Honeycutt v. Coleman, et al.
| Docket Number: | 2010-CA-01470-COA Linked Case(s): 2010-CA-01470-COA ; 2010-CT-01470-SCT ; 2010-CT-01470-SCT ; 2010-CT-01470-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 05-30-2013 |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 06-19-2012 Opinion Author: Russell, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Insurance - Cancellation of insurance policy - Rejection of uninsured-motorist coverage - Section 83-11-9 - Duty of agent - Tort Claims Act - Section 11-46-9 - Statute of limitations Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Ishee, Roberts, Carlton, Maxwell and Fair, JJ. Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Barnes, J., Concurs in Part and in the Result Without Separate Written Opinion Procedural History: Summary Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - INSURANCE Appealed from Court of Appeals |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 08-27-2010 Appealed from: Lowndes County Circuit Court Judge: James T. Kitchens, Jr. Disposition: SUMMARY JUDGMENT, FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO UNINSURED-MOTORIST COVEAGE AVAILABLE Case Number: 2001-0059-CV1 |
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| Note: | On May 30, 2013, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded this opinion. The SCT opinion can be found at http://courts.ms.gov/Images/Opinions/CO84338.pdf | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Charlie Honeycutt |
JOSEPH E. ROBERTS JR. |
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| Appellee: | Tommy Coleman, Atlanta Casualty Companies, Atlanta Casualty Company and American Premier Insurance Company | THOMAS Y. PAGE JOHN W. CROWELL | ||
| Appellee #2: | ||||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Insurance - Cancellation of insurance policy - Rejection of uninsured-motorist coverage - Section 83-11-9 - Duty of agent - Tort Claims Act - Section 11-46-9 - Statute of limitations |
| Summary of the Facts: | A motor-vehicle accident occurred involving Mississippi State Trooper Tommy Coleman, Charlie Honeycutt, and Matthew Blaxton. At the time of the accident, Blaxton was driving the vehicle, and Honeycutt was the passenger. Blaxton’s vehicle turned left at a flashing yellow light in front of Trooper Coleman. Trooper Coleman struck Blaxton’s vehicle on the right rear side. Honeycutt filed a complaint against Trooper Coleman, Atlanta Casualty Companies, Atlanta Casualty Company, and American Premier Insurance Company. The court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of Trooper Coleman and dismissed him as a party defendant. The court later entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants Atlanta Casualty Companies, Atlanta Casualty Company, and American Premier Insurance Company, followed by entry of a final judgment of dismissal with prejudice. Honeycutt appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Cancellation of insurance policy On September 12, 1993, Barbara Honeycutt had applied for motor-vehicle insurance and was issued policy number 03010110 from Atlanta Casualty. The policy was effective from September 15, 1993, to March 15, 1994. Barbara signed a rejection of uninsured-motorist coverage for policy number 03010110. On February 10, 1994, Atlanta Casualty issued a renewal certificate with an effective date of March 15, 1994, and an expiration date of September 15, 1994. On March 21, 1994, Atlanta Casualty sent a cancellation notice of the policy for non-payment of the premium effective March 31, 1994. On March 11, 1994, Sam Honeycutt made application to American Premier Insurance Company for motor-vehicle insurance. The application contained a signed rejection of uninsured-motorist coverage by Sam. According to Sam and Barbara, the uninsured-motorist coverage rejections they signed were not explained by the insurance agent. Honeycutt argues that the circuit court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of Atlanta Casualty because the proper procedure was not followed by Atlanta Casualty to effectuate the cancellation of policy number 03010110. In particular, Honeycutt argues that a legal issue remains as to whether Atlanta Casualty Company effectively cancelled the insurance policy by mailing notice to the Honeycutt’s residence. Section 83-11-9 provides that proof of mailing of notice of cancellation, or of intention not to renew, or of reasons for cancellation to the named insured by a certificate of mailing, at the address shown in the policy, shall be sufficient proof of notice. Atlanta Casualty mailed the notice of cancellation to Barbara Honeycutt at her residence. Thus, the Atlanta Casualty met the requirements set out in the statute. Honeycutt also argues that the timeliness of the notice is to be determined by the date the insured is in receipt of the notice rather than the date of its mailing. When a certificate of mailing relative to the notice of cancellation is produced, and it contains the address shown on the policy, it is sufficient notice of cancellation. In this case, the record contains a copy of the certificate of mailing which contained the admittedly correct address, which was listed in the policy of insurance; therefore, this established sufficient proof of notice of cancellation. Issue 2: Duty of agent Sam argues that while he signed the rejection of the uninsured-motorist coverage, he did not do so knowingly. In spite of their testimony that they did not know what they were signing, both Sam and Barbara knowingly rejected uninsured-motorist coverage in writing. Moreover, they both signed and acknowledged that the uninsured-motorist coverage was offered and explained, and that they voluntarily and intentionally signed the waiver. It is well settled under Mississippi law that a contracting party is under a legal obligation to read a contract before signing it. Moreover, knowledge of the contents of a contract is imputed to a contracting party even if that party did not read the contract before signing it. Moreover, the insurance agent did not have a duty to explain the terms to them. Issue 3: Tort Claims Act Section 11-46-9 provides that a governmental entity and its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment shall be free of liability for a claim based upon any of the acts or omissions enumerated therein. Honeycutt argues that that Trooper Coleman is liable for damages, because he was not acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Trooper Coleman provided uncontroverted testimony that on the date of the accident he was working a 4 p.m. until 1 a.m. roadblock detail in East Columbus and acting within the scope of his employment. They ended the roadblock early because Trooper Coleman did not live in Columbus and needed time to drive home. In a similar case, the Supreme Court found that an officer returning from traffic court when the accident occurred was acting within the course and scope of his employment as a patrol officer. Thus, Trooper Coleman was acting within the course and scope of his employment with the Mississippi Highway Patrol at the time the accident occurred. Accordingly, Honeycutt’s claims against Trooper Coleman are barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in section 11-46-11(3). |
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