Young v. Meacham
| Docket Number: | 2007-CA-01093-SCT Linked Case(s): 2007-CA-01093-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-20-2008 Opinion Author: Diaz, P.J. Holding: Reversed and Remanded |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Medical malpractice - Supplemental expert designation - M.R.C.P. 26(f)(1) - Supplemental affidavit - M.R.C.P. 56(c),(e) Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, P.J., Easley, Carlson, Graves and Dickinson, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Smith, C.J., and Lamar, J. Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Randolph, J. Procedural History: Summary Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - MEDICAL MALPRACTICE |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 06-27-2007 Appealed from: DeSoto County Circuit Court Judge: Andrew C. Baker Disposition: The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Case Number: CV2001-204 RD |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Bobbi J. Young and Lynda L. Carter, next of kin to Clarence S. Young, deceased |
William R. Bruce |
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| Appellee: | Robert R. Meacham, Gina V. Bray, Robert H. Smith, Stevan I. Himmelstein, Baptist Memorial Hospital Desoto, Inc., and Cardiovascular Physicians of Memphis | JAMES LAWRENCE WILSON, IV; TOMMIE G. WILLIAMS; ALBERT C. HARVEY; MICHAEL KEVIN GRAVES; JANELLE MARIE LOWREY; DAVID W. UPCHURCH; ROBERT K. UPCHURCH; DION JEFFERY SHANLEY; S. DUKE GOZA; WALTER ALAN DAVIS; JOHN H. DUNBAR | ||
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| Topic: | Medical malpractice - Supplemental expert designation - M.R.C.P. 26(f)(1) - Supplemental affidavit - M.R.C.P. 56(c),(e) |
| Summary of the Facts: | After Clarence Young died, the plaintiffs filed a wrongful death, medical malpractice claim against Dr. Robert Meacham, Dr. Gina Bray, Dr. Robert Smith, Dr. Smith’s employer, Baptist Memorial Hospital-Desoto, Inc., Dr. Stevan Himmelstein, and Dr. Himmelstein’s employer, Cardiovascular Physicians of Memphis. The plaintiffs later filed a motion for summary judgment against the individual doctors and attached an affidavit from an expert who stated that the doctors had been negligent in their care of Young, and had they provided timely and proper care, it was probable that Young would have survived. During the expert’s deposition, the defendants presented him with an EKG report showing Young’s heart had an ejection fraction of ten to twenty percent. He stated that he had never seen the report and questioned the report’s validity because it stated that the EKG was performed four days after Young’s death. When he was asked to assume that the EKG was performed on the day of Young’s death and that it was properly interpreted, he stated that, based on the hypothetical questions, with an ejection fraction of ten to twenty percent, the damage to Young’s heart was such that there would not have been any causal link between the defendants’ acts or omissions and Young’s death. All of the defendants filed motions for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that the plaintiffs’ expert had withdrawn his criticisms and that the plaintiffs’ deadline for designating experts had expired. The plaintiffs then filed motions to continue summary judgment motions until they could review the EKG results and consult with their expert. The plaintiffs later responded to the motions for summary judgment, arguing that the defendants could not meet their burden of proof, because the opinions given in the expert’s deposition were based on hypothetical questions and not facts. The plaintiffs also filed a supplemental expert designation of the same expert and filed a second affidavit from the expert. The only difference between this and the original affidavit was his opinion that the EKG had been interpreted wrongly. The defendants filed motions to strike the supplemental expert designation. The trial court ultimately granted the motions to strike and the motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendants on the ground that the plaintiffs no longer had expert testimony that would establish causation between the defendants’ alleged negligence and the resulting injuries. The plaintiffs appeal. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | The basis for the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was that the plaintiffs’ supplemental designation of the expert, as well as his supplemental affidavit, were provided outside the discovery deadlines. However, the scheduling order made no mention of supplemental discovery. By holding that the plaintiffs’ supplemental expert designation violated the scheduling order, the trial court erroneously equated a discovery deadline with a deadline for supplementation of an expert opinion. To the contrary, M.R.C.P. 26(f)(1) requires that a party seasonably supplement a prior response with any question addressed to the identity of each person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the subject matter on which the person is expected to testify, and the substance of the testimony. In the present case, no trial date had been set, and the expert’s supplemental affidavit did nothing to change his original opinions. There is nothing in the rules, absent unusual circumstances and a showing of prejudice, that would prevent a plaintiff from responding to a motion for summary judgment with a supplemental affidavit. The plaintiffs filed the supplemental opinion in affidavit form within the deadline established under M.R.C.P. 56©,(e). The trial court erred by refusing to consider the expert’s supplemental affidavit. Also, the trial court was incorrect in holding that the expert had completely withdrawn his original expert opinion. This finding was based on answers given in his deposition that were in response to hypothetical questions. His responses to questions not based on established fact did not alter his expert opinions. Accordingly, there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was a causal link between the defendants’ acts or omissions and Young’s death. Dr. Smith and BMH-D argue that the plaintiffs’ failure to respond to Dr. Smith’s requests for admission entitles them to summary judgment. Other than Dr. Smith’s first motion for summary judgment, the issue was never raised again, and the trial court never ruled on the motion. The plaintiffs did not file a response to the motion for summary judgment, and they did not request a withdrawal of the admission. Dr. Smith never asked the court to rule on his motion. Dr. Smith joined BMH-D’s motion for summary judgment, but the motion did not raise the requests for admission argument. Therefore, this issue will not be addressed on appeal. |
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