Bunton v. King


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Docket Number: 2007-IA-00621-SCT
Linked Case(s): 2007-IA-00621-SCT ; 2007-M-00621-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 09-25-2008
Opinion Author: LAMAR, J.
Holding: Reversed and Remanded

Additional Case Information: Topic: Personal injury - Tort Claims Act - Notice requirement - Section 11-46-11(1)
Judge(s) Concurring: SMITH, C.J., WALLER, P.J., CARLSON, DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, JJ.
Dissenting Author : GRAVES, J., with separate written opinion.
Dissent Joined By : DIAZ, P.J., AND EASLEY, J.
Procedural History: Interlocutory Appeal; Dismissal
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - TORTS-OTHER THAN PERSONAL INJURY & PROPERTY DAMAGE; Motion to Dismiss

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 04-05-2007
Appealed from: WARREN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
Judge: Isadore Patrick
Disposition: This case comes before the Court on interlocutory appeal from the Circuit Court of Warren County. Charles Bunton and the Housing Authority of the City of Vicksburg (“HACV”), defendants, seek review of the trial court’s denial of their motion to dismiss based upon the plaintiffs’ failure to strictly comply with the ninety-day notice requirement of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA).
Case Number: 05,0271-CI

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: CHARLES E. BUNTON, III AND HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF VICKSBURG




STEVEN L. LACEY, DAVID A. BARFIELD



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief
  • Appellant #1 Reply Brief

  • Appellee: DARRELL KING AND MARY KING T. JACKSON LYONS, RAJU AUNDRE’ BRANSON  

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    Topic: Personal injury - Tort Claims Act - Notice requirement - Section 11-46-11(1)

    Summary of the Facts: On August 26, 2004, Daryl and Mary King were involved in an automobile crash with Charles Bunton. Bunton was an employee of the Housing Authority of the City of Vicksburg and was driving an HACV-owned vehicle at the time of the crash. On August 15, 2005, the Kings sent a notice-of-claim letter to James Stirgus, Sr., Executive Director of HACV, as required by the notice provision of the Tort Claims Act. The Kings filed their complaint only seven days after sending the notice letter. Bunton filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Kings had failed to comply with the Act’s notice requirement by failing to wait the prescribed ninety-day period before filing their complaint. The Kings’ original complaint named Charles Bunton, HACV, and Mississippi Housing Authorities Risk Management, Inc. as defendants. The original complaint mistakenly described HACV as an entity of the City of Vicksburg and named the Mayor of Vicksburg as HACV’s agent for service of process. The Kings sought leave to file an amended complaint to correct the mistake. The amended complaint described HACV as a “public body corporate and politic created by statute” and stated its Executive Director, James E. Stirgus, Sr., was its registered agent for service of process. The court entered an order granting the Kings leave to amend and dismissed MHARM as a defendant. The court also held that the amended complaint related back to the date of the original complaint under M.R.C.P. 15(c) for the purpose of the statute of limitations. Further, the court held that because the amended complaint was filed more than ninety days after the notice letter was sent to the defendants, it met the notice requirement. Bunton and HACV appeal.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: The Supreme Court has held that the ninety-day notice requirement under section 11-46-11(1) is a mandatory rule which is strictly enforced. The Kings argue that the Court’s holding should not be applied retroactively. However, the Court has also held that the rule requiring strict compliance with the ninety-day-notice requirement should be applied retroactively. By waiting only seven days to file suit after sending their notice-of-claim letter, the Kings failed to comply with the notice requirement. Because the notice requirement is jurisdictional, the circuit court never obtained subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the trial court erred when it failed to grant Bunton’s motion to dismiss.


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