Langdon v. Langdon


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Docket Number: 2001-CA-01077-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 09-09-2003
Opinion Author: Chandler, J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Divorce: Habitual cruel and inhuman treatment - Division of marital assets - Settlement funds - Contempt - Attorney’s fees
Judge(s) Concurring: McMillin, C.J., King and Southwick, P.JJ., Bridges, Thomas, Lee, Irving, Myers and Griffis, JJ.
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 05-31-2001
Appealed from: Humphreys County Chancery Court
Judge: Vicki Barnes
Disposition: HELEN CROCKER LANGDON WAS GRANTED A DIVORCE ON THE GROUND OF HABITUAL CRUEL AND INHUMAN TREATMENT, WAS AWARDED CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILDREN, MARITAL ASSETS DISTRIBUTED BETWEEN THE PARTIES, AND ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COURT REPORTER'S FEES AWARDED.
Case Number: 99-0609
  Consolidated: 2001-CA-01315-COA Charles Kent Langdon v. Helen Crocker Langdon; Humphreys Chancery Court; LC Case #: 99-0609; Ruling Date: 07/27/1999; Ruling Judge: Jane R. Weathersby

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Charles Kent Langdon




ARNOLD F. GWIN



 

Appellee: Helen Crocker Langdon CHARLES R. BRETT  

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Topic: Divorce: Habitual cruel and inhuman treatment - Division of marital assets - Settlement funds - Contempt - Attorney’s fees

Summary of the Facts: Helen Langdon was granted a divorce from Charles Langdon on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. The court awarded Helen custody of the couple’s two youngest children and Kent custody of the oldest child. The court divided the parties' assets, awarded Helen attorney's fees and court reporter's fees, and ordered Kent to pay Helen $525 per month in child support and $300 per month in alimony. Kent appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Habitual cruel and inhuman treatment Kent argues that the evidence of his habitual cruel and inhuman treatment was insufficient to support a divorce on that ground. The conduct which evinces habitual cruel and inhuman treatment must be such that it endangers life, limb, or health, or creates a reasonable apprehension of such danger and renders the relationship unsafe for the party seeking relief, or renders the marriage revolting to the non-offending spouse and makes it impossible to carry out the duties of the marriage. There is sufficient evidence in the record to support the chancellor's finding that Kent engaged in habitually cruel conduct. Helen testified about three occasions during the marriage when Kent hit her and caused injuries. These were instances of conduct endangering life, limb or health, creating a reasonable apprehension of danger. Kent also argues that, because Helen resumed marital relations and cohabitation with him after two of the incidents, Helen condoned any cruel and inhuman treatment that may have occurred. Where condonation has occurred, if the cruel conduct subsequently occurs, the previous offenses are revived for the chancellor's consideration of the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Even if Helen condoned the two incidents by resuming marital relations with Kent, the chancellor properly considered those incidents as evidence of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment because Kent engaged in physically violent conduct toward Helen in a later incident. Issue 2: Division of marital assets Kent argues that the chancellor committed several reversible errors in her distribution of the parties' assets. In dividing the marital property, the court should consider substantial contributions to the accumulation of the property by each party to the marriage; expenditures and disposal of the marital assets by each party; market value and emotional value of the marital assets, value of the nonmarital property; tax, economic, contractual, and legal consequences of the distribution; elimination of alimony and other future frictional contact; income and earning capacity of each party; and any other relevant factor. Kent argues that the court erred in finding that settlements funds Helen received from a lawsuit were non-marital. The chancellor must use an analytic approach to classify proceeds of a personal injury suit as marital or personal which requires the chancellor to focus on the type of loss the settlement was intended to compensate. That portion of the proceeds allocable to compensation to the initially injured spouse for pain, suffering and disfigurement is that spouse's separate property, while that portion allocable to lost wages, lost earnings capacity and medical and hospital expenses are marital assets. The chancellor in this case found that there was no evidence as to those portions of the proceeds allocable to lost wages, lost earnings capacity, and medical and hospital expenses to the extent they applied during the marriage and that the entire $200,000 settlement was compensation for Helen's injuries, pain, suffering and disfigurement, and was Helen's separate property. The court’s finding was a reasonable conclusion in light of the evidence that Helen incurred severe pain, suffering and disfigurement. Kent also argues that the chancellor erred in finding that the net proceeds from the sale of a lot purchased by Helen were Helen's non-marital asset and that the proceeds had been depleted. While assets acquired during the marriage are presumptively marital assets subject to equitable distribution, an asset may be classified as non-marital if it is purchased with one spouse's separate funds, such as gifts or inheritances. The evidence shows that Helen's father gave Helen the house for the sole purpose of facilitating her purchase of the lot. The use of the house was a gift to Helen that Helen used to procure the mortgage on the lot. There was no evidence that Helen made a down payment on the lot that could have come from marital funds, and no evidence of commingling. Kent argues that the chancellor erred by subtracting an airplane debt from his portion of the equity in the couple’s residence because it resulted in his receipt of $5,792 less than Helen. The chancellor need not divide assets equally, only equitably. Here, the chancellor noted that Helen had a significantly lower income and earning capacity than Kent and that Kent was primarily responsible for the purchase, maintenance and disposal of the airplanes used in his crop dusting service. Kent argues that the court erred in ordering him to pay delinquent property taxes on the parties' former residence in the amount of $7,823.29. In light of Helen's considerably lower income, it was permissible for the chancellor to order Kent to pay the delinquent taxes, which constituted a lump sum, while giving Helen the prospective tax burden. Issue 3: Contempt Helen filed a motion for citation of contempt for Kent's failure to retain her medical coverage. Kent argues that the chancellor erred in holding him in contempt because it was impossible for him to comply with the temporary order since he could not continue Helen's coverage because the insurance company returned his premium. Because there was substantial evidence for the chancellor to conclude that the insurance company never refused any premiums to secure Helen's coverage, the chancellor did not commit manifest error by finding Kent in contempt. Issue 4: Attorney’s fees and court reporter’s costs Kent argues that the chancellor erred in awarding fees and costs, because Helen had an obvious ability to pay her attorneys. Where the record shows an inability to pay and a disparity in relative financial positions of the parties, there is no error in awarding attorney's fees. Helen met her burden of proof to show that she was unable to pay the attorneys' fees and costs. As previously noted, there was a significant disparity in the parties' incomes and earnings capacity. Issue 5: Contempt Kent argues that the chancellor erred in holding him in civil contempt for his failure to pay the mortgage as required by the temporary order, because he was unable to make the mortgage payments. A defendant may avoid a judgment of contempt by establishing that he is without the present ability to discharge his obligations. Kent failed to file for modification of the temporary order prior to being held in contempt and did not offer any documentary evidence of his income and expenses. Therefore, the chancellor was within her discretion in holding him in contempt.


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