Johnson v. Johnson
Docket Number: | 2002-CA-01552-COA Linked Case(s): 2002-CT-01552-COA ; 2002-CA-01552-COA ; 2002-CA-01552-COA |
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Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 12-16-2003 Opinion Author: Griffis, J. Holding: Reversed and Remanded |
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Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Marital property - Consent to divorce - Periodic alimony - Lump sum alimony Judge(s) Concurring: McMillin, C.J., King and Southwick, P.JJ., Thomas, Irving and Chandler, JJ. Concur in Part, Dissent in Part 1: Bridges, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 08-22-2002 Appealed from: Wayne County Chancery Court Judge: Sarah P. Springer Disposition: JUDGMENT FOR DIVORCE ON IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES GRANTED. ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT ORDERED, ASSETS DIVIDED. Case Number: 2000-294 |
Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
Appellant: | Paula L. Johnson |
WILLIAM B. JACOB
JOSEPH A. KIERONSKI
DANIEL P. SELF |
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Appellee: | Richard E. Johnson | THOMAS T. BUCHANAN |
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Synopsis provided by: If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
Topic: | Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Marital property - Consent to divorce - Periodic alimony - Lump sum alimony |
Summary of the Facts: | Paula Johnson filed for divorce from Richard Johnson on the grounds of adultery, habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and irreconcilable differences. The parties agreed to an irreconcilable differences divorce. The chancellor was presented with sixteen contested issues. The chancellor concluded that none of the three corporations of which Richard was the majority shareholder were marital assets, awarded Paula $750 per month in permanent periodic alimony and denied her request for lump sum alimony; and denied Paula’s request for attorney’s fees and costs. Paula appeals. |
Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Marital property Paula argues that the court erred in finding that she was not entitled to an equitable division of the stock Richard owned in the three corporations. One of the corporations was formed before the marriage and the other two were formed after the parties were married. Occasionally, Paula worked at and assisted Richard in these businesses, but her primary role was that of a homemaker and stay-at-home mom. Paula first argues that the parties stipulated, in the consent to divorce, that all businesses of the parties were to be classified as marital property. Under an irreconcilable differences divorce, the consent defines the issues that are to be contested and resolved by the chancellor. In considering the express authority the parties granted, the chancellor understood that she was to consider the entire concept of equitable division when considering the businesses (issue no. 14) and to simply divide any other assets (issue no. 15). The chancellor correctly interpreted the scope of the court’s authority granted by the consent for divorce. Marital property for the purpose of divorce is any and all property acquired or accumulated during the marriage. The contributions and efforts of the marital partners, whether economic, domestic or otherwise are of equal value. Here, the chancellor erroneously concluded that Paula’s efforts contributed negligibly to the value of the businesses or that the corporations’ success was due solely to Richard’s efforts and involvement. Therefore, the case is remanded for the chancellor to equitably divide the value of Richard’s stock in the three corporations as a marital asset. The chancellor also erred in classifying the stock of two of the corporations. The stock of both corporations should have been classified as marital property because each corporation was organized, incorporated and began operations during the term of the marriage. With regard to the stock of the third corporation, an increase in the value of the corporation due to the husband’s managerial efforts, during the marriage, would allow the increase in value of the stock to be considered a marital asset. The “accumulated” value of the stock in this case was included in the amount of the couple’s “Net Worth - Marital Assets.” Therefore, the increase in value of the stock was a marital asset subject to equitable division. Issue 2: Periodic alimony If an equitable division of marital property, considered with each party's non-marital assets, leaves a deficit for one party, then alimony should be considered. Alimony, if allowed, should be reasonable in amount commiserate with the wife’s accustomed standard of living minus her own resources, and considering the ability of the husband to pay. In this case, the chancellor considered the semblance of the standard of living Paula enjoyed during the marriage. This is an improper legal standard. A review of the Armstrong factors indicates that Richard earned more than $12,000 a month. He was granted sole and complete ownership of all the businesses, which produced the income the parties used during their marriage, and was granted exclusive use of the former marital home. He also received half of the money in his retirement accounts. In contrast, Paula is now unemployed. She listed her expenses as $4,000 per month for herself and $1,070 for the two children. Paula was awarded $750 a month in alimony and $1200 a month in child support and received $250,000 as payment for her half of the marital home and half of the value of the retirement accounts. A significant deficit existed for Paula, and the chancellor clearly failed to adequately compensate for this deficit. Issue 3: Lump sum alimony The chancellor committed error in the failure to award Paula lump sum alimony. The holding by the chancellor wholly disregards Paula’s domestic contribution. The assets Paula received from the judgment were meager by comparison to Richard’s assets. Also, Paula had no financial security without Richard. |
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