Jackson v. State
| Docket Number: | 2011-KA-00169-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 06-21-2012 Opinion Author: Carlson, P.J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: House burglary - Sufficiency of evidence - Lesser-included offense instruction Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Randolph, Lamar, Chandler, Pierce and King, JJ. Dissenting Author : Dickinson, P.J. Dissent Joined By : Kitchens, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 10-21-2010 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: W. Swan Yerger Disposition: Appellant was convicted of house burglary and sentenced to twenty-five years as a habitual offender. District Attorney: Robert Shuler Smith Case Number: 09-1003CRY |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | David Anthony Jackson a/k/a David Jackson |
AAFRAM YAPHET SELLERS
BRICE RASHOD WHITE |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: LAURA HOGAN TEDDER |
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| Topic: | House burglary - Sufficiency of evidence - Lesser-included offense instruction |
| Summary of the Facts: | David Jackson was convicted of house burglary and sentenced to twenty-five years. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Sufficiency of evidence Jackson argues that the evidence against him was not legally sufficient to sustain a conviction for house burglary, due to the fact that the evidence did not support a finding that he had the intent to commit the crime of larceny once inside the house. Burglary of a dwelling has two elements: unlawful breaking and entering, and intent to commit a crime therein. Intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence. In this case, the evidence showed that Jackson had parked his car away from the house but on the property. The window of the guest house was broken, apparently with a fire extinguisher, and the guest house had been rummaged through. At the main house, a footprint was found on a door, indicating that someone had attempted to kick down the door with a foot. Another door was broken down, apparently with a piece of firewood. The main house also had been rummaged through, with drawers and the gun cabinet opened, various items strewn around, and a check from the checkbook missing. Jackson was seen crossing the road and disappearing into the woods. He walked right past his own car, next to which officers were standing. He later was apprehended and found scratched, dirty, and covered in leaves. Shoe-print analysis showed that the individual who had entered and rummaged through both houses had shoes of the same brand, size, and degree of wear as Jackson. The jury had the right to make the logical inference that Jackson broke and entered the main house and guest house with the intent to commit larceny. Law-abiding citizens do not break into the homes of people they do not know and rummage through their effects, then flee when their actions are discovered. Issue 2: Lesser-included offense instruction Jackson argues that the circuit court erred in refusing his proposed jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of trespass. A lesser included offense instruction should be granted unless the trial judge can say, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the accused, and considering all reasonable favorable inferences which may be drawn in favor of the accused from the evidence, that no reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense (and conversely not guilty of at least one essential element of the principal charge). Implicit in every conviction of burglary is the finding that the defendant committed a trespass. From the language of his proffered jury instruction on the lesser-included offense, and from the argument in his brief, it is clear that Jackson sought a jury instruction on trespass under section 97-17-87, one of several statutes that address trespass. But section 97-17-87 is merely a “catch-all” statute. The inference ordinarily to be drawn from an unexplained breaking and entering into the home of another person unknown to the defendant, followed by rummaging through the victim’s effects and fleeing upon discovery, is that the defendant had the intent to commit larceny. In contrast, the inference that Jackson was merely a trespasser without other criminal intent is not reasonable under these facts. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Jackson, and considering all reasonable favorable inferences which may be drawn in favor of Jackson from the evidence, no reasonable jury could find Jackson guilty only of the lesser-included offense of trespass, and conversely not guilty of at least one essential element of the principal charge of house burglary. |
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