Ball v. Mayor & Bd. of Aldermen of the City of Natchez
| Docket Number: | 2006-CA-02126-SCT Linked Case(s): 2006-CA-02126-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 04-10-2008 Opinion Author: Easley, J. Holding: ON DIRECT APPEAL: AFFIRMED; ON CROSS-APPEAL: AFFIRMED |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Real property - Jurisdiction - Section 11-51-75 - Standing - Perfected appeal - Section 25-41-5 - Unlawful sale - Section 21-17-1(13) - Section 57-7-1 - Classification of property - Donation - Walkaway Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller and Diaz, P.JJ., and Graves, J. Dissenting Author : Dickinson, J., with separate written opinion. Dissent Joined By : Carlson, Randolph and Lamar, JJ. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 11-17-2006 Appealed from: Adams County Circuit Court Judge: Forrest Johnson Disposition: The trial court determined that: (1) it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal; (2) the appellants had standing to pursue the appeal; (3) the actions of the mayor and board were authorized by Mississippi Code Annotated Section 57-7-1; (4) the development was commercial within the meaning of Mississippi Code Annotated Section 57-7-1; (5) the extensions of the option agreement were reasonable and necessary and did not violate any statutory or constitutional rights; (6) all of the meetings conducted by the mayor and board were legal; (7) the sale price of the property was reasonable; (8) any restriction of access by the general public of the existing sidewalk and walkway was unreasonable; and (9) any remaining issues were resolved against the appellants. Case Number: 06-KV-0018S |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | GWENDOLYN E. BALL, J. NEIL VARNELL AND
SARGE PRESTON |
JAMES A. BOBO,
MICHAEL E. D’ANTONIO, JR. |
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| Appellee: | Mayor and Board of Aldermen of the City of Natchez, Mississippi | Walter Brown | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Real property - Jurisdiction - Section 11-51-75 - Standing - Perfected appeal - Section 25-41-5 - Unlawful sale - Section 21-17-1(13) - Section 57-7-1 - Classification of property - Donation - Walkaway |
| Summary of the Facts: | The City of Natchez sold some surplus land, known as the Natchez Pecan Factory Site, to Worley Brown LLC, for the development of a portion of the Waterfront Development District. Gwendolyn Ball, J. Neil Varnell, and Sarge Preston, City residents, appealed the actions taken by the mayor and the board of aldermen to circuit court, in regard to the extension of an option contract and the execution on the special warranty deed to Worley Brown. The two appeals were consolidated by the court. The trial court determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal; the appellants had standing to pursue the appeal; the actions of the mayor and board were authorized by section 57-7-1; the development was commercial within the meaning of section 57-7-1; the extensions of the option agreement were reasonable and necessary and did not violate any statutory or constitutional rights; all of the meetings conducted by the mayor and board were legal; the sale price of the property was reasonable; any restriction of access by the general public of the existing sidewalk and walkway was unreasonable; and any remaining issues were resolved against the appellants. The residents appeal, and the City cross-appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Jurisdiction At the August 9, 2005, city council meeting, the mayor and board unanimously adopted a resolution to enter into an option development agreement with Worley Brown for the sale and development of the Natchez Pecan Factory Site. At the May 30, 2006 city council meeting, the mayor executed and delivered the deed of conveyance to Worley Brown. The City argues that the circuit court and the Supreme Court have no jurisdiction to hear this case, because the council took no action at its May 30, 2006 meeting and no appeal was taken from the actions taken at the August 9, 2005 city council meeting. Section 11-51-75 provides for ten days to appeal from the date of adjournment of a session in which a board of supervisors or municipal authorities render a judgment or decision. The ten-day appeal period from the actions of a board or municipal authority is mandatory and jurisdictional. Here, while the vote for the resolution to extend an option agreement for the sale and development of the property was a final disposition of the resolution, it was not a final disposition of all the issues for various reasons. First, the language of the option agreement may be interpreted to be conditional in nature, and therefore, not a final disposition of the issues. The option agreement provided for a February 9, 2006, deadline to accept the option agreement and for closing within fifteen days of the exercise of the option. The agreement contained no provision for an extension of the option agreement. Worley Brown did not sign the option agreement prior to February 9, 2006. Rather than accept the option within 180 days pursuant to the terms of the option agreement, Worley Brown requested an extension. The City’s thirty-day extension was outside the terms of the option agreement, and thus, was akin to a new agreement with Worley Brown. In addition, the execution of the deed on May 30, 2006, by the mayor to Worley Brown was an appealable action. The extensions by the city council acted as renewals of the option agreement. Thus, the City’s argument is without merit. Issue 2: Standing The City argues that the residents have no standing to appeal the actions of the City. To have standing, a claimant must demonstrate that the City's action had an adverse effect on property in which he has an interest. The residents in this case were property owners in the City, and their property was located near the Natchez Pecan Factory Site. Furthermore, they alleged that the project would adversely impact their properties. Thus, they have standing. Issue 3: Perfected appeal The City argues that the residents failed to perfect an appeal from the January 24, 2006 meeting (on this date at a regular meeting, the city council adopted a resolution to extend the option agreement for thirty days), because they did not submit a bill of exceptions and failed to have the mayor sign the bill of exceptions. However, the record shows that the residents filed a notice of appeal and bill of exceptions on February 3, 2006. The notice included a service-of-process form and a receipt-of-service from the City, indicating timely delivery to the mayor. Although the mayor did not sign the bill of exceptions due to a disagreement with the facts presented by the residents, the record contains a final amended and consolidated bill of exceptions signed by the mayor. This bill of exceptions included the objections to the January 24, 2006, meeting. Thus, there is no merit to the City’s argument. At the January 23 meeting, the residents objected to a lack of quorum and objected that the mayor unlawfully “presided” over the meeting by telephone which is prohibited by section 25-41-5. While a review of the statute in effect at the time of the meeting fails to locate any prohibition of a mayor presiding over a meeting via teleconference, it does require thirty days’ advance notice for a teleconference of a scheduled meeting. The record is silent concerning notice of the teleconference. Nonetheless, no prejudice was alleged or demonstrated by the residents for the alleged lack of notice. They have had ample opportunity to participate in the process by attending the January 24 meeting, objecting to the City’s actions at the meeting, filing a notice of appeal and a bill of exceptions concerning the actions of the City at the meeting, arguing their case before the circuit court, and filing an appeal. Issue 4: Unlawful sale The residents argue that the sale of the Natchez Pecan Factory Site was arbitrary, capricious, illegal, and unsupported by the evidence. They claim that the City conducted the sale of the property pursuant to an incorrect statute, that the City failed to follow the requirements of the statute, and that the sale was an unlawful donation by the City to Worley Brown. The provisions of section 21-17-1(13) clearly and unambiguously state that the powers conferred by Section 13 are “in addition and supplemental” to other laws. Therefore, the City had authority to proceed pursuant to section 57-7-1. That statute provides, in part, that the property “may be set aside and improved for industrial and commercial purposes and the same may thereafter be operated or the same may be leased or sold upon such terms and conditions as” a municipality or governmental subdivision shall prescribe. The clear and unambiguous language of the statute does not mandate that the surplus land must be set aside and improved by the municipality. The statute does not mandate that improvements must be made on surplus land, therefore, the sale of the land is not dependent on whether improvements have been made to the land prior to its conveyance. The statute implies that the monies for the improvements would be available after a lease or sale is finalized unless there is an unusual arrangement for prepayment of all or a portion of the lease payments or sale of the property. Therefore, a municipality would begin the improvements after it received payments for the lease or sale. Issue 5: Classification of property The residents argue that the trial court erred by classifying the proposed development of condominiums as commercial property. The City argues that the property is not zoned as residential, industrial, or commercial property but is zoned as “Waterfront Development District” property, which is intended to be a mixed-use district of property. An opinion by the Attorney General’s Office provided that section 57-7-1 permitted the disposal of surplus property for industrial and commercial purposes. Thus, the trial court did not err by finding that the proposed development of the condominiums was commercial in nature. Issue 6: Donation The residents argue that the City effectively has donated the property to Worley Brown. Section 57-7-1 is an economic development statute. Therefore, the objective of the City’s sale or lease of surplus property may not be to receive the highest purchase price. In other words, the lease or sale may be tied to a vision for a city development plan. The goal of economic development may be more than the immediate receipt of the highest bid or appraisal value offered for surplus property. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by finding that the price of the property accepted by the City was reasonable. Issue 7: Walkaway The City argues that the trial court erred by finding that any restriction of access by the general public of the existing sidewalk and walkway was unreasonable. The trial court did not err by prohibiting access to the sidewalk and walkways, as the option agreement provided for such access by the general public. |
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