Springfield v. Members 1st Community Federal Credit Union
| Docket Number: | 2010-CA-00359-COA Linked Case(s): 2010-CA-00359-COA ; 2010-CT-00359-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 05-29-2012 Opinion Author: Barnes, J. Holding: Reversed and remanded |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Malicious prosecution - Probable cause - Existence of indictment - Conversion to summary judgment - M.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) - M.R.C.P. 56 - Notice - Timeliness of brief - M.R.A.P. 2(b) Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Ishee, Roberts, Russell and Fair, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Maxwell, J. Dissenting Author : Carlton, J. Procedural History: Dismissal Nature of the Case: CIVIL - TORTS-OTHER THAN PERSONAL INJURY & PROPERTY DAMAGE |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 01-26-2010 Appealed from: Monroe County Circuit Court Judge: Jim S. Pounds Disposition: GRANTED RULE 12(B)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION Case Number: CV2009-222-PM |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Norma Springfield |
LUANNE STARK THOMPSON
T. KILPATRICK |
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| Appellee: | Members 1st Community Federal Credit Union | TIMOTHY MICHAEL PEEPLES | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Malicious prosecution - Probable cause - Existence of indictment - Conversion to summary judgment - M.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) - M.R.C.P. 56 - Notice - Timeliness of brief - M.R.A.P. 2(b) |
| Summary of the Facts: | Norma Springfield filed a complaint for malicious prosecution against her former employer, Members 1st Community Federal Credit Union and others, after embezzlement charges were brought against her and later dismissed. The trial court granted the defendants’ second motion to dismiss, finding that Norma failed to establish “want of probable cause.” Norma appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Malicious prosecution In order to establish a claim of malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence: the institution or continuation of a criminal proceeding; by, or at the insistence of, the defendant; the termination of such proceedings in plaintiff’s favor; malice in instituting the proceedings; want of probable cause for the proceeding; the suffering of injury or damage as a result of the prosecution. The legal issue raised on appeal is whether the return of an indictment by the grand jury means Norma cannot, as a matter of law, prove the element of “want of probable cause.” Regarding the element of “want of probable cause,” a court must look to the facts reasonably available to each defendant at the time the malicious prosecution was initiated. Probable cause requires the concurrence of a subjective element – an honest belief in the guilt of the person accused, and an objective element – reasonable grounds for such beliefs. Members 1st claims that under Mississippi law, the existence of an indictment establishes probable cause as a matter of law. When a conviction is obtained, a prima facie case is established that probable cause is present unless there was some corrupt practice involved in the conviction; however, the prima facie case is subject to rebuttal by the plaintiff. Taking all of the allegations of the complaint as true, Norma’s complaint is legally sufficient. The trial court’s dismissal of the case was error. Issue 2: Conversion to summary judgment Norma argues that the trial court judge improperly converted his ruling on the second motion to dismiss under M.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) into one for summary judgment. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion is based on failure of the pleadings to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. While Rule 12(b) provides that a motion to dismiss can be treated as one for summary judgment if “matters outside of the pleadings are presented” and not excluded by the court, and “all parties are given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent” under M.R.C.P. 56, that is not the case here. There were no affidavits filed in the case, and no depositions had been taken. Norma was not given proper notice by the trial court that the motion was being converted into a Rule 56 motion. Therefore, the motion could not be converted into one for summary judgment at the hearing, and the case dismissed. Issue 3: Timeliness of brief Members 1st argues that Norma’s brief was untimely served upon them and therefore her appeal must be dismissed. After the grant of two extensions of time, Norma’s appellate brief was due October 1, 2010. The record shows Norma’s brief was timely filed on October 1, 2010. However, Norma admits in her reply brief that she did not send her brief to Members 1st until the next business day of October 4, 2010. The case file shows no motion to dismiss the appeal by Members 1st due to the untimely service of Norma’s brief. Instead, Norma corrected the deficiency by sending the brief to Members 1st on October 4, 2010, by UPS overnight service, as she stated in her reply brief. The Court could award “other sanctions” under M.R.A.P. 2(b) for failure to provide timely service, but declines to do so in this case where the deficiency was promptly remedied and Members 1st has alleged no prejudice as a result of the deficiency. |
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