Tynes v. Tynes
| Docket Number: | 2002-CA-01091-COA Linked Case(s): 2002-CA-01091-COA ; 2002-CA-01091-COA |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 11-18-2003 Opinion Author: Bridges, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Alimony - Retirement benefits - Equitable distribution - Personal injury settlement - Attorney’s fees Judge(s) Concurring: McMillin, C.J., King and Southwick, P.JJ., Thomas, Lee, Irving, Myers, Chandler and Griffis, JJ. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 05-18-2002 Appealed from: Forrest County Chancery Court Judge: Sebe Dale, Jr. Disposition: DIVORCE GRANTED BUT NO ALIMONY AWARDED TO WIFE Case Number: 00-0804-D |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Sue Carol Tynes |
GLENN LOUIS WHITE |
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| Appellee: | Ronald Price Tynes | DAVID ALAN PUMFORD |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Alimony - Retirement benefits - Equitable distribution - Personal injury settlement - Attorney’s fees |
| Summary of the Facts: | Sue and Ronald Tynes consented to a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. The court entered a judgment regarding the division of property, alimony and support. Sue appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Alimony Sue argues that the court erred in failing to award alimony. Factors the court should consider in determining whether to award alimony include income and expenses of the parties; health and earning capacity of the parties; needs of each party; obligations and assets of each party; length of the marriage; presence or absence of minor children in the home; age of the parties; standard of living of the parties; tax consequences of the spousal support order; fault or misconduct; wasteful dissipation of assets by either party; and any other equitable factor. Here, the chancellor conducted a thorough analysis of all of the relevant factors in this case and did not abuse his discretion in finding that Sue was not entitled to an award for alimony. Issue 2: Retirement Sue argues that the chancellor erred in failing to consider Ron's retirement income as marital property. Factors the court should consider when attempting to effect an equitable distribution of marital property include substantial contribution to the accumulation of property; degree to which each spouse has expanded, withdrawn, or otherwise disposed of marital assets and any prior distribution of assets; market value and emotional value of assets subject to distribution; value of assets not ordinarily absent equitable factors to the contrary, subject to such distribution; tax and other economic consequences; extent to which property division may be utilized to eliminate periodic payments and other potential sources of friction; needs of the parties; and any other equitable factor. Here, Sue will become eligible for a divorced spouse annuity from the U.S.A. Railroad Retirement Board upon her reaching sixty-two years of age by virtue of her marriage to Ron. Also, she is a participant in the PERS state retirement system. Although the record does not show when Sue may start receiving her retirement and the amount thereof, it is apparent that the judge took this into consideration and made adequate and sufficient provisions for Sue. Issue 3: Personal injury settlement Sue argues that the chancellor erred when he failed to consider Ron's personal injury settlement as non-marital property. In considering personal injury proceeds obtained during the marriage, that portion of the proceeds allocable to compensation to the initially injured spouse for pain, suffering, and disfigurement should be awarded in its entirety to the injured spouse; that portion of the proceeds allocable to lost wages, lost earnings capacity, and medical and hospital expenses, to the extent those apply to the time period of the marriage, are marital assets and are to be divided according to equitable distribution principles; and that portion of the proceeds allocable to loss of consortium should be awarded in its entirety to the spouse who suffered that loss. The record shows that Ron received $47,688 for advances, i.e., money that had been paid to him in the period from the injury date until the settlement date, and also a settlement of $800,043 for his personal injuries, i.e., for pain, suffering, and disfigurement. Given the facts, the chancellor was not in error in finding that the remainder of Ron's personal injury settlement proceeds were allocable to compensate him for pain, suffering, and disfigurement and were, therefore, outside of the marital estate. Issue 4: Attorney’s fees Sue argues that the judge erred in not granting her attorney's fees. When a party is able to pay attorney's fees, an award of attorney's fees is not appropriate. The record shows by Sue's own testimony, that the amount of money she had $5,000 or $6,000 left in certificates of deposits and that she makes a monthly income of $1,253 from her job with the school system. This was ample evidence to support the court’s conclusion that Sue was able to pay her attorney's fees. |
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