Archer v. State
| Docket Number: | 2007-KA-00072-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 07-24-2008 Opinion Author: EASLEY, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Armed robbery - Ineffective assistance of counsel - M.R.A.P. 22(b) - Fair and impartial jury Judge(s) Concurring: SMITH, C.J., WALLER AND DIAZ, P.JJ., CARLSON, DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, JJ. Dissenting Author : GRAVES, J., without separate written opinion. Concurs in Result Only: LAMAR, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 03-01-2004 Appealed from: Holmes County Circuit Court Judge: Jannie M. Lewis Disposition: Conviction of armed robbery and sentence of ten (10) years, with two (2) years suspended, in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. District Attorney: James H. Powell, III Case Number: 11,130 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | CHRISTOPHER ARCHER |
KELSEY LEVOIL RUSHING |
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| Appellee: | STATE OF MISSISSIPPI | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: LAURA HOGAN TEDDER | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Armed robbery - Ineffective assistance of counsel - M.R.A.P. 22(b) - Fair and impartial jury |
| Summary of the Facts: | Christopher Archer was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to ten years, with two years suspended. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Ineffective assistance of counsel Archer argues that he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to seek suppression of the gun found in Archer’s possession at the time of his arrest; failed to use a peremptory challenge on juror number 21, who disclosed during voir dire that she personally knew the victim, and had, herself, been the victim of a robbery; and failed to request a motion for dismissal at the close of the state’s case and again at the end of the defense’s case. The appellant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim will not be addressed on this direct appeal. As the record indicates, appellant’s counsel on appeal also assisted the appellant’s lead counsel at trial. Pursuant to M.R.A.P. 22(b), a self-ineffectiveness claim is absolutely inappropriate and must not be permitted. In the event a reviewing court finds itself presented with such a claim, it should not address and rule upon the matter during a direct appeal, no matter how clearly the record indicates baselessness. The only means by which a reviewing court adequately can ensure that a criminal defendant represented on appeal by his or her trial counsel has the opportunity at least to fully raise an ineffectiveness claim is via a post-conviction proceeding. This is not meant to prevent the court from acting on direct appeal in the extraordinary event that the record clearly shows ineffective trial assistance of constitutional dimensions by the same counsel representing the defendant on appeal. That is not the case here. Therefore, Archer’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is dismissed without prejudice. Issue 2: Fair and impartial jury Archer argues that the court erred by denying his challenge for cause as to juror number 11, due to her disclosure that she casually knew the victim in this case and erred by not sua sponte excusing juror 21 from the venire. Archer offers nothing more than a conclusive assertion that the trial court erred by denying his challenge for cause as to juror number 11, based on her disclosure that she casually knew the victim in this case from having seen him in the community. A tangential relationship with the victim in a criminal case, by itself, is not a sufficient reason to exclude a potential juror for cause. Moreover, the juror affirmatively indicated this relationship would not prevent her from being fair and impartial, nor would it affect her ability to render judgment based solely on the evidence presented. Archer’s argument that juror 21 should have been removed on the court’s own motion charges essentially that the juror’s relationship with the victim and her circumstance as a prior victim herself disqualified her as a competent juror in this case. The record shows juror 21 was forthright in each of her responses to questions posed during voir dire. The juror affirmatively indicated that neither her relationship with the victim in this case, nor her prior circumstance as a robbery victim, would prevent her from being fair and impartial, nor would it affect her ability to render judgment based solely on the evidence presented. Archer has failed to show why the trial court’s belief in the juror's oath to remain fair and impartial throughout was error. |
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