHEAD |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Possession of stolen vehicle - Attorney-client privilege - M.R.E. 401 - M.R.E 901 - M.R.E. 502(a)(5) - M.R.E. 502(d)(1) - M.R.E. 102 - M.R.E. 501(1) - Right to counsel |
| Summary of the Facts: | Alphonso Hayden was convicted of possession of a stolen vehicle and was sentenced as a habitual offender to ten years without parole. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Attorney-client privilege Hayden argues that the trial court erred in denying him the protection of the attorney-client privilege when, after it removed his retained counsel, it required said counsel to testify against his former client as a witness for the prosecution that Hayden gave him documents introduced by the State (the bill of sale and certificate of title). The documents were relevant under M.R.E. 401 since a reasonable juror could certainly conclude that, because Hayden produced the fraudulent documents in discovery, he knew the vehicle was stolen. The documents were also authenticated under M.R.E. 901. That the documents were admissible, however, does not address the question of whether the attorney-client privilege was breached when the attorney testified that he received the documents from Hayden. As a general rule, an attorney’s testimony that he or she received items from the client would violate the attorney-client privilege. However, the client may waive the privilege in certain circumstances. The necessity for a waiver of the privilege, however, presupposes that the particular communication to the attorney was privileged to begin with. Under M.R.E. 502(a)(5), a communication is confidential if not intended to be disclosed to third persons. When Hayden provided the documents to his attorney, he expressed no intention or expectation that his act, or the documents themselves, would be considered by the attorney – or anyone else – to be confidential or privileged. And even though subsequent circumstances may have caused Hayden to change his mind, it was too late because there is clear evidence that the trial judge already had been provided the documents and had been informed that Hayden was the source. It is clear that the only two persons who could have communicated this information to the judge were Hayden and his attorney. This is compelling evidence that, when Hayden provided the documents to the attorney, there was no expectation of confidentiality or privilege concerning the documents or the fact that Hayden provided them. Rule 502(d)(1) clearly and specifically states that there is no privilege where the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud. Because Hayden supplied the documents, he clearly meets the “reasonably-should-have-known” test of Rule 502(d)(1). Thus, no privilege existed with respect to the documents, their source, or their content. This case is nothing more than an attempt by an accused to use manufactured evidence to avoid incarceration which circumvents the purpose of the rules as stated in M.R.E. 102. It appears that the certificate of title and/or the bill of sale which Hayden furnished to his attorney were counterfeit. If this is the case, Hayden’s actions were not only a fraud upon the court, but also a crime under section 97-9-125. Hayden’s attorney unwittingly was involved in this fraud/crime, therefore destroying any privilege or confidentiality which arguably might have existed. There was no impropriety associated with the trial court’s requirement that the attorney testify. With certain limited exceptions, M.R.E. 501(1) provides that no person has a privilege to refuse to be a witness. Issue 2: Right to counsel Hayden argues that, by dismissing his attorney, the trial judge violated Hayden’s right to counsel. The trial judge pointed out the conflict of interest created by Hayden’s production of the incriminating documents. The general rule is that an attorney may not proceed with the representation of a client with whom the attorney has a conflict of interest. The existence of the conflict was sufficient for, and in fact required, the attorney’s removal as counsel. Hayden might very well have proceeded with the attorney as his attorney, had he waived the conflict of interest. Additionally, he simply could have stipulated to the single fact which required the attorney’s testimony, that is, that the documents were provided by Hayden. Such stipulation would have made the attorney’s testimony unnecessary. Also, there is no indication that Hayden suffered prejudice by proceeding with his new counsel. |
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