Ruffin v. State
| Docket Number: | 2007-KA-00695-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 10-23-2008 Opinion Author: Waller, P.J. Holding: Affirmed |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Armed robbery & Capital murder - Motion to suppress - Change of venue - Section 99-15-35 - Continuance - Duress instruction Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Diaz, P.J., Easley, Carlson, Graves, Dickinson, Randolph and Lamar, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 04-12-2007 Appealed from: YAZOO COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: Jannie M. Lewis Disposition: Count I: Conviction of capital murder and sentence of life imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, without the possibility of parole. Count II: Conviction of armed robbery and sentence of ten (10) years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. The sentence imposed in Count II shall run concurrent to the sentence imposed in Count I. District Attorney: James H. Powell, III Case Number: 24-9505 |
|
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Micah Ruffin |
Imhotep Alkebu-Lan; Chokwe Lumumba; Barry Howard |
|
|
| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: JOHN R. HENRY | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Armed robbery & Capital murder - Motion to suppress - Change of venue - Section 99-15-35 - Continuance - Duress instruction |
| Summary of the Facts: | Micah Ruffin was found guilty of armed robbery and capital murder. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Motion to suppress A valid waiver of Miranda rights must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The State meets its burden making a prima facie case by the testimony of an officer, or other person having knowledge of the facts, that the confession was voluntarily made without any threats, coercion, or offer of reward. Ruffin gave two statements at the Yazoo City Police Department. The investigator testified that he read Ruffin his Miranda rights before handing him the Miranda form to read for himself and that Ruffin appeared to understand and signed the form. He testified that he did not threaten Ruffin, and that Ruffin gave his statement freely and voluntarily. Before either person left the room, Ruffin volunteered to give another statement. The investigator told him his rights, and Ruffin indicated that he understood and proceeded to give the second statement. Ruffin argues that he did not voluntarily waive his privilege against self-incrimination, because he did not sign the waiver portion of the Miranda form or execute a second Miranda form. There is no requirement that a valid waiver must be in writing and signed for an incriminating statement to be admissible. All that is required is that the accused be afforded the protection of the Miranda warning and thereafter knowingly and intelligently waive his rights and freely and voluntarily make the statement. There is sufficient evidence to show that Ruffin was adequately advised of his Miranda rights. In addition, no direct or implied promises of leniency were made. Issue 2: Change of venue A change of venue may be granted only if the defendant makes a satisfactory showing that he cannot receive a fair and impartial trial where the offense is charged. Under section 99-15-35, a change of venue must be requested in writing, sworn to by the prisoner, made to the court, supported by the affidavits of two or more credible persons, that, by reason of prejudgment of the case, or grudge or ill will to the defendant in the public mind, he cannot have a fair and impartial trial in the county where the offense is charged. Ruffin failed to comply with the statutory requirements set forth in section 99-15-35. Furthermore, the fact that twelve jurors had heard something about the case and that fourteen knew the victim’s family is insufficient to warrant a change of venue. Issue 3: Continuance The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ruffin’s motion for a continuance. The record shows that, early on, Ruffin had the services of co-counsel. Even if his only attorney had been the attorney who was suspended from the practice of law, he had adequate time to prepare for trial. His attorney was reinstated to the practice of law on January 18, 2007, and Ruffin’s trial did not start until April 2, 2007. Issue 4: Duress instruction Ruffin argues that the trial court erred by not allowing a duress instruction on the underlying felony of kidnapping, because there is evidence to show that he acted at another person’s behest out of fear of being killed. There is no foundation in the evidence to support Ruffin’s theory that he participated in the kidnapping out of duress. Ruffin failed to show any present, imminent, and impending threat of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily injury. Ruffin never indicated that the other person had threatened him or had done anything in particular to cause a well-founded fear of death or serious bodily injury. Moreover, on at least two occasions—once at the home and once at the cornfield—Ruffin actually possessed the gun. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
