Wayne County Sch. Dist. v. Worsham


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Docket Number: 2011-CA-00328-SCT
Linked Case(s): 2011-CA-00328-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Date: 03-22-2012

Additional Case Information: Topic: Personal injury - Tort Claims Act - Reduction in speed limit on county road - Section 63-3-511 - Negligence per se - M.R.C.P. 9(d)

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 02-17-2011
Appealed from: Wayne County Circuit Court
Judge: Lester F. Williamson
Case Number: CV-2009-26-W

Note: Motion to Strike Extra-Record Citations From the Brief of Appellee is denied.

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Wayne County School District








 
  • Appellant #1 Reply Brief

  • Appellee: Ernestine Worsham, Individually and on Behalf of Ze'Metrice Denison, a Minor  

    Synopsis provided by:

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    Topic: Personal injury - Tort Claims Act - Reduction in speed limit on county road - Section 63-3-511 - Negligence per se - M.R.C.P. 9(d)

    Summary of the Facts: Following an accident between a school bus and a four-door passenger car, the driver of the car, Ernestine Worsham, brought suit alleging negligence and negligence per se on behalf of the driver of the school bus, and negligence, negligence per se, and gross negligence on behalf of Wayne County School District. After a bench trial, the driver of the school bus, Natasha Middleton, was dismissed from the suit. And despite evidence that a local county supervisor unilaterally had placed the speed-limit signs on County Farm Road, without a traffic investigation, approval by the Board, or passage of an ordinance, the trial court found Middleton’s actions constituted negligence per se, and thus awarded judgment in favor of Worsham in the amount of $800,000. Worsham was apportioned seventy-five percent fault, reducing the judgment against Wayne County School District to $200,000. Wayne County appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Wayne County argues that the trial court erred when it ruled that a single member of the Board of Supervisors unilaterally can reduce the speed limit on a county road without complying with the mandatory requirements found in section 63-3-511. Worsham argues that Wayne County is procedurally barred from raising this issue on appeal, because it was not properly raised according to M.R.C.P. 9(d). This procedural rule is inapplicable to the instant facts. Wayne County is not relying on a specific “ordinance” or a “special, local, or private statute” as its defense. Rather, Wayne County relies on a state statute and evidence of noncompliance with that statute to contend that, as a matter of law, it was not negligent per se. Section 63-3-511 provides that “local authorities, including boards of supervisors . . . determine and declare, by ordinance, a reasonable and safe speed limit,” and that such determinations be made “upon the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation.” At trial, the Board member testified that, in 2001, he had erected two thirty-mile-per-hour speed-limit signs on County Farm Road without authority from the Board or any other basis to do so. But the trial court held that, at the time of the accident, the thirty-mile-per-hour signs were controlling, because the Board of Supervisors effectively had adopted the signs through “implied dedication” and “prescription.” The doctrine of prescription has no bearing on whether a county supervisor can unilaterally change the speed limit on a county road. What is controlling over the present facts is the statutory requirement laid out in section 63-3-511. The statute is plain on its face, and leaves no room for statutory construction. It is quite clear from the record that the Board member did not follow the law when he unilaterally placed the speed-limit signs on County Farm Road, without first having conducted an engineering and traffic investigation, and then seeking approval through an ordinance by the Wayne County Board of Supervisors. Thus, Worsham cannot prevail on a claim for negligence per se. The case is remanded for the court to address the additional claims of negligence and gross negligence.


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