Crosthwait v. Southern Health Corp. of Houston, Inc., et al.
| Docket Number: | 2010-CT-00526-SCT Linked Case(s): 2010-CA-00526-COA ; 2010-CA-00526-COA ; 2010-CT-00526-SCT ; 2010-CT-00526-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 06-07-2012 Opinion Author: Carlson, P.J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Medical malpractice - Section 15-1-36 - Professional service - Expert testimony Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Dickinson, P.J., Randolph and Pierce, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Lamar, J. Dissenting Author : King, J. Dissent Joined By : Kitchens and Chandler, JJ. Procedural History: Summary Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY Writ of Certiorari: Granted Appealed from Court of Appeals |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 03-03-2010 Appealed from: Chickasaw County Circuit Court Judge: Andrew K. Howorth Disposition: Granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees. Case Number: H2008-119 |
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| Note: | The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals which can be found at http://courts.ms.gov/Images/Opinions/CO70487.pdf . | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Ruth Agnes Crosthwait |
WILLIAM C. WALKER, JR. |
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| Appellee: | Southern Health Corporation of Houston, Inc. d/b/a Trace Regional Hospital and Marcia Morgan | JOHN G. WHEELER |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Medical malpractice - Section 15-1-36 - Professional service - Expert testimony |
| Summary of the Facts: | Ruth Agnes Crosthwait was admitted to Trace Regional Hospital for treatment of fluctuating blood sugar stemming from diabetes. Crosthwait was eighty-two years old, lived alone, and generally could walk without assistance. Crosthwait fell and suffered significant injury, including a broken hip and a loss of mobility and independence. Crosthwait filed suit against the hospital and Morgan. The hospital and Morgan filed a motion for summary judgment. The circuit court granted the hospital’s motion, and Crosthwait appealed. The Court of Appeals held that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment to the hospital. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | In cases of medical malpractice, a plaintiff must prove the existence of a duty by the defendant to conform to a specific standard of conduct for the protection of others against an unreasonable risk of injury; a failure to conform to the required standard; and an injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by the breach of such duty by the defendant. And in proving medical malpractice, expert testimony must be used to show that the requisite standard of care was not followed, and expert testimony must be used to establish that the defendant’s failure was the proximate cause, or proximate contributing cause of the plaintiff’s alleged injuries. Where a plaintiff fails to present expert testimony as to the applicable standard of care, breach thereof, and proximate causation, summary judgment is mandated. Crosthwait states that the acts of drying a wet floor and ensuring that hospital patients traverse safely through a known, dangerous condition do not fall within the scope of either a hospital’s licensed activities or Nurse Morgan’s professional services. Instead, Crosthwait argues that these acts fall within the standard of reasonable care incumbent on businesses. The hospital disagrees and argues that Crosthwait’s claim was for medical malpractice under section 15-1-36(2). Section 15-1-36(1), relating to medical malpractice claims, applies to “injuries or wrongful death arising out of the course of medical, surgical or other professional services[.]” A ‘professional service’ involves the application of special skill, knowledge and education arising out of a vocation, calling, occupation or employment. Medical or professional services are not limited to direct interventions such as performing surgery or administering medications, but include all aspects of medical evaluation, treatment, and care that involve the application of special skill or knowledge. Moreover, a nurse’s decision, based on professional knowledge, falls within the statutory language of “medical, surgical or other professional services[.]” In this case, Morgan’s specialized knowledge or training was called upon in this situation. Most adults need no assistance in walking to and from the shower; however, the record reveals that Crosthwait required such assistance. The determination that Crosthwait could not safely negotiate her way to and from the shower without assistance required the exercise of professional knowledge and judgment to assess Crosthwait’s medical condition and consequent physical limitations. Morgan was called upon to aid an elderly and fragile patient in walking to and from a shower. The decision as to whether to provide such assistance involved medical judgment, and the claim thus was one for medical negligence. It is undisputed that Crosthwait failed to offer pre-suit notice, failed to consult with an expert prior to filing suit, and failed to support her claim with expert testimony. Since Crosthwait’s claim was one of medical negligence, summary judgment of the claim was mandated, and the trial court did not commit error in granting summary judgment in favor of the hospital and Morgan. |
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