Chamberlin v. State
| Docket Number: | 2006-DP-01489-SCT Linked Case(s): 2006-DP-01489-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 07-17-2008 Opinion Author: LAMAR, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Death penalty direct appeal - Suppression of statements - Admission of evidence - Peremptory challenges - Photographs - M.R.E. 401 - M.R.E. 403 - Sentencing instructions - Payment of travel and expenses - Proportionality Judge(s) Concurring: SMITH, C.J., WALLER, P.J., EASLEY, CARLSON, GRAVES, DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, JJ. Concurs in Result Only: DIAZ, P.J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - DEATH PENALTY -DIRECT APPEAL |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 08-04-2006 Appealed from: Forrest County Circuit Court Judge: Robert Helfrich Disposition: Counts I and II: Convictions of Capital Murder and Sentence of Death by Lethal Injection. District Attorney: Jon Mark Weathers Case Number: 04-715CR |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | LISA JO CHAMBERLIN |
MICHAEL ADELMAN,
GAY POLK-PAYTON |
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| Appellee: | STATE OF MISSISSIPPI | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: PAT McNAMARA, MARVIN L. WHITE, JR. | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Death penalty direct appeal - Suppression of statements - Admission of evidence - Peremptory challenges - Photographs - M.R.E. 401 - M.R.E. 403 - Sentencing instructions - Payment of travel and expenses - Proportionality |
| Summary of the Facts: | Lisa Jo Chamberlin was convicted and sentenced to die by lethal injection for capital murder during the commission of a robbery. She appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Suppression of statements Chamberlin argues that the court should have suppressed statements she made during the second, third, fourth, and fifth interviews with officers. The Miranda warning requires that, before subjecting a person in police custody to interrogation, law enforcement officers must inform the person that he has the right to remain silent, that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. Once this warning has been given, if the person in custody indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. The State has the burden of proving all facts prerequisite to admissibility beyond a reasonable doubt. If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. The admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored. In this case, the statements obtained in the second interrogation were properly obtained and admitted. The officer read Chamberlin her Miranda rights; Chamberlin signed and initialed a waiver; and there is no indication that Chamberlin invoked any of her Miranda rights. Similarly, the initiation of the third interrogation by the officers was proper. During the third interrogation, Chamberlin did not make a statement concerning her involvement in the murders. However, she became very emotional and indicated that she no longer wanted to answer questions, and the officer properly ceased questioning. Due to the undisputed evidence that she knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her rights at the beginning of the fourth interrogation, the initiation of the fourth interrogation by the officers was proper, and her subsequent inculpatory statements were admissible in evidence against her. As for the fifth interview, the State submitted at the suppression hearing undisputed evidence that Chamberlin initiated that interview. Thus, Chamberlin’s statement made during the fifth interview was admissible. Chamberlin also argues that in order for her confession to be admissible, the State must have produced all of the witnesses present at the alleged confession. Chamberlin’s argument fails for two reasons. First, Chamberlin did not testify at the suppression hearing or provide any evidence. Thus, the State was not required to rebut her testimony by calling all the officers present at the questioning or signing of the confession. Second, all of the officers present at the interrogations in which Chamberlin was questioned and confessed testified at the suppression hearing. Issue 2: Admission of evidence Chamberlin argues that the court should have suppressed the evidence found in seven plastic bags recovered from the Russell County Dump in Russell County, Kansas, because the evidence was recovered as a result of information obtained from her statements which the officers obtained after she had invoked her Miranda rights. Since there was no self-incrimination violation, the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine is inapplicable to the evidence found in the dump. Issue 3: Peremptory challenges Chamberlin argues that the trial court erred by not making a clear determination that Chamberlin had established a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that the State had exercised seven of its twelve peremptory challenges to strike black jurors from the regular panel. This argument is moot since all three steps of the Batson analysis were completed. For the first four jurors challenged, Chamberlin offered no rebuttal to the State’s reasons. On the remaining three challenged jurors, Chamberlin argued reasons why they would make good jurors but failed to rebut the specific reasons proffered by the State for striking them. Considering the totality of the evidence, the trial court’s ruling on Chamberlin’s Batson challenge was neither clearly erroneous nor against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Issue 4: Photographs Chamberlin argues that, over her objections, the trial court admitted thirteen prejudicial photographs which had no probative value. So long as a photograph has probative value and its introduction serves a meaningful evidentiary purpose, it may still be admissible despite being gruesome, grisly, unpleasant, or even inflammatory. A photograph has a meaningful evidentiary purpose when it aids in describing the circumstances of the killing, describes the location of the body or cause of death, or supplements or clarifies witness testimony. The comment to M.R.E. 401 states that if there is any probative value, the rule favors admission of the evidence. Of the thirteen photographs in question in this case, two depicted the bodies as they were found at the Gillett farm. The remaining ten photographs were taken during the autopsies. In order to exclude any photograph, the trial court would have been required to find as to any particular photograph that, pursuant to M.R.E. 403, the probative value of such photograph was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Considering the photographs that were admitted, the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing these photographs to be admitted into evidence. Issue 5: Sentencing instructions Chamberlin argues that the trial court erred when it refused to give two proposed instructions, one on mitigating evidence and the other a mercy instruction. The Court has repeatedly held that capital defendants are not entitled to a mercy instruction. Additionally, the Court has found that a defendant is not entitled to an instruction that the jury may return a life sentence even if the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances or if they do not find any mitigating circumstances. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing either instruction. Issue 6: Payment of travel and expenses Chamberlin argues that the trial court erroneously denied her petition for payment of travel and related expenses for her aunt and childhood best friend, who were to testify during the sentencing phase. Chamberlin’s failure to obtain a ruling on her pre-trial motion was a direct result of her failure to request a ruling at an appropriate time. The trial court heard several pre-trial motions brought by the defense. However, the defendant did not present to the trial court her motion for payment of travel expenses. Therefore, the trial court did not, in fact, decline Chamberlin’s pre-trial motion, rather, it did not rule on it at all and the issue is therefore procedurally barred. Issue 7: Proportionality Section 99-19-105(3) requires the Court to perform a proportionality review when affirming a death sentence in a capital case. Chamberlin's death sentence was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. In addition, the evidence is more than sufficient to support the jury's finding of statutory aggravating circumstances. Further, upon comparison with other factually similar cases in which the death sentence was imposed, the sentences of death were neither excessive nor disproportionate in this case. |
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