Hughes v. State


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Docket Number: 2010-KA-01609-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 06-21-2012
Opinion Author: Chandler, J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Capital murder - Juror misconduct - Weight of evidence - Peremptory challenges - Motion to suppress - Probable cause - Proof of burglary - DNA evidence
Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson and Dickinson, P.JJ., Randolph, Lamar, Kitchens and Pierce, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): King, J.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 10-14-2009
Appealed from: Madison County Circuit Court
Judge: William E. Chapman, III
Disposition: Appellant was convicted of two counts of capital murder and sentenced to life in prison on each count.
District Attorney: Michael Guest
Case Number: 2008-0341

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Carla Hughes a/k/a Carla A. Hughes




BRANDON I. DORSEY JOHNNIE E. WALLS, JR.



 

Appellee: State of Mississippi OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: STEPHANIE B. WOOD  

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Topic: Capital murder - Juror misconduct - Weight of evidence - Peremptory challenges - Motion to suppress - Probable cause - Proof of burglary - DNA evidence

Summary of the Facts: Carla Hughes was convicted of two counts of capital murder and sentenced to two sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. She appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Juror misconduct The trial judge instructed the jury that it was not to consider Hughes’s failure to testify as evidence of either guilt or innocence. During deliberations, the jury submitted a note to the trial court stating “[c]ould the State have called Carla Hughes to the stand?” Hughes argues that the note showed that the jury disregarded the court’s instructions not to consider Hughes’s failure to testify, constituting jury misconduct. This issue is procedurally barred. When the jury’s note was submitted to the court, Hughes did not object or move for a mistrial on the basis of jury misconduct. Notwithstanding the procedural bar, there was no error, because the jury is presumed to follow the instructions of the trial court. Issue 2: Weight of evidence Hughes argues that the verdicts were against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, because there was no direct evidence that she committed the murders. The verdict was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. The State established that Hughes had a motive for killing the victim. Hughes was upset that Pittman would not leave the victim to be with her, and once before had attempted to confront Banks. Pittman testified that Hughes knew where the victim lived. Cell-phone records placed Hughes in the vicinity of the victim’s home at the time of the murder. A witness verified that he had loaned Hughes a knife and a .38 caliber Rossi handgun loaded with five bullets three days before the murder, and Hughes had returned the empty gun after her police interview. Five bullets were found at the crime scene – four in the victim’s body, and one in the garage door. Ballistics testing confirmed that the gun Hughes had borrowed was the murder weapon. Issue 3: Peremptory challenges Hughes exercised one of her peremptory challenges on juror number thirty-two because that juror had expressed concerns about being away from work during jury service. The trial court denied Hughes’s peremptory challenge, finding it was a pretext for discrimination, because Hughes had not exercised strikes on other jurors with similar concerns. On appeal, Hughes argues that the trial court’s finding of pretext was clearly erroneous, entitling her to a new trial. The trial court did not err by denying Hughes’s peremptory challenge of juror number thirty-two. Hughes exercised five peremptory strikes against white males. The State raised a Batson challenge, arguing that Hughes’s strikes were made on the basis of race and gender discrimination. The trial court required Hughes to state race and gender-neutral reasons for the strikes. Counsel for Hughes said that, after the trial court had allowed the State’s peremptory challenges, few African-Americans were left. The trial court allowed three of Hughes’s strikes, finding that there were race/gender-neutral reasons for striking those jurors, but found that Hughes’s reasons for striking jurors number twenty-two and thirty-two were pretextual. The State successfully showed that the Hughes’ reason was pretextual because Hughes had not exercised peremptory challenges on female jurors with similar concerns about the effect of sequestration on their responsibilities. Thus, the trial court’s finding of pretext concerning Hughes’s strike of juror number thirty-two was not clearly erroneous. Issue 4: Motion to suppress Hughes moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the search of her house on the ground that the search warrant was issued without probable cause. The trial court overruled the motion. Hughes argues that the search violated her constitutional right of protection from illegal search and seizure because there was no probable cause to issue the search warrant. Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within an officer's knowledge are sufficient to justify a man of average caution in the belief that a crime has been committed and that a particular individual committed it. The issuing court must consider the totality of the circumstances in making the determination of probable cause. Here, the trial court did not err by finding that the municipal judge had a substantial basis for the finding of probable cause to issue the search warrant. The police had a weapon in custody that linked Hughes to the murders, and Hughes had a motive for killing the victim. Issue 5: Burglary Hughes argues that the State failed to prove the underlying crime of burglary, because the State did not prove that Hughes was at the victim’s home that evening. Even though Hughes correctly argues that there was no direct evidence of burglary, direct evidence is unnecessary to support a conviction when the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, there was ample circumstantial evidence that Hughes broke and entered the victim’s home for the purpose of assaulting the victim. Hughes had a motive for harming the victim. Cell-phone records placed Hughes in the vicinity of the victim’s home during the time of the murder. The murder weapon was linked to Hughes. The elements of breaking and entering were shown by police testimony describing how the rear door to the victim’s home had been forced open. And shoes matching the footwear impression made on the rear door of the home were found in Hughes’s closet, and the victim’s blood was found on the shoes. Issue 6: DNA evidence Hughes argues that the State did not show an unbroken chain of custody of the TredSafe shoes and that the trial court erred by admitting the results of the DNA testing of the TredSafe shoes. In order for the defendant to show a break in the chain of custody, there must be an indication or reasonable inference of probable tampering with the evidence or substitution of the evidence. A mere suggestion that tampering possibly could have occurred does not satisfy the defendant’s burden. This issue is procedurally barred due to the lack of a contemporaneous objection. In addition, it is without merit. No evidence supported an indication or reasonable inference of probable tampering that would have supported the exclusion of the TredSafe shoes, and the State established the chain of custody.


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