Causey v. Sanders
| Docket Number: | 2006-CA-01697-SCT Linked Case(s): 2006-CA-01697-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 10-23-2008 Opinion Author: Randolph, J. Holding: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Wrongful death - Expert testimony - M.R.E. 702 - Allocation of fault - Section 85-5-7(1) - Punitive damages - Remittitur - Chance of recovery instruction Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller, P.J., Carlson, Dickinson and Lamar, JJ. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: Graves, J. with separate written opinion. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part Joined By 1: Diaz, P.J., and Easley, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial; JNOV; Motion for Remittitur and/or to Strike Punitive Damages; Motion for a New Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - WRONGFUL DEATH |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 08-15-2006 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: Tomie Green Disposition: Judgment was entered against Dr. Causey in the amount of $3,485,000. Subsequent to the entry of judgment, Dr. Causey filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, a Motion for Remittitur and/or to Strike Punitive Damages, and a Motion for New Trial. Each of these post-trial motions was denied. Case Number: 251-02-1031CIV |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | William A. Causey, M.D. |
Joseph LeRay McNamara; Stephanie C. Edgar; John Michael Coleman |
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| Appellee: | Reitha Sanders, Individually and on Behalf of all Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Ersel Allen | Richard A. Freese; Dennis C. Sweet; Daniel F. Mars | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Wrongful death - Expert testimony - M.R.E. 702 - Allocation of fault - Section 85-5-7(1) - Punitive damages - Remittitur - Chance of recovery instruction |
| Summary of the Facts: | After Ersel Allen died, her daughter, Reitha Sanders, filed suit against UMC; Mark Williams, MD; Phil McCluskey, MD; William Causey, MD; D. Daniel, RN; Hospice Ministries, Inc.; Hospice of Central Mississippi, Inc.; and John Does 1-10. UMC physicians, Drs. Williams and McCluskey, along with Hospice nurse Daniel, were voluntarily dismissed from this action. UMC reached settlement with Sanders for $15,000, and it was dismissed from the action. Trial took place against the remaining defendants, Dr. Causey and Hospice. Dr. Causey was the Medical Director of Hospice Ministries where Allen had died. Dr. Causey moved for a directed verdict, citing insufficient expert testimony, and his motion was denied. Prior to the verdict, Hospice settled for $1,000,000. A unanimous jury verdict was returned against Dr. Causey in the amount of $4,000,000. Subsequent to the compensatory damages award, the trial judge automatically submitted the punitive damages issue to the jury. Sanders offered no additional proof of wrongdoing to support punitive damages other than that submitted in her case-in-chief. Dr. Causey objected to the jury considering insurance as evidence of net worth. Preserving his objection, Dr. Causey stipulated to the amount. The jury awarded Sanders an additional $500,000 in punitive damages, by a vote of nine-three. By agreement, Dr. Causey received credit for the settlement amounts of UMC and Hospice. Judgment was thus entered against Dr. Causey in the amount of $3,485,000. Dr. Causey appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Expert testimony During trial, Sanders provided testimony from four experts that Dr. Causey had breached the applicable standard of care and that Allen was given lethal doses of Dilaudid. Dr. Causey argues that none of these experts had any specialized training or board certification in the fields of palliative medicine, pain medicine, hospice medicine, or pain management. However, neither did Dr. Causey. Dr. Causey offered seven experts, all of whom agreed with Sanders’s experts that it would have been a violation of the standard of care to hasten Allen’s death or to kill Allen with an overdose of Dilaudid. During trial, all experts presented by both parties met the standards as outlined by M.R.E. 702. Dr. Causey argues that Sanders’s experts should have been limited to testify as to the standard of care in a hospice setting. The general rule as to expert testimony in medical malpractice actions is that a specialist in a particular branch within a profession will not be required. Most courts allow a doctor to testify if they are satisfied of his familiarity with the standards of a specialty, though he may not practice the specialty himself. Here, the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in allowing Sanders’s experts to testify as to the condition of Allen and violation of the standard of care by Dr. Causey. The trial court also allowed Dr. Causey’s experts to opine as to Allen’s condition and cause of death, and that in their opinion, Dr. Causey did not violate the standard of care. The jurors were provided with conflicting expert testimony and rendered their decision accordingly. Issue 2: Allocation of fault Based on the pleadings and transcript, an issue was made of the alleged negligence of UMC, and that but for UMC’s misdiagnosis, Allen would not have entered hospice. Although the jury was presented with evidence regarding the alleged negligence of UMC, the trial court refused to issue an instruction regarding allocation of fault. Additionally, the trial court declined to allow the form of the verdict to contain any reference to UMC. Dr. Causey argues this was error. For an intervening and superceding cause to extinguish liability of the original actor, the cause must be unforeseeable. A superseding cause is an act of a third person or other force which by its intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another which his antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about. Although UMC anticipated Allen would die within six months, it cannot be fairly argued that UMC reasonably anticipated Allen’s death would be from an overdose. Assuming arguendo that UMC was negligent, proximate cause must be satisfied for fault to be allocated pursuant to section 85-5-7(1) and it must be proved that UMC and Dr. Causey consciously and deliberately pursued a common plan or design to commit a tortious act before joint and several liability may be imposed. There is no evidence that UMC actually took part in Dr. Causey’s decision to switch the medication to Dilaudid, or to establish the dosage. Thus, the trial court did not err in not issuing an allocation of fault instruction. Issue 3: Punitive damages Dr. Causey argues that the trial judge erred in automatically submitting punitive damages to the jury. The counter argument is that the trial judge was deciding this issue under the Court’s previous rulings or statute. Whether the judge’s ruling was made by statute or by a perceived “automatic” standard is of no consequence, as there is error in both. The use of the word “automatically” in Bradfield v. Schwartz, 936 So. 2d 931 (Miss. 2006) has been misconstrued by some. The word “automatic” refers only to the facts in the Bradfield case itself. The decision in Bradfield does not stand for the proposition that the trial court should automatically submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury for determination, but only that the trial judge should commence an evidentiary hearing before the jury on the issue of punitive damages, and at the conclusion of this evidentiary hearing in the second phase, the trial court has available all of the traditional options for determining whether or not the punitive-damages issue should be submitted to the jury. In this case, no additional evidence was presented by either party regarding conduct that would justify punitive damages, and there was no separate evidentiary hearing. Factually, there is no support that Dr. Causey acted with malice or with gross disregard for the rights of others. Therefore, the award of punitive damages is reversed and rendered. Issue 4: Remittitur Dr. Causey argues there was little or no evidence put on related to damages, and that the evidence regarding Allen’s life expectancy was “speculative at best.” Experts for both parties gave contrary testimony on how long Allen was expected to live. The family expended $6,300 for Allen’s burial expenses. The Sanders family’s testimony centered on their loss of the enjoyment, society, and companionship of Allen. Additionally, the jury was instructed that the wrongful-death beneficiaries were entitled to recover for the pain, suffering, and mental anguish sustained by the decedent from the time of the occurrence of the wrongful conduct until death. Compensation in a wrongful death action is not limited to actual damages and lost wages, but extends to the pain and suffering of the deceased, as well as the loss of companionship and society. Dr. Causey failed to present evidence of any bias or show that the damages were contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Therefore, there is no error. Issue 5: Chance of recovery instruction Dr. Causey argues he was entitled to a chance-of-recovery instruction. Loss-of-chance-of-recovery theory instructions are generally submitted by plaintiffs in circumstances where a medical provider’s negligence does not cause a patient’s injury or death, but arguably hindered the patient from achieving reasonably probable and substantial recovery from injury. In the case sub judice, Dr. Causey was alleged to have caused the death of Allen due to an overdose, not to have hindered Allen’s recovery. Therefore, the chance-of-recovery instruction is not applicable. |
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