Berryman v. Lannom
| Docket Number: | 2010-CA-01947-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 05-22-2012 Opinion Author: Maxwell, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Insurance - Interpleader - M.R.C.P. 22 - Statute of limitations - Tolling provision for minors - Section 15-1-59 - Withdrawal of funds - M.R.C.P. 62(a) - M.R.C.P. 65(b) Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, Carlton, Russell and Fair, JJ. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - INSURANCE |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 10-25-2010 Appealed from: DeSoto County Chancery Court Judge: Vicki Cobb Disposition: $50,000 IN INTERPLEADED FUNDS DISBURSED TO APPELLEES Case Number: 08-06-1182 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Leon Berryman, Individually and on behalf of Ariel Berryman, a Minor |
OLUFEMI GBOLAHAN SALU |
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| Appellee: | Glynes H. Lannom, Individually, and as the Personal Representative of Zachary D. Lannom, Deceased, and of Jacob D. Lannom, Deceased; and Daniel Lannom | JOHN BOOTH FARESE NICHOLAS JOSEPH OWENS JR. | ||
| Appellee #2: | ||||
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| Topic: | Insurance - Interpleader - M.R.C.P. 22 - Statute of limitations - Tolling provision for minors - Section 15-1-59 - Withdrawal of funds - M.R.C.P. 62(a) - M.R.C.P. 65(b) |
| Summary of the Facts: | Esurance Insurance Company filed a complaint for interpleader. Esurance had issued automobile liability insurance to Larry Setzer with a maximum liability limit of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident. On April 17, 2007, during Esurance’s coverage period, Setzer collided into Glynes Lannom’s Buick Park Avenue, injuring her, killing her two sons, Jacob and Zachary Lannom, and paralyzing a fourth passenger, Philip Bieselin. Joaquin Gonzales’s car and Leon Berryman’s eighteen wheeler, in which his daughter Ariel was a passenger, were also involved in the accident. Esurance named Glynes (individually and as representative for Zachary and Jacob); the boys’ father, Daniel (as representative for Zachary and Jacob); Bieselin; Gonzales; and both Berrymans as interpleader defendants, alleging they all had made claims against Setzer. The complaint also alleged Glynes and Daniel had sued Setzer for the wrongful deaths of Jacob and Zachary. Attached to Esurance’s interpleader complaint was a copy of Glynes and Daniel’s tort complaint. The Berrymans answered the interpleader complaint and requested the full policy limits from the interpleaded funds. But in their answer, they made no allegation that either was entitled to the insurance proceeds due to injuries caused by Setzer. On October 12, 2010, Daniel filed a petition to disburse the funds. The docket reflects a notice of hearing on his petition was also filed that same day. The Berrymans filed no response to Daniel’s petition. On October 25, 2010, the chancellor heard the petition. Because there was no transcript of this hearing, the Berrymans prepared a statement of evidence in absence of a transcript. Glynes and Daniel objected to this statement as not reflecting what truly occurred at the hearing and submitted their own statement. The chancellor held that Glynes and Daniel’s statement was accurate. The chancellor found that, because the Berrymans failed to file an action against Setzer within the three-year statute of limitations, they could not recover any portion of the $50,000. The chancellor ordered the $50,000 be split equally between Glynes and Daniel. The Berrymans appeal. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Interpleader Ordinarily, interpleader under M.R.C.P. 22 is conducted in two stages. In the first, the court hears evidence to determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to interplead the defendants. In the second stage, a determination is made on the merits of the adverse claims. This appeal involves the second stage only. The Berrymans do not object to the chancery court’s order that Esurance deposit the money and then be dismissed from the case. The mere fact Esurance named the Berrymans as claimants does not in itself entitle them to a portion of the interpleaded fund. The Berrymans also have to demonstrate how they are entitled to a portion of this particular fund. The Berrymans argue the chancellor erred by holding their failure to file suit against Setzer within the three-year statute of limitations barred their claim to the interpleaded funds because the passage of time is not fatal to a claimant’s entitlement to interpleaded funds, and the statute of limitations had not run against Ariel, a minor at the time of the accident. Interpleader is an equitable remedy. And it cannot be used as a vehicle by which a claimant gains a superior position in respect to other claimants than he would otherwise have. At the time Esurance filed the complaint for interpleader, Glynes and Daniel could reduce their claim to a judgment, but Leon could not, making his claim inferior. Thus, there was no error in the chancellor’s denial of Leon’s claim based on his failure to file a claim against Setzer within the three-year statute of limitations. Ariel is in a different position because she is a minor and still potentially able to pursue a judgment against Setzer, based on the tolling provision for minors under section 15-1-59. While the chancellor’s application of the statute of limitations against Ariel was error, the chancellor’s denial of Ariel’s claim was the correct result. Ariel had the responsibility to show she was entitled to a portion of the Esurance proceeds. Though the Berrymans were notified about Daniel’s petition to disburse funds and the October 25, 2010 hearing on the petition, Ariel neither responded to the motion nor presented any evidence at the hearing showing she was entitled to a portion of the funds. In Ariel’s interpleader answer, she did not allege she had suffered an injury that would entitle her to a portion of the funds. Issue 2: Withdrawal of funds The Berrymans argue Glynes and Daniel’s immediate withdrawal of the interpleaded funds from the chancery court, the same day as the disbursement hearing, violated the ten-day automatic stay of judgments in M.R.C.P. 62(a). While Glynes and Daniel did technically violate Rule 62(a), the Berrymans have failed to show this violation warrants reversal. The course the Berrymans chose to follow was to appeal, filing their notice on November 18, 2010. Two weeks prior, on November 4, 2010, the automatic stay had expired because the Berrymans had elected not to file a post-judgment motion that would have furthered stayed the judgment pending the motion’s resolution. Because the stay expired before the Berrymans filed their notice of appeal and well before they filed their January 19, 2011 motion to stay, the Berrymans cannot show they would have been in any different position had Glynes and Daniel waited until November 4, 2010, to withdraw the funds. In making their automatic-stay argument, the Berrymans seek to take advantage of a temporary restraining order filed by another interpleader defendant, Bieselin. However, any reliance by the Berrymans on Bieselin’s TRO is misplaced. The right to a TRO is personal to the applicant upon meeting the requirements of M.R.C.P. 65(b). The docket reflects Bieselin—not joined by the Berrymans or any other interpleader claimants—filed a TRO on November 4, 2010, and after the TRO was granted, posted bond on November 22. The Berrymans would have had to join the TRO in order to claim any right to enforce or extend it, and there is no evidence they did. Because they did not join the TRO, the Berrymans could not depend on the TRO to stay the disbursement of the funds to Glynes and Daniel. |
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