Sanford v. Sanford
| Docket Number: | 2010-CA-00873-COA Linked Case(s): 2010-CA-00873-COA ; 2010-CT-00873-SCT ; 2010-CT-00873-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 05-08-2012 Opinion Author: Russell, J. Holding: Reversed and remanded |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Section 93-5-2 - Oral agreement - Division of personal property - Written agreement - Consent to divorce Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Ishee, Roberts and Maxwell, JJ. Dissenting Author : Fair, J. Dissent Joined By : Barnes and Carlton, JJ. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 09-10-2009 Appealed from: Lamar County Chancery Court Judge: Sebe Dale, Jr. Disposition: ENFORCED PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND ENTERED FINAL JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE Case Number: 2008-0025-GN-D |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Samantha Louise Sanford |
S. CHRISTOPHER FARRIS |
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| Appellee: | Leslie Sanford | ERIK M. LOWREY DAVID ALAN PUMFORD | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Section 93-5-2 - Oral agreement - Division of personal property - Written agreement - Consent to divorce |
| Summary of the Facts: | Samantha Sanford filed a complaint for divorce and temporary relief against Leslie Sanford alleging fault grounds for divorce, including habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, habitual and excessive use of drugs, habitual drunkenness; in the alternative, Samantha alleged irreconcilable differences. She also sought custody of the parties’ minor child. Samantha and Leslie executed a joint motion to withdraw fault grounds. On that same day, the chancellor signed an order dismissing fault grounds, which was filed the next day. That order stated “it is therefore, ordered and adjudged that the fault grounds for divorce be, and the same are hereby dismissed as to both parties[,] and this matter may proceed with a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.” A consent to divorce was signed by Samantha, Leslie, and counsel for each party. The consent to divorce contained handwritten revisions. The text lined through below was actually struck through with a pen. The text italicized below was actually handwritten in the document. None of the changes were initialed by the parties. The parties read into the record an oral agreement concerning, among other things, child custody, visitation, and partial property division. At the time of the oral agreement, the parties had not resolved issues pertaining to the division of personal property. A month later, Samantha filed a handwritten motion to withdraw her consent to divorce. Leslie filed a motion for citation for contempt and to enforce settlement. Samantha filed a request for an on-the-record finding that the proposed property-settlement agreement was not adequate and sufficient, arguing that her share of the marital estate was inadequate. Leslie filed a response, motion to dismiss, and motion for sanctions. Leslie filed a second motion for citation for contempt. The chancellor adjudicated Samantha in contempt for her failure to sign the property-settlement agreement. In his bench ruling, the chancellor ordered Samantha to be immediately incarcerated until she purged herself of contempt. Samantha filed a motion for stay of judgment of contempt and determination of supersedeas bond pending her appeal. The Mississippi Supreme Court entered an order on Samantha’s petition for writ of habeas corpus finding “that although [Samantha] orally agreed to the property settlement, there has been no written agreement as to property rights. [Samantha] was therefore entitled to withdraw from the oral agreement. The panel finds that the petition should be granted and that [Samantha] should be released.” Eventually, the chancellor entered a final judgment of divorce. The court reporter’s transcript was attached to the final judgment of divorce and was incorporated as the parties’ property-settlement agreement. Neither party’s signature appears anywhere on the transcript, and no written property-settlement agreement was ever signed or filed by the parties. Samantha appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | The issue in this case is whether the chancellor had the authority to enter a divorce based on irreconcilable differences with only a transcript of the parties’ oral agreement attached to the judgment of divorce and without a written property-settlement agreement disposing of all property issues. Divorce is a statutory act and the statutes must be strictly followed. Under section 93-5-2, there are two routes under which a divorce may be obtained on the ground of irreconcilable differences. First, the parties may provide a written agreement settling all property rights between the parties to the court, which must be found adequate and sufficient by the court and incorporated into the judgment of divorce. Alternatively, if the parties cannot reach an agreement, the parties may consent in writing to the divorce itself and submit the issues on which the parties cannot agree to the court. Here, the parties filed a consent to divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences, which stated “all issues are settled.” Therefore, the parties were required to provide a written agreement under section 93-5-2(2). The oral agreement covered everything except the division of personal property. Despite an incomplete agreement, the chancellor told the parties that they would not be at liberty to back out of the oral agreement as dictated into the record. Pursuant to section 93-5-2(3), the chancellor abused his discretion in binding the parties to an oral agreement that did not dispose of all property matters between the parties. In addition, the parties filed a consent to divorce stating that “all issues are settled.” In fact, not all issues were settled because the division of household goods was unresolved at that time. Nevertheless, because the parties were not submitting issues for the chancellor’s consideration under section 93-5-2(3), subsection (3) was not applicable. Instead, subsection (2) of section 93-5-2 applied, which required a “written agreement for the custody and maintenance of any children of that marriage and for the settlement of any property rights between the parties[.]” There is simply no written agreement between the parties resolving all property, custody, and support issues as required under section 93-5-2(2). Thus, the case is reversed and remanded. |
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