Holland v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co.
| Docket Number: | 2007-CA-02023-SCT Linked Case(s): 2007-CA-02023-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 12-11-2008 Opinion Author: Carlson, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Negligent misrepresentation - Fraudulent misrepresentation - Breach of fiduciary duty - Waiver - Successor judge - M.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) - M.R.C.P. 56(c) Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller, P.J., Dickinson, Randolph and Lamar, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz, P.J. Dissenting Author : Easley, J., without separate written opinion. Concurs in Result Only: Graves, J. Procedural History: Summary Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - TORTS-OTHER THAN PERSONAL INJURY & PROPERTY DAMAGE |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 10-09-2007 Appealed from: PANOLA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: L. Joseph Lee Disposition: The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Peoples Bank. Case Number: CV98-177BP2 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Danny Holland |
Robert Q. Whitwell; David E. Flautt |
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| Appellee: | Renasant Bank, f/k/a The Peoples Bank & Trust Company | Scott R. Hendrix; Stephen M. Corban; L. Bradley Dillard | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Negligent misrepresentation - Fraudulent misrepresentation - Breach of fiduciary duty - Waiver - Successor judge - M.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) - M.R.C.P. 56(c) |
| Summary of the Facts: | Danny Holland filed suit against Renasant Bank f/k/a Peoples Bank & Trust Company, alleging negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty and breach of covenants of good faith and fair dealing. Holland sought compensatory damages in the amount of $5,000,000 and punitive damages in the amount of $10,000,000. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bank, and Holland appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Misrepresentations Holland argues that when cotton prices dropped, his business suffered losses due to the Bank’s negligent and fraudulent misrepresentations regarding his line of credit. The trial court ruled that Holland’s claim of negligent misrepresentation failed because a promise to lend money is not a past or present existing fact but a “promise of future conduct” and as such is “not such a representation as will support recovery under a theory of negligent misrepresentation.” Although the trial court did not specifically address the claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, the rule is the same. In cases of fraud, relief cannot be based on future promises, except in some cases when a contractual promise is made with the present undisclosed intention of not performing it. Holland admits that there was never an actual agreement to extend the line of credit by $200,000. He states that he told a bank employee he might need the money at a future date based on the cotton market. Furthermore, Holland would have to prove that he had a right to rely on such a falsehood. However, Holland should have reasonably known that the employee lacked authority to lend that amount of money and that any loan proposals would have to be brought before the Bank’s board. As to the claim of breach of fiduciary duty, Holland fails to show that there was an escrow agreement that would impose a fiduciary duty on the Bank or its agent. Assuming arguendo that Holland could establish a prime facie case of fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation or breach of fiduciary duty, those claims would be deemed waived based on Holland’s signing the renewal notes and participating in the workout agreement with the Bank. Issue 2: Waiver The Bank argues that all possible defenses and claims relating to the notes and otherwise available to Holland were waived at the time Holland renewed the promissory notes and signed the workout agreement. All possible claims that Holland could have had against the Bank, including the negligence claim, were waived by the workout agreement and renewal notes. Issue 3: Successor judge Holland argues that the trial court erred in granting the Bank’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Summary Judgment, given that a prior judge already had entered an order denying summary judgment and given that the current judge already had set the date for trial. He argues that since no new evidence was put forth by the Bank that would justify relief under M.R.C.P. 60(b)(6), the original order denying summary judgment should stand. An order denying summary judgment is neither final nor binding upon the court or successor courts. The law-of-the-case doctrine, wherein a successor judge is precluded from correcting errors of law made by the predecessor judge or from revising the predecessor judge’s order or judgment on its merits, has no applicability where the order or judgment is not of a final character. Thus, Holland’s reliance on Rule 60(b)(6) is misplaced in that the rule applies only where the judgment or order is final. Issue 4: Waiver Holland argues that the Bank was dilatory in filing its motion and that such delay should be held to constitute a waiver of claims by the Bank. Whether a motion is timely is to be a discretionary determination and is left to the trial court on a case by case basis considering the facts and circumstances. Thus, the judge was well within his authority to consider and grant the motion. Even in a case where trial was a few weeks away, the Supreme Court upheld a trial court’s grant of summary judgment as being within the trial court’s discretion where the threshold under M.R.C.P. 56(c) was satisfied. |
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