Branch v. State


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Docket Number: 2007-KA-00579-SCT
Linked Case(s): 2007-KA-00579-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 10-30-2008
Opinion Author: Lamar, J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Statutory rape & Gratification of lust - Admission of testimony - M.R.E.701 - M.R.E. 702 - M.R.E. 803(4) - Sufficiency of evidence
Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller and Diaz, P.JJ., Easley, Carlson, Dickinson and Randolph, JJ.
Dissenting Author : Graves, J., without separate written opinion.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 03-07-2006
Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court
Judge: Tomie Green
Disposition: Count l: Conviction of statutory rape and sentence of thirty (30) years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with ten (10) years suspended, leaving twenty (20) years to serve and five (5) years supervised probation. Count II: Conviction of gratification of lust and sentence of fifteen (15) years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with five (5) years suspended, leaving ten (10) years to serve. Sentence in Count l shall run concurrently with the sentence in Count II.
District Attorney: Robert Shuler Smith
Case Number: 03-0-952

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Sylvester Branch




William R. LaBarre; James Adam Powers; Virginia L. Watkins



 
  • Appellant #1 Reply Brief

  • Appellee: State of Mississippi OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: W. Glenn Watts  

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    Topic: Statutory rape & Gratification of lust - Admission of testimony - M.R.E.701 - M.R.E. 702 - M.R.E. 803(4) - Sufficiency of evidence

    Summary of the Facts: Sylvester Branch was convicted of statutory rape and gratification of lust. He appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Admission of testimony Branch argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing a forensic interviewer to testify regarding the victim’s credibility as to the allegations of abuse, because he admitted he had no first-hand knowledge of the events and this testimony usurped the duty of the jury to evaluate the victim’s credibility. Branch failed to object to the testimony pursuant to M.R.E.701 and 702. Therefore, Branch waived the right to appeal this issue. The trial court admitted the testimony under M.R.E. 803(4). There was no error by the court. The purpose of the interview was to ascertain if the victim needed further medical attention and to judge whether her claims were credible. The victim identified Branch as her abuser during the course of the interview, an interview clearly undertaken for the purpose of promoting medical treatment. The victim identified her biological father, who at the time of the abuse was married to the victim’s mother and lived in the same household. As such, her statement to the interviewer is one that a physician would rely upon in providing medical care and therapy. Therefore, the testimony was admissible under M.R.E. 803(4). Issue 2: Sufficiency of evidence Branch argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a directed verdict because the statutory-rape charge encompassed the charge of gratification of lust. Branch argues that the fondling was in furtherance of the actual rape rather than a second offense. The crime of lustful touching, as set forth in Section 97-5-23, does not contain all the elements of statutory rape, as set forth in Section 97-3-65(1)(b). Notably, the crime of statutory rape contains the element “sexual intercourse,” while the crime of gratification of lust involves handling, touching, or rubbing any member of a child. The crime of gratification of lust does not require any proof of sexual intercourse or proof of a laceration/tearing of the child’s genitalia. As such, statutory rape requires proof of an additional element not required by gratification of lust. Therefore, the trial court properly denied Branch’s motion for a directed verdict.


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