Jordan, et al. v. McAdams
| Docket Number: | 2010-CA-01333-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 04-10-2012 Opinion Author: Fair, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Motion for sanctions - Timeliness of motion - M.R.C.P. 11(b) - Section 11-55-5 - M.R.C.P. 57 - Findings of fact - M.R.C.P. 52 Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Griffis, P.J., Barnes, Roberts, Carlton and Maxwell, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Ishee and Russell, JJ. Dissenting Author : Irving, P.J. Procedural History: Declaratory Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - OTHER |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 07-14-2010 Appealed from: Leflore County Chancery Court Judge: Joseph Webster Disposition: DENIED SANCTIONS Case Number: G09-0110 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | David Jordan, Ronnie Stevenson, Charles E. McCoy, Sr., Tennill Cannon and Carl Palmer |
WILLIE JAMES PERKINS SR. |
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| Appellee: | Carolyn McAdams | A. LEE ABRAHAM JR. PRESTON RIDEOUT | ||
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| Topic: | Motion for sanctions - Timeliness of motion - M.R.C.P. 11(b) - Section 11-55-5 - M.R.C.P. 57 - Findings of fact - M.R.C.P. 52 |
| Summary of the Facts: | The day that Carolyn McAdams took office as Mayor of Greenwood, she sent a letter to the city attorney, James Littleton, terminating his employment. Mayor McAdams then nominated the firm of Abraham and Rideout to the position. The Greenwood City Council rejected the nomination in a five-to-two vote, held the next day. Littleton then announced he would serve as city attorney until a replacement was approved by the city council. Littleton continued to act as the city attorney at subsequent city council meetings. Mayor McAdams filed a lawsuit against Littleton and five of the seven city council members. The chancery court held that Littleton had no authority to hold over, and it enjoined him from continuing to act as city attorney. The judgment against Littleton was ultimately affirmed on appeal by the Mississippi Supreme Court. The chancery court also held that McAdams was not entitled to any relief against the defendant councilmen. The councilmen sought sanctions against McAdams, contending the claims against them were frivolous. They also alleged that McAdams had sued them for the purpose of harassment. The chancellor denied the motion. The councilmen appeal. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Timeliness of motion McAdams argues that the councilmen’s request for sanctions was untimely. The councilmen filed a motion for sanctions more than three months after the chancery court’s order disposing of the substantive claims in the case. The post-order motion was not the councilmen’s first pleading seeking sanctions. A motion for sanctions need not be made for the first time after a judgment has been entered. The councilmen requested sanctions in their answer to the complaint. In its order disposing of the substantive claims, the chancery court expressly took the issue of sanctions under advisement. Thus, the issue of sanctions was properly before the chancery court. Issue 2: Sanctions The councilmen argue that the chancery court erred in not granting sanctions against McAdams. Under M.R.C.P. 11(b), a trial court may award sanctions against a party or attorney who has filed a pleading that is frivolous or was filed for the purpose of harassment or delay. Section 11-55-5 allows the court to impose sanctions for claims brought “without substantial justification” or “interposed for delay or harassment.” A pleading is frivolous only when, objectively speaking, there was no hope of success at the time it was filed. The councilmen argue that the suit against them was frivolous because it did not cite any wrongdoing or seek any relief against them. However, the mayor’s complaint clearly states that it sought a declaratory judgment against the councilmen, as allowed under M.R.C.P. 57. Moreover, there is no question that a genuine dispute existed between the mayor and the defendant councilmen as to Littleton’s right to hold over. Once they were brought into the suit, the councilmen did in fact take the position that Littleton had a right to hold over, going so far as to argue that the City could not function without him. The fact that this suit sought to resolve a matter of public concern weighs against an award of sanctions. The councilmen also argue that McAdams should have sued the entire city council rather than five of the seven members individually. As the councilmen have failed to cite any authority showing that suing the councilmen individually rendered the suit frivolous, this argument is without merit. The councilmen further argue the complaint for declaratory judgment was racially and politically motivated harassment. The five councilmen point out that they are all African-American Democrats, while the two council members who were not sued are white and members of the Republican Party. Although this could support an inference of improper motivations, no other evidence has been presented that this suit was racially or politically motivated. Moreover, McAdams had a rational reason to sue only those five councilmen, as they comprised the majority of the council that opposed her on the issues she sought to have decided in the lawsuit. The mere fact that the five councilmen are African Americans, without anything else, is insufficient proof of a racial motive. The same can be said of the political allegations. Issue 3: Findings of fact The councilmen argue that the chancellor erred in not supporting his opinion with more detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The chancellor did expressly find that the suit was not frivolous or filed for the purpose of harassment or delay. Additionally, the councilmen did not file a post-trial motion requesting additional findings of fact and conclusions of law, as allowed by M.R.C.P. 52. Additionally, in Rule 11 sanctions cases, an appellate court will assume that the trial court made determinations of fact sufficient to support its ruling where no specific finding has been made. Thus, there was no deficiency in the chancellor’s findings of fact. |
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