In re Guardianship of Lane v. Lane
| Docket Number: | 2006-CT-02016-SCT Linked Case(s): 2006-CA-02016-COA ; 2006-CA-02016-COA ; 2006-CT-02016-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-20-2008 Opinion Author: Dickinson, J. Holding: Reversed and Remanded |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Settlement agreement - Doctrine of impossibility Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller, P.J., Carlson, Randolph and Lamar, JJ. Dissenting Author : Diaz, P.J., and Easley, J., without separate written opinion. Concurs in Result Only: Graves, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY Writ of Certiorari: yes Appealed from Court of Appeals |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 11-10-2006 Appealed from: RANKIN COUNTY CHANCERY COURT Judge: John Grant Disposition: The Chancellor set aside a prior settlement agreement and declared the agreement void. Case Number: 54240 |
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| Note: | This opinion reverses a previous Court of Appeals' decision and remands the case back to the trial court. See the COA opinion at: http://www.mssc.state.ms.us/Images/Opinions/CO47188.pdf | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF
AUSTIN LANE, A MINOR:
WILLIAM BUSH, M.D. |
STEPHEN P. KRUGER;
AUBREY BRYAN SMITH |
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| Appellee: | BRANDY LANE, NATURAL PARENT AND LEGAL GUARDIAN OF AUSTIN LANE, A MINOR | TINA LORRAINE NICHOLSON |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Settlement agreement - Doctrine of impossibility |
| Summary of the Facts: | After giving birth to a son who was born with several severe brain injuries, including hydrocephalus, cerebral palsy, and blindness, Brandy Lane was appointed legal guardian for her son, Austin, by the Rankin County Chancery Court so she could initiate a personal-injury claim on her son’s behalf. Lane instituted a civil action in the Madison County Circuit Court against Dr. William Bush, the City of Ridgeland, River Oaks Hospital, the OB-GYN Clinic of Jackson, PLLC, and Dr. William Sutherland, alleging that Austin’s injuries were the result of Dr. Bush’s and Dr. Sutherland’s failure to properly evaluate and treat Lane after a car accident. After learning that Dr. Bush’s liability insurance would not provide coverage for the acts complained of in the lawsuit, Lane petitioned the chancellor to grant her authority to settle Austin’s claims with him for $10,500. The settlement agreement was conditioned upon its approval by the chancery court. The agreement also stated that Austin retained the right to prosecute any claims “against the other named defendants including, but not limited to, claims against the other defendants for their vicarious liability” for Dr. Bush's conduct. However, the agreement did not mention the clinic, specifically, in this regard. At the settlement hearing, the chancellor inquired as to the liability of the remaining defendants. Lane’s counsel represented to the chancellor that she understood the clinic could still be held vicariously liable for Dr. Bush’s conduct. Counsel for Dr. Bush did not contradict this understanding. Finding the settlement was in the best interest of Austin, the chancellor approved the settlement agreement. The Madison County Circuit Court later granted the clinic summary judgment on the claim that it was vicariously liable for Dr. Bush’s conduct. Lane filed a motion asking the chancellor to amend his decree to more specifically state that the vicarious liability claims against the clinic for Dr. Bush’s conduct were preserved. At the hearing, the chancellor stated that the settlement “released Dr. Bush individually and only him.” In his amended decree, the chancellor did not condition his approval of the settlement on a reversal by the circuit court or an appellate court of the summary judgment which had been granted to the clinic. In fact, the amended decree made no mention of the summary judgment. Lane then filed a motion in the Madison County Circuit Court, requesting that Austin’s vicarious liability claims be reinstated against the clinic. After the Supreme Court handed down J&J Timber Co. v. Broome, 932 So. 2d 1 Miss. 2006), which held that a vicarious liability claim against an employer may not be pursued where the employee has been released, Lane returned to chancery court and filed a motion to set aside the settlement with Dr. Bush. The chancellor set aside the settlement agreement. Dr. Bush appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | The question in this case is whether the doctrine of impossibility of performance of a contract, when applied to the facts of this case, may serve as a basis for setting aside both the settlement agreement and the chancery court approval of the settlement. Lane argues that both she and Dr. Bush “intended” that her claims against the clinic would survive, and that J&J Timber made that impossible by holding that the release of an employee releases the employer’s vicarious liability for that employee’s actions. The undisputed facts are that, when the chancellor entered his amended decree approving the settlement agreement, summary judgment had already been granted to the clinic, and J & J Timber had not been handed down. Thus, it was not J & J Timber, but rather the summary judgment granted to the clinic by the circuit court, which prevented Lane from pursuing a claim against the clinic. Even if the Court had not handed down J & J Timber, Lane could not have pursued a claim against the clinic for the alleged negligence of Dr. Bush because the circuit court had granted summary judgment to the clinic for reasons other than J & J Timber, and the summary judgment was not appealed. Lane was not required to pursue a claim against the clinic, and Lane’s ability to pursue the claim was not made a condition subsequent within the agreement. J & J Timber affected no part of the “performance” required under the settlement. In fact, performance under the settlement agreement was already complete when J & J Timber was handed down. Neither party claims that the chancellor’s approval of the settlement with Dr. Bush released the clinic. The clinic was released from liability – not by the settlement with Dr. Bush – but by the circuit court’s unappealed grant of summary judgment which had already taken place when the amended decree was applied for and entered. Because the performance required under the settlement was not made “impossible” by J&J Timber, Lane’s claim of impossibility of performance is without merit. |
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