Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Moore


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Docket Number: 2006-IA-00884-SCT
Linked Case(s): 2006-IA-00884-SCT ; 2006-M-00884-SCT
Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 09-04-2008
Opinion Author: RANDOLPH, J.
Holding: Reversed and Rendered
Additional Case Information: Topic: Personal injury - Dismissal - M.R.C.P. 41(d) - M.R.C.P. 1 - Application to court - M.R.C.P. 7(b) - M.R.C.P. 5(a) - M.R.C.P. 60(b) - Good cause
Judge(s) Concurring: SMITH, C.J., CARLSON, DICKINSON AND LAMAR, JJ.
Dissenting Author : EASLEY, J., with separate written opinion.
Dissent Joined By : WALLER AND DIAZ, P.JJ., AND GRAVES, J.
Procedural History: Interlocutory Appeal
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY; Interlocutory Appeal
Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 05-09-2006
Appealed from: Amite County Circuit Court
Judge: Lillie Blackmon Sanders
Disposition: The trial court denied the railroad company's motion to dismiss the suit filed by Martha Moore, administratrix of the estate of Willie B. Moore.
Case Number: 97-0006-S
  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY




 ROMNEY HASTINGS ENTREKIN, RICHARD A. FOLLIS, VICKI R. LEGGETT, PATRICK H. ZACHARY



  
  • Appellant #1 Brief
  • Appellant #1 Reply Brief
    		•
    Appellee: MARTHA MOORE, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF WILLIE B. MOORE, DECEASED WAYNE DOWDY, WILLIAM S. GUY  
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    Topic: Personal injury - Dismissal - M.R.C.P. 41(d) - M.R.C.P. 1 - Application to court - M.R.C.P. 7(b) - M.R.C.P. 5(a) - M.R.C.P. 60(b) - Good cause
    Summary of the Facts: Martha Moore, the administratrix of the Estate of Willie B. Moore, filed an action against Illinois Central Railroad Company. The appellate record and the general civil docket of Amite County are devoid of activity exhibiting pursuit of the suit to judgment from December 28, 1998, until October 31, 2005, more than ten years after Willie’s death. In 2006, ICRR filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to M.R.C.P. 41(d), claiming that “no action has been taken of record for over seven (7) years nor any written application made by [Moore] showing good cause as to why the case should not be dismissed . . . .” The circuit court denied ICRR’s Motion to Dismiss. The Supreme Court granted an interlocutory appeal.
    Summary of Opinion Analysis: As noted by M.R.C.P. 1, the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure are not mere suggestions or recommendations. Compliance is a requirement toward the end of securing the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. M.R.C.P. 7(b) provides that an application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be made in writing, shall state with particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order sought. Not only did Moore fail to make application by motion, but she also failed to properly serve notice on ICRR under M.R.C.P. 5(a), for Moore certainly was seeking relief. Unwritten and unapproved local customs or procedures which conflict with the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure must suffer the same demise as formal ancient writs such as writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of review which were abolished by M.R.C.P. 60(b). To eliminate any question of what is an “application in writing” or “action of record,” either a motion to avoid dismissal of the cause or an actual “action of record” must be filed. A clear distinction exists between an “action of record,” i.e., pleadings, discovery requests, deposition notices, etc., and an ex parte “application in writing” to the court (M.R.C.P. 7(b)(1)), apart from a motion. Parties advance a case to judgment through “actions of record.” Almost without exception, parties can seek relief from the court only through motions, not via ex parte letters to clerks of the court. Correspondingly, courts should speak through orders: if good cause is shown, favorably; absent good cause shown, unfavorably. Any approach to the contrary is as logical as allowing parties to request continuances, summary judgment, or a new trial by ex parte letters. Assuming arguendo such letters satisfy the M.R.C.P. 41(d)(1) “application in writing” language, how is the “good cause shown” requirement met? Given almost seven years of inactivity, Moore’s letters cannot justly be considered in compliance with Rule 41(d) as actions of record. Nor do these letters constitute “an application in writing . . . To the court,” accompanied by “good cause shown why it should be continued as a pending case.” Moore’s letters made no attempt to offer good cause as to why the case should remain on the active docket. The letters were completely silent on the issue of good cause. Since Moore’s “application in writing” failed to establish “good cause,” and no documentary or testimonial evidence was presented at the hearing demonstrating “good cause,” Rule 41(d)(1) requires that the case shall be dismissed without prejudice.


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