Berry v. State
| Docket Number: | 2002-KA-00957-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 10-07-2003 Holding: Affirmed |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Sale of cocaine - Sufficiency of evidence - Reasonable doubt instructions - One juror instruction - Prosecutorial misconduct - Cross-examination - Narration of videotape Judge(s) Concurring: McMillin, C.J., King and Southwick, P.JJ., Thomas, Lee, Irving, Myers, Chandler and Griffis, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 03-12-2002 Appealed from: Union County Circuit Court Judge: Andrew K. Howorth Disposition: SALE OF COCAINE - SENTENCED TO SERVE A TERM OF 20 YEARS, 8 YEARS SUSPENDED WITH 12 YEARS TO SERVE IN AN INSTITUTION TO BE DESIGNATED BY THE MISSISSIPPI BOARD OF CORRECTIONS FOR THE CRIME OF SALE OF COCAINE IN COUNT II. District Attorney: James M. Hood, III Case Number: UK2001-176 |
|
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Reno O'Neal Berry |
STEPHEN P. LIVINGSTON |
||
| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BILLY L. GORE |
|
|
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Sale of cocaine - Sufficiency of evidence - Reasonable doubt instructions - One juror instruction - Prosecutorial misconduct - Cross-examination - Narration of videotape |
| Summary of the Facts: | Reno Berry was convicted of the sale of cocaine and was sentenced to twenty years with eight years suspended. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Sufficiency of evidence Berry challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. All of the evidence including a video showing Berry’s illegal actions points to the fact that Berry committed the crime of selling cocaine. Issue 2: Reasonable doubt instructions Berry argues that the court erred in failing to grant jury instructions that concerned reasonable doubt. If the instructions fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice, there will be no reversible error. One of the instruction was properly refused because it commented on the weight of the evidence. With regard to the other two instructions, they were both redundant since the jury received a plethora of instructions concerning reasonable doubt. Issue 3: One juror instruction Berry argues that the court erred by failing to give a one juror instruction which calls on each juror to stand by his convictions on the evidence, and does not permit any single juror to bring in or stand for any other verdict than one which he was authorized to adopt by law and the evidence in the case. Denial of the one juror instruction is not error where another instruction instructs the jury that twelve jurors must agree upon the verdict. Here, the jury instructions, taken as a whole, adequately inform the jury that all twelve jurors must agree on the verdict. Therefore, the court's denial of the instruction was not error since there were other instructions which said the exact same thing. Issue 4: Prosecutorial misconduct Berry argues that, during closing arguments, the prosecutor improperly objected to defense counsel's mentioning a prior burglary conviction of the State's confidential source. During closing argument, counsel cannot state facts which are not in evidence and which the court does not judicially know, in aid of his evidence. Here, there was no harm or prejudice to Berry since he was permitted to attack the credibility of this witness during closing arguments. Issue 5: Cross-examination Berry argues that the court erred in refusing to allow him to cross examine the confidential informant about his prior convictions. Because Berry fails to cite any authority for his position, the issue is procedurally barred. Issue 6: Videotape Berry argues that it was error to allow the State's witness to explain to the jury what was taking place in the video as the videotape was being played for the jury. As long as the witness's testimony is confined to matters actually perceived first-hand there can be no improper prejudice to the defendant to permit the witness to relate those observations to the jury. Because the witness was physically present consummating the sale of cocaine, he had first-hand knowledge of the events as they were taking place. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
