Wallmark v. Wallmark
| Docket Number: | 2002-CA-02150-COA Linked Case(s): 2002-CA-02150-COA |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 12-16-2003 Opinion Author: Lee, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Divorce: Adultery - Periodic alimony - Lump sum alimony - Equitable distribution - Attorney’s fees Judge(s) Concurring: McMillin, C.J., King and Southwick, P.JJ., Bridges, Thomas, Irving, Myers, Chandler and Griffis, JJ. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 06-11-2002 Appealed from: Hinds County Chancery Court Judge: William H. Singletary Disposition: CHANCELLOR DENIED AWARD OF ALIMONY AND ATTORNEY'S FEES AND MADE AN EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF THE MARITAL ESTATE. Case Number: G-2000-57 S/2 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Cheryl Van Zant Wallmark |
WILLIAM B. PEMBERTON |
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| Appellee: | Val J. Wallmark | KATHLEEN A. CONWAY |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Divorce: Adultery - Periodic alimony - Lump sum alimony - Equitable distribution - Attorney’s fees |
| Summary of the Facts: | Val Wallmark filed a complaint for divorce from Cheryl Wallmark, alleging habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Cheryl filed a counterclaim alleging uncondoned adultery, habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, and alternatively, irreconcilable differences. Cheryl was granted a divorce on the ground of uncondoned adultery. The court divided the assets and liabilities, denied lump sum and permanent alimony to Cheryl, and directed each party to pay their own attorney's fees and costs. Cheryl appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Periodic alimony Cheryl argues that the court erred in denying permanent alimony, because of the disparity in income between her and Val. In deciding whether to award alimony, the chancellor should consider the income and expenses of the parties, the health and earning capacities of the parties, the needs of each party, the obligations and assets of each party, the length of the marriage, the presence or absence of minor children in the home, the age of the parties, the standard of living of the parties during the marriage and at support determination, the tax consequences of the spousal support order, fault or misconduct, wasteful dissipation of assets by either party, and any other equitable factors. Here, the chancellor noted that a disparity existed in Cheryl and Val's earning capacities but noted that, after equitably dividing the marital estate, Cheryl should be very well able to provide for her needs. The denial of periodic alimony was not so oppressive, unjust, or grossly inadequate as to evidence an abuse of discretion. Issue 2: Lump sum alimony Cheryl argues that she met the necessary requirements in order to qualify for lump sum alimony. Factors to be considered by the chancellor in determining whether to award lump sum alimony include whether the spouse seeking lump sum alimony made a substantial contribution to the potential payor's accumulation of wealth; length of marriage; disparity between the separate estates; and whether the spouse seeking lump sum alimony would lack financial security in the absence of an award. After making an equitable division of the marital estate giving equal separate estates to the parties, the chancellor determined that no disparity existed and further determined that, from her equal separate estate and income, Cheryl should be financially secure. The chancellor's decision to deny an award of lump sum alimony does not amount to an abuse of discretion. Issue 3: Equitable distribution Cheryl argues that the chancellor erred in dividing the marital assets and liabilities. The chancellor clearly articulated his rationale for the equitable division of the marital estate. The ruling on the issue on equitable division of the martial assets was within the court's authority. Issue 4: Attorney’s fees Cheryl argues that because she was granted a divorce on the grounds of uncondoned adultery, Val should be responsible for her attorney's fees. If a party is financially able to pay his or her own attorney in a domestic case, then it is inappropriate to require the other party to make the payment instead. The chancellor’s determination that Cheryl and Val each had sufficient resources to bear the expense of their attorney's fees was not an abuse of discretion. |
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