In the Interest of M.I., et al.


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Docket Number: 2011-IA-00607-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 04-12-2012
Opinion Author: King, J.
Holding: Affirmed and Remanded

Additional Case Information: Topic: Child custody - Youth court - Jurisdiction - Section 43-21-151(1) - Section 43-21-613(2) - Durable legal custody - Section 43-21-105(y)
Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson and Dickinson, P.JJ., Randolph, Lamar, Kitchens, Chandler and Pierce, JJ.
Procedural History: Interlocutory Appeal
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - CUSTODY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 04-05-2011
Appealed from: Lauderdale County Youth Court
Judge: Veldore F. Young
Disposition: Denied motion to transfer.
Case Number: YC-06-486


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Topic: Child custody - Youth court - Jurisdiction - Section 43-21-151(1) - Section 43-21-613(2) - Durable legal custody - Section 43-21-105(y)

Summary of the Facts: Theresa and Ralph Anderson, paternal aunt and uncle of two minors who were adjudicated neglected and abused, filed a Motion to Transfer Jurisdiction to the Chancery Court of Neshoba County. The Lauderdale County Youth Court denied the motion. The Andersons appeal.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: The Andersons argue that the youth court erred in retaining jurisdiction over this matter, maintaining that chancery courts have continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over custody matters. They also argue that the youth court terminated its jurisdiction over this matter with its order that granted them “full legal and physical custody” rather than durable legal custody. Section 43-21-151(1) grants the youth court “exclusive original jurisdiction in all proceedings concerning a delinquent child, a child in need of supervision, a neglected child, an abused child or a dependent child.” Section 43-21-613(2) gives the youth court authority to modify a disposition order regarding custody or disposition of a child upon motion of a child or child’s parent, guardian, or custodian. Here, the youth court possessed original jurisdiction, as the two children were adjudicated neglected and abused, thus falling squarely within the purview of section 43-21-151(1). Based on the statutory authority of youth courts to modify disposition orders and to retain jurisdiction over an abused or neglected child until the child reaches age twenty, the youth court in this case clearly retains jurisdiction over the matter so long as it did not otherwise terminate its jurisdiction. The Andersons argue that the court’s order did not grant durable legal custody, but rather gave them some sort of custody with a greater degree of permanency, thus terminating the youth court’s jurisdiction. Section 43-21-105(y) defines “durable legal custody” as the legal status created by a court order which gives the durable legal custodian the responsibilities of physical possession of the child and the duty to provide him with care, nurture, welfare, food, shelter, education and reasonable medical care. The Youth Court Act provides that in cases in which durable legal custody has been granted, the youth court’s obligation to conduct periodic review hearings is lifted, unless the youth court specifically orders such hearings. The Act also releases DHS from oversight or monitoring responsibilities in cases in which durable legal custody is granted. The Youth Court Act does not preclude the youth court’s retention of jurisdiction in matters in which durable legal custody is granted, nor does it preclude further DHS involvement. While the youth court in this case did not use the most explicit language possible in its order to indicate that it was granting durable legal custody, it did state that the placement in the matter was “durable.” It immediately followed that statement with a notation that review hearings need not continue. It also allowed, but notably did not mandate, DHS to close its file. It further specifically authorized further review hearings if so petitioned, indicating that it intended to retain jurisdiction over the matter. It follows that the youth court ordered a durable legal custody arrangement, and thus did not terminate its jurisdiction.


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