Chapell v. State
| Docket Number: | 2011-CA-00336-COA Linked Case(s): 2011-CA-00336-COA ; 2011-CT-00336-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 06-19-2012 Opinion Author: Maxwell, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Post-conviction relief - Jurisdiction - Disproportionate sentence - Credit for time served - Section 99-19-23 Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, Russell and Fair, JJ. Concurs in Result Only: Carlton, J., Concurs in Result Only Without Separate Written Opinion Procedural History: PCR Nature of the Case: PCR |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 02-17-2011 Appealed from: DESOTO COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: James McClure, III Disposition: MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISMISSED Case Number: CV2010-0200MD |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Jeffrey Dale Chapell |
JAMES D. FRANKS JR. |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: LAURA HOGAN TEDDER | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Post-conviction relief - Jurisdiction - Disproportionate sentence - Credit for time served - Section 99-19-23 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Jeffrey Chapell pled guilty to three counts of sexual battery of a child and two counts of fondling a child and was sentenced to three concurrent twenty-five-year terms in prison, followed by two concurrent fifteen-year terms of post-release supervision. He filed a motion for post-conviction relief which was dismissed. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Jurisdiction Chapell argues he was entitled to relief because the circuit judge who imposed his sentence failed to make an on-the-record finding of personal and subject-matter jurisdiction. The only authority Chapell cites is a completely irrelevant civil case. Failure to cite relevant authority obviates the appellate court’s obligation to review such issues. Clearly, the circuit court had jurisdiction to sentence Chapell. The court served Chapell with a ten-count indictment that included the five counts to which he pled guilty. Thus, the court had the jurisdiction to accept his plea and impose his sentence. Issue 2: Disproportionate sentence Chapell argues his sentence is grossly disproportionate to sentences imposed in the same and surrounding jurisdictions for similar crimes, and the trial court did not take into account mitigation evidence of his low IQ. The circuit court found Chapell’s sentencing argument had been waived by not raising it on direct appeal. Chapell’s sentencing claims could and should have been raised a direct appeal. Chapell argues his disproportionate-sentence argument could not have been made on direct appeal because it required facts and information not in the trial record. But Chapell’s primary argument is that his sentence is unconstitutional because of his diminished mental capacity. This complaint existed immediately after the sentencing hearing. The psychological evaluation Chapell attached to his PCR motion is the exact same evaluation reviewed by the sentencing judge prior to imposing Chapell’s sentence. Chapell’s counsel made the same arguments about Chapell’s low IQ and childlike mental capacity before the sentencing court. Thus, this issue was appropriate for direct appeal. Chapell also argues the circuit court erred by not conducting a proportionality review. Generally, sentences that do not exceed the maximum term allowed by statute will not be considered grossly disproportionate. Chapell faced a potential life sentence for each charge of sexual battery, and fifteen years’ imprisonment for each charge of fondling. The sentencing court imposed a sentence that was only five years more than the minimum for each sexual battery charge and ordered the sentences to run concurrently. Chapell also argues his sentence is excessive in light of his diminished mental capacity. The sentencing judge stated on the record he had reviewed this evidence before imposing a sentence. And the judge essentially sentenced him to serve only twenty-five years in prison, with the remaining fifteen years to be served through post-release supervision. While twenty-five years in prison is by no means insignificant, it is far less than the three consecutive life sentences, followed by thirty more years, the judge could have imposed on Chapell, while still remaining within the statutory limits. Thus, there is no error. Issue 3: Credit for time served Chapell argues the sentencing judge erred by only crediting him sixty-four days for time served in jail prior to sentencing. Chapell argues the year he spent out on bond under house arrest should also have been credited. A post-conviction relief pleading is not the proper means to calculate and receive credit for the initial time served. Instead, Chapell should send such requests to the proper authorities within the Mississippi Department of Corrections’ administrative system. Furthermore, he was not entitled to credit for his time under house arrest under section 99-19-23. |
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