Lang v. Lutz


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Docket Number: 2002-CA-00054-COA
Linked Case(s): 2002-CT-00054-SCT ; 2002-CA-00054-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 10-28-2003
Opinion Author: Thomas, J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Wills & estates - Undue influence - Conversion - Fiduciary duties - Accounting - Warranty deed - Slander of title
Judge(s) Concurring: McMillin, C.J., King and Southwick, P.JJ., Bridges, Lee, Irving, Myers, Chandler and Griffis, JJ.
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 03-28-2001
Appealed from: Claiborne County Chancery Court
Judge: Kennie Middleton
Disposition: JUDGMENT AGAINST APPELLANTS FINDING VIOLATION OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES AS TRUSTEE
Case Number: 99-0099

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: In Re: The Matter of the Conservatorship of the Estate and the Person of Annie Mae Loyd: Margaret Loyd Lang and Clyde Lang




WILLIAM D. BOERNER



 

Appellee: Edith Cecille Loyd Lutz, Conservatrix; Claiborne Chancery Court SIM C. DULANEY  

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Topic: Wills & estates - Undue influence - Conversion - Fiduciary duties - Accounting - Warranty deed - Slander of title

Summary of the Facts: A trust was established to take care of Annie Mae Loyd, with her daughter Margaret Lang appointed as trustee. Edith Loyd Lutz, Margaret's sister, became upset with the management of the trust, and filed a petition for appointment of conservator which was granted by the court. Margaret filed a motion to set aside and an order was entered which appointed Margaret and Edith co-conservatrixes. This created a dispute which led to litigation. The chancellor found in part that Margaret had violated her fiduciary duty as trustee, that she should be removed as trustee, that a warranty deed from Margaret to her husband of real property contained in the trust should be cancelled, and ordered Margaret to make an accounting to the court and to reimburse the trust some $14,400. Margaret appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Undue influence Margaret argues that the chancellor erred in finding that she procured her office of trust through undue influence. The question in this case is whether or not the chancellor erred in removing Margaret as trustee for the Annie Mae Loyd Trust. The chancellor based his decision on the actions of Margaret as trustee of the Annie Mae Loyd Trust. Undue influence in the procurement of the trust is not relevant to the case. Issue 2: Conversion Margaret argues that the chancellor erred in finding the temporary support to be unreasonable, since the same chancellor later approved $1,200 per month as payment for care of Annie Mae Loyd. Conversion requires an intent to exercise dominion or control over goods which is inconsistent with the true owner's right. The chancellor determined that Margaret converted to her personal use $14,400, or twelve months' care at $1,200 per month, and that she did not provide clear and convincing evidence that the transaction was made in good faith, full knowledge, and with consent of the parties. The substantial weight of the evidence supports the chancellor's decision. Issue 3: Fiduciary duties Margaret argues that the chancellor erred in finding her to have violated her fiduciary duties as trustee, since the trust gave her authority to deposit funds in her own name and the sale of property to her husband was for good and valuable consideration. The existence of a confidential or fiduciary relationship gives rise to a presumption of undue influence. The grantee/beneficiary must then prove by clear and convincing evidence: good faith on the part of the grantee/beneficiary; grantor's full knowledge and deliberation of his actions and their consequences; and advice of a competent person disconnected from the grantee and devoted wholly to the grantor/testator's interest. The chancellor found that the sale of Annie Mae’s land to Margaret's husband went against the intention Annie Mae expressed in the last will and trust to leave her property to her surviving children in equal shares. By selling the property to her husband, Margaret had ended up with all of Annie Mae Loyd's land while the rest of Annie Mae's children ended up with none without voluntarily having given up their interest. Therefore, the substantial weight of the evidence supports the chancellor's decision. Issue 4: Accounting Margaret argues that the chancellor erred in ordering an accounting. The chancellor is vested with the authority to oversee and supervise the administration of a trust. Having determined that Margaret had violated her fiduciary duties as trustee, it is within the chancellor's authority to order an accounting in order to determine what assets remain in the estate. Issue 5: Warranty deed Margaret argues that the chancellor erred in cancelling the warranty deed from her as trustee of the Annie Mae Loyd Trust to her husband, because by selling the property at or above fair market value, the sale was an arms length transaction and as trustee she was vested with the authority to sell the property at any time. Margaret had the burden to overcome the presumption of invalidity by producing clear and convincing evidence that this transaction was not the product of undue influence. The chancellor determined that she failed to overcome this presumption of undue influence, and the sale went against the expressed intention that the children inherit the land in equal shares. Issue 6: Slander of title Margaret argues that the chancellor erred in dismissing Clyde's counter-complaint for slander of title and assessing court costs to them. Since the court found that Lutz had a valid right to have her case decided, filing a lis pendens notice cannot be slander of title. The action for slander of title was therefore rendered moot when the chancellor entered his judgment setting aside the conveyance which was the subject of the slander of title suit.


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