Armstead v. State
Docket Number: | 2007-KA-00238-SCT | |
Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 04-03-2008 Opinion Author: Waller, P.J. Holding: Affirmed |
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Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Sale of cocaine & Possession of cocaine - Suppression of statement - Prosecution of more than one offense Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Diaz, P.J., Easley, Carlson, Dickinson, Randolph and Lamar, JJ. Concurs in Result Only: Graves, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 01-25-2007 Appealed from: OKTIBBEHA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: Lee J. Howard Disposition: Count I: Conviction of sale of cocaine and sentence of fourteen (14) years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, and payment of a fine of $5,000.00. Said sentence shall run consecutively with the sentence imposed in Count II. Count II: Conviction of possession of cocaine and sentence of three (3) years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Said sentence shall run consecutively with the sentence imposed in Count I. District Attorney: Forrest Allgood Case Number: 2006-0180 |
Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
Appellant: | Perry Armstead |
OFFICE OF INDIGENT APPEALS
BY: BRENDA JACKSON PATTERSON |
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Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: JOHN R. HENRY |
Synopsis provided by: If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
Topic: | Sale of cocaine & Possession of cocaine - Suppression of statement - Prosecution of more than one offense |
Summary of the Facts: | Perry Armstead was convicted on one count of sale or transfer of cocaine and one count of possession of cocaine. Armstead was sentenced to fourteen years for the sale of cocaine and three years for possession of cocaine, with the sentences to run consecutively. He appeals. |
Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Suppression of statement Armstead filed a pre-trial motion to suppress his statement that the drugs in the house belonged to him, which the court denied. Armstead argues that the admission of his statement is subject to a heightened standard of review because the trial court failed to make specific findings of fact. This argument is without merit because the trial court did make specific findings of fact in finding Armstead’s statements to be admissible. Armstead also argues that he was not advised of his Miranda rights prior to questioning, because the officer did not actually witness or hear the agent read Armstead his rights but merely relied on the agent’s past practice of reading individuals their rights. The agent testified that he read Armstead his rights, and the officer stated unequivocally that he overheard the agent read Armstead his Miranda rights. Only a short time transpired between the time that the agent read Armstead his Miranda rights and the officer’s questioning. Thus, there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Armstead was adequately advised of his constitutional rights under Miranda. Armstead also argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he voluntarily and knowingly waived his privilege against self-incrimination, because his statements were coerced by a threat to arrest Armstead’s wife. Threats to arrest a defendant’s family members do not render a confession involuntary so long as probable cause exists to arrest such persons. Here, probable cause existed to arrest Armstead’s wife. Cocaine was found in the kitchen, a common area of the home. Armstead’s wife had been living in the home and was listed on the lease. Issue 2: Prosecution of more than one offense Armstead argues that he was materially prejudiced in his right to a fair trial on the sale-of-cocaine charge in count A because his confession in count B would not have been admissible at a trial on count A alone. There is no authority for restricting the multi-count-indictment statute because some element of proof necessary as to one charge would be inadmissible on another charge if tried separately. Whenever a defendant is tried on a multi-count indictment, the possibility that a jury will infer guilt on all counts from guilt on one individual count does not warrant reversal so long as the jury is instructed that each count must be considered separately, and each count is supported by substantial evidence and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, the jury was instructed that each count should be considered separately. |
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