Edwards v. State


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Docket Number: 2011-CP-00368-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 06-05-2012
Opinion Author: Carlton, J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Post-conviction relief - Time bar - Section 99-39-5(2) - Defective indictment - Constitutional claims - Due process - Right to appeal - Conflict of interest
Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, Maxwell, Russell and Fair, JJ.
Procedural History: PCR
Nature of the Case: PCR

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 02-08-2011
Appealed from: Alcorn County Circuit Court
Judge: Paul S. Funderburk
Disposition: MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISMISSED
Case Number: CV-11-054-FA

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Billy Edwards a/k/a Billy Lee Edwards




PRO SE



 

Appellee: State of Mississippi OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS  

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Topic: Post-conviction relief - Time bar - Section 99-39-5(2) - Defective indictment - Constitutional claims - Due process - Right to appeal - Conflict of interest

Summary of the Facts: In 2004, Billy Edwards pled guilty to burglary and larceny of a dwelling. He was sentenced to twenty-five years. In 2011, Edwards filed a motion for post-conviction relief, which the court denied as time barred. Edwards appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Time bar According to section 99-39-5(2), a PCR motion following a guilty plea shall be made within three years after entry of the judgment of conviction. Here, Edwards filed his PCR motion well past the three-year statute of limitations. Thus, it is time barred. Issue 2: Defective indictment Edwards argues that his indictment was legally insufficient because the address of the dwelling he burglarized was not given on the indictment. Claims alleging defective indictment are barred when a motion for post-conviction relief is not filed within the three-year time limitation. Moreover, Edwards waived his current claims of legal insufficiency of the indictment charging him with burglary and larceny of a dwelling when he entered his guilty plea to the charge. Issue 3: Constitutional claims Edwards argues he was deprived of due process of law because the trial court failed to correctly advise him of the right to appeal his sentence; he was denied due process of law when the trial court failed to conduct a competency hearing which rendered his guilty pleas unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent; his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by advising him to waive any conflict of interest arising from his counsel’s joint representation of his codefendants and himself; and the court’s acceptance of his guilty plea in the face of his trial counsel’s conflict of interest violated his constitutional rights. A trial court is not required to inform the defendant of his right to direct appeal his sentence after he enters a guilty plea. The record shows that the trial judge presiding over the plea hearing took great measures to ensure Edwards knew exactly what he was doing by entering his guilty pleas and the consequences of doing so. Thus, the judge ensured Edwards’s plea was voluntary. The record shows that the trial court did not violate a duty to advise Edwards of a conflict. Additionally, the record reflects that the trial court’s inquiry on the record shows Edwards accepted and waived any conflict due to the joint representation. Thus, Edwards’ constitutional claims have no merit.


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