Grant v. Ford Motor Co.
| Docket Number: | 2009-CA-01815-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 05-08-2012 Opinion Author: Carlton, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Motion to compel - Production of design drawings - M.R.C.P. 34 - Expert testimony - M.R.C.P. 6(d) - M.R.E. 702 - M.R.C.P. 30(b)(6) deposition - Products liability - Causation Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Ishee, Roberts, Russell and Fair, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Barnes, J. Dissenting Author : Griffis, P.J. Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Irving, P.J., and Maxwell, J., Concur in Part and in the Result Without Separate Written Opinion Procedural History: Summary Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 09-30-2009 Appealed from: Clarke County Circuit Court Judge: Lester Williamson, Jr. Disposition: SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF FORD MOTOR COMPANY Case Number: 2002-144(W) |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Kelly Grant, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate and Heirs-at-Law and/or Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Makayla Maggard, Deceased, a Minor |
STACEY L. SIMS |
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| Appellee: | Ford Motor Company | MICHAEL B. WALLACE WALKER (BILL) JONES III REBECCA L. HAWKINS CABLE MATTHEW FROST EVERETT EAVES WHITE | ||
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Motion to compel - Production of design drawings - M.R.C.P. 34 - Expert testimony - M.R.C.P. 6(d) - M.R.E. 702 - M.R.C.P. 30(b)(6) deposition - Products liability - Causation |
| Summary of the Facts: | This case arises out of a vehicular accident on U.S. Highway 45 South in Clarke County. According to the accident report, Doris Riley ran a stop sign on the east side of U.S. Highway 45, crossed both lanes of traffic on the northbound side of the highway, and crashed her 1998 Toyota into the driver’s side of Grant’s 1996 Ford Probe. Grant’s three-year-old daughter, Maggard, was seated in the driver’s side rear compartment of the Ford Probe and suffered a fatal head injury during the accident. Grant filed a complaint against Ford, in which she alleged that her 1996 Ford Probe’s design and manufacturing defects caused and contributed to the fatal injuries of Maggard, Grant’s daughter. After several years of pretrial litigation, Ford moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Grant appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Design drawings During pretrial discovery, Grant requested all design drawings relating to the 1996 Ford Probe. In 2008, Grant attempted to retrieve the design documents through letters rogatory to Mazda Motor of America in California. After failing in her efforts, Grant subsequently filed a motion seeking to compel Ford to produce the design documents. In her motion to compel, Grant alleged that, although Ford may lack actual possession of the drawings, Ford had control over the design drawings and should be compelled to produce the documents. Ford informed both Grant and the trial court that Ford had requested the documents from Mazda. However, Mazda denied Ford’s request because Mazda was not a party to this lawsuit, and Mazda did not believe any legal obligation existed requiring it to provide the documents to Ford. Grant again filed a supplemental motion to compel. Ultimately, the trial court denied Grant’s motion to compel. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Grant’s motion to compel. M.R.C.P. 34 sets forth the requirements for document production and states, in pertinent part, that a party may serve on any other party a request to produce documents which are in the possession, custody, or control of the party upon whom the request is served. Grant produced no evidence establishing that Ford possessed any control or custody over the design drawings. Furthermore, Ford demonstrated that it possessed no legal right to obtain the design drawings from Mazda since the Production Agreement developed in 1992 had long expired. The Production Agreement relied upon by Grant governed the relationship of the parties only for the production cycle of the Ford Probe from 1992 through 1997. Issue 2: Expert testimony The trial court struck the portions of the affidavits of Grant’s expert witness, Dr. Benedict, that addressed data or information accumulated after Dr. Benedict’s deposition. The trial court also granted Ford’s motion to exclude Dr. Benedict’s seatbelt, structural integrity, and biomechanic opinions. Grant argues that the trial court erred by not providing her sufficient notice of the June 11, 2009 hearing on Ford’s motion to strike Dr. Benedict’s affidavits as required by M.R.C.P. 6(d). Grant received notice that Ford objected to Dr. Benedict’s affidavits as being untimely on the day Grant filed Dr. Benedict’s affidavits with the trial court. In fact, the service of affidavits resulted in the hearing on Ford’s motion to exclude Dr. Benedict’s opinions to be moved from May 26, 2009, to June 11, 2009. As such, the trial court committed no error in finding that Grant had sufficient notice of Ford’s motion. Grant argues, that notwithstanding the notice error, Ford’s motion to strike Dr. Benedict’s affidavits lacks merit and should have been denied by the trial court. However, there was o abuse of discretion by the trial court in excluding the new information in Dr. Benedicts’s affidavits. The court was knowledgeable of the complexity of the products-liability claims at issue, and of the time and expense required to timely address additional information for trial. Grant also argues that the trial court erred in excluding the opinions of Dr. Benedict relating to seatbelts, structural integrity, and biomechanic opinions, because in accordance with M.R.E. 702, Dr. Benedict’s testimony was based upon sufficient facts and data; was a product of reliable principles and methods; and applied to facts of this case. The record shows no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s application of Rule 702 and the standard set forth in Daubert. The trial court thoroughly examined Dr. Benedict’s qualifications and opinions and determined that Dr. Benedict’s opinions were unsupported by substantial testing and were wholly unreliable, and the trial court further found that Dr. Benedict was not qualified to testify as an expert in the field of biomechanics. Issue 3: Summary judgment When Ford moved for summary judgment on the ground that Grant lacked the ability to prove the required elements of her products-liability claim, Grant then moved the court for a stay pending Ford’s M.R.C.P. 30(b)(6) deposition. Following that deposition, Grant sought the trial court’s permission to require Ford to appear at another deposition and to also produce additional documents. Grant further asked the trial court to amend the scheduling order to allow her to conduct additional discovery. The trial court rejected Grant’s requests. Grant now argues that the trial court erred as follows as related to these rulings: denying her motion to compel the completion of the 30(b)(6) deposition of Ford; denying her motion to allow additional discovery; denying her motion to amend the scheduling order; and granting summary judgment in favor of Ford. The party resisting summary judgment must present specific facts why he cannot oppose the motion and must specifically demonstrate how postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable him, by discovery or other means, to rebut the movant's showing of the absence of a genuine issue of fact. Even if the trial court had allowed the completion of the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition and had granted Grant’s additional discovery requests, Grant’s initial claim is still flawed because she cannot prove causation of the victim’s injury due to the trial judge’s previous exclusion of Dr. Benedict’s biomechanics opinions. Actions brought under section 11-1-63(a) require that the plaintiff prove (ii), (iii), and at least one of four elements of a claim under (i). The trial court did not err by excluding the opinions of Grant’s expert witness, Dr. Benedict. Because Grant failed to offer any other evidence to support the essential elements of her claims, there was no error in the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Ford. |
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