Cates v. Swain
| Docket Number: | 2010-CA-01939-COA Linked Case(s): 2010-CA-01939-COA2010-CT-01939-SCT2010-CT-01939-SCT2010-CT-01939-SCT |
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| Oral Argument: | 01-12-2012 | |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 05-02-2013 |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 04-17-2012 Opinion Author: Maxwell, J. Holding: Affirmed in part, reversed and rendered in part. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Unjust enrichment - Constructive trust - Nature of relationship - Unmarried cohabitants - Joint venture - Implied trust Judge(s) Concurring: Griffis, P.J., Barnes, Roberts, Carlton and Fair, JJ. Irving, P.J., concurs in part and in the result without separate written opinion. Judge(s) Concurring Separately: Russell, J., specially concurs with separate written opinion joined by Irving, P.J.; Ishee, J., joins in part. Dissenting Author : Lee, C.J. Dissent Joined By : Ishee, J., in part. Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Irving, P.J., concurs in part and in the result without separate written opinion Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - OTHER Appealed from Court of Appeals |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 10-29-2010 Appealed from: Tate County Chancery Court Judge: Percy L. Lynchard, Jr. Disposition: Denied Appellee/Cross-Appellant's Request for Constructive and/or Resulting Trust; Awarded Appellee/Cross-Appellant $44,995 in Payment for Unjust Enrichment Case Number: 06-6-243(PL) |
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| Note: | On May 2, 2013, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals to the extent that it affirmed the chancellor’s rejection of Swain’s claim of a constructive trust or a resulting trust and reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals with regard to the unjust-enrichment award. It further found the chancellor made a mathematical error in the calculation of the unjust-enrichment award, and vacated the chancellor’s judgment in part, and remanded the case to the chancery court for entry of judgment in the correct amount of $41,495. The SCT opinion can be found at http://courts.ms.gov/Images/Opinions/CO83507.pdf | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Mona Cates |
JONATHAN S. MASTERS
ROBERT M. STEPHENSON |
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| Appellee: | Elizabeth Swain | JOHN THOMAS LAMAR JR. DAVID MARK SLOCUM JR. | ||
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| Topic: | Unjust enrichment - Constructive trust - Nature of relationship - Unmarried cohabitants - Joint venture - Implied trust |
| Summary of the Facts: | Mona Cates and Elizabeth Swain were involved in an intimate relationship with one another and cohabited for over five years in three different states. After Swain moved out of Cates’s Tate County home, Swain sued Cates seeking various equitable remedies. Swain requested the court declare a constructive and/or resulting trust exists in the Mississippi home and that Swain be reimbursed for her investments in both the Washington and Mississippi houses. Cates moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing the requested relief “violates the Mississippi Constitution’s prohibition against homosexual marriage.” The chancellor denied the motion. The chancellor found Cates and Swain were in a confidential relationship but Cates had not abused that confidence. Thus, he denied a constructive trust. The chancellor also held insufficient evidence of a resulting trust existed because there was no evidence title to the Florida, Washington, or Mississippi properties was to be held by Cates for Swain’s benefit. So he rejected Swain’s request that Cates be divested of a portion of her interest in the Mississippi home. But the chancellor found Cates had been unjustly enriched. He found, based on their living arrangements in Florida and Washington, Swain was entitled to recoup her equity in the Florida home, which she had given to Cates. The chancellor awarded Swain $38,000, less the $2,500 Cates paid as earnest money on the Florida home. In total, the chancellor awarded Swain a judgment of $44,995 to be paid by Cates in cash. Cates appeals, and Swain cross-appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Nature of relationship Though Swain alleged her living arrangement with Cates was a “joint venture,” the chancellor found no business partnership existed. Both women admit their relationship was personal and intimate. During the course of their relationship the women cohabited, and both wrote large checks to the other, and improved each other’s property. They jointly titled some assets, such as vehicles and checking and investment accounts, while intentionally buying homes individually. In their various financial interactions, they never formalized any loans to each other or agreements to share an interest in property not jointly titled. And they did not enter into any contractual agreements concerning their property should they separate. Mississippi does not enforce contracts implied from the relationship of unmarried cohabitants, whether opposite-sex or same sex—especially here, where the chancellor found no express agreement beyond mere cohabitation that would support Swain’s claim that she be repaid for financial contributions she made during their relationship. Furthermore, Swain was married to another man and could not validly marry Cates even in a jurisdiction that recognizes same-sex marriage. Therefore, the limited putative spouse doctrine is inapplicable. The basis for an action for ‘unjust enrichment’ lies in a promise, which is implied in law, that one will pay to the person entitled thereto which in equity and good conscience is his. It is an obligation created by law in the absence of any agreement; therefore, it is an implied in law contract. By holding Cates was unjustly enriched through her cohabitation with Swain, the chancellor essentially found an implied contract that Swain would be remunerated for her financial contributions to Cates. Swain’s financial contributions to the homes in which she cohabited, rent free, with Cates must be viewed as given gratuitously without expectation of repayment, absent evidence of an express agreement between the two. The chancellor’s unjust enrichment remedy was outside the bounds of a chancery court’s equitable powers, and the judgment is reversed and rendered in Cates’ favor. Issue 2: Implied trust No implied trust arose in Swain’s favor. A constructive trust arises by operation of law against one who, by fraud, actual or constructive, by duress or abuse of confidence, by commission of wrong, or by any form of unconscionable conduct, artifice, concealment, or questionable means, or who in any way against equity and good conscience, either has obtained or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold and enjoy. Here, there is no evidence, let alone clear and convincing evidence, that Cates abused her relationship with Swain to obtain title to the Washington or Mississippi homes. Swain argues she trusted Cates and their relationship, investing money and “sweat equity” in the Washington and Florida homes. But, there is no record evidence that Cates promised to convey Swain an interest in the Washington or Mississippi properties in exchange for her financial contributions and improvements. The record instead shows Swain invested in Cates’s properties based on their long-term personal relationship. And there is no evidence Cates abused that relationship. Swain argues the abuse lay in Cates’s keeping the property after they broke up. But a constructive-trust analysis focuses on the acquisition of property and whether it was obtained through fraud or abuse of a confidential relationship. Further, Cates testified Swain did not desire to own the properties because she was still married to her husband and “didn’t want to take that chance,” presumably that her husband might receive a portion of any interest she may have obtained. The chancellor also found insufficient evidence of a resulting trust. While Swain testified she did not want to title another home in her name because of her husband, the evidence is certainly not clear and convincing that Swain actually purchased the Washington or Mississippi home in Cates’s name. Thus, the chancellor did not err. |
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