Williams v. State
| Docket Number: | 2011-KA-00128-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 05-29-2012 Opinion Author: Presiding Judge Irving Holding: Affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Incest - Ineffective assistance of counsel - M.R.E. 412 - Sufficiency of evidence - Section 97-29-5 - Admission of testimony - Exclusion of testimony - Expert testimony - Voluntariness of confession - Jury instruction - Illegal sentence Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Griffis, P.J., Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, Carlton, Maxwell, Russell and Fair, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 11-19-2010 Appealed from: Warren County Circuit Court Judge: James Chaney, Jr. Disposition: CONVICTED OF INCEST AND SENTENCED TO TEN YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, WITH SEVEN YEARS TO SERVE, THREE YEARS SUSPENDED, AND FIVE YEARS OF POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION District Attorney: Richard Earl Smith, Jr. Case Number: 10,0247-CRC |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | London Williams, Jr. |
WARREN L. MARTIN JR. |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: LISA LYNN BLOUNT SCOTT STUART |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Incest - Ineffective assistance of counsel - M.R.E. 412 - Sufficiency of evidence - Section 97-29-5 - Admission of testimony - Exclusion of testimony - Expert testimony - Voluntariness of confession - Jury instruction - Illegal sentence |
| Summary of the Facts: | London Williams Jr. was convicted of incest. He was sentenced to ten years, with seven years to serve, three years suspended, and five years of post-release supervision. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Ineffective assistance of counsel Williams argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to file a motion to suppress his confession, failed to file a motion under M.R.E. 412 to inquire into the victim’s prior sexual behavior, failed to timely file a witness list, which contained the name of a witness prepared to offer exculpatory evidence, submitted a jury instruction with the wrong defendant’s name listed, and failed to inform Williams of his right not to testify at trial. While challenges to the effectiveness of counsel are more appropriately brought during post-conviction proceedings rather than on direct appeal, an appellate court may address an ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal if the presented issues are based on facts fully apparent from the record. Here, the facts and issues related to Williams’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are apparent from the record. A defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights are not violated by questioning in the absence of his attorney unless the defendant has asserted his right to an attorney. Williams’ attorney was not present during the giving of the statement. At one point during the interview, Williams asked for permission to call his attorney and was allowed to make the call. Williams placed the call and then continued to answer questions. He never requested the presence of his attorney. Based on the record, it is difficult to see how the circuit court would have excluded the statements. With regard to his M.R.E. 412 claim, evidence of the victim’s past sexual conduct was not relevant to Williams’s incest charge. Instead, the State only needed to prove that Williams had sex with his daughter and that he knew that she was his daughter at the time. Williams testified to both elements at trial. Even if Williams’s attorney was ineffective for failing to timely disclose his witness list, this did not prejudice Williams, especially where Williams admitted in his testimony that he and the victim had sex. Williams argues that his attorney was ineffective for submitting a jury instruction with the wrong defendant’s name listed. However, the final version of the instruction given to the jury omitted the portion containing the wrong name. The record belies Williams’s contention that his attorney failed to advise him of his right not to testify at trial. Issue 2: Sufficiency of evidence Section 97-29-5 proscribing incest requires proof of a single act of adultery or fornication between persons who are prohibited from marrying by reason of blood. Additionally, the defendant must have full knowledge of the relationship between himself and the other participant. Williams admitted during his testimony that he had sex with the victim and that he knew she was his daughter. Based on Williams’s testimony, there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction of incest. Issue 3: Admission of testimony Williams argues that the circuit court erred in allowing a nurse to testify as to medical causation. The nurse, who is a certified sexual assault nurse examiner, testified that there were no lacerations or tears on the victim’s vagina. She further testified that in cases of sexual assault, medical professionals do not always expect to find tearing or lacerations. The testimony was relevant only to the charge of sexual battery, of which the jury found Williams not guilty. Evidence regarding the presence or absence of vaginal tearing was not relevant to the charge of incest, of which Williams was ultimately convicted. Consequently, any error in admitting the nurse’s testimony was harmless and cured by the verdict. Issue 4: Exclusion of testimony Williams argues that the circuit court erred in excluding the testimony of the doctor who performed the victim’s pelvic exam in conjunction with the sexual-assault examination. However, the circuit court never ruled to exclude her testimony. The doctor was a witness for the State, whom the State released without calling. Williams made no objection to the State’s decision to release the doctor. Issue 5: Expert testimony Williams argues that the circuit court erred in allowing the State’s forensic DNA analyst to testify that Williams’s blood was used to establish his paternity of the victim. However, she never testified that Williams’s DNA profile was obtained from a blood sample. Instead, she testified that the victim’s DNA profile was obtained using a blood sample. This issue is without merit. Issue 6: Incest statute Williams argues that the language of the incest statute imposes a duty of responsibility on “persons,” not just males engaging in the unlawful act. Therefore, according to Williams, because the jury found him not guilty of sexual battery, it necessarily determined that the victim consented to the incestuous act with her father and should likewise be subject to criminal prosecution. However, the Supreme Court has previously rejected Williams’s exact argument. Issue 7: Voluntariness of confession Williams argues that the statement he gave to officers admitting that he had sex with the victim was involuntary because he was not given a Miranda warning, nor did he offer to sign a waiver. Because Williams failed to object to the testimony regarding his statement, this issue is procedurally barred. Issue 8: Jury instruction Williams argues that the circuit court should have granted one of his instructions because it tracks the statutory language of section 97-29-5. An instruction’s legal sufficiency does not prevent its exclusion where the instruction is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions. In this case, the elements of incest were adequately addressed in the other instructions put before the jury. Issue 9: Illegal sentence Williams argues that his sentence is illegal because it exceeds the maximum sentence for incest. The circuit court sentenced Williams to ten years, with seven years to serve, three years suspended, and five years of post-release supervision. As Williams correctly points out, the period of incarceration (seven years) plus the period of post-release supervision (five years) exceeds the maximum sentence allowed for incest (ten years). Therefore, Williams’s sentence is illegal. The case is remanded for resentencing. |
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