Seales v. State
| Docket Number: | 2010-KA-01525-SCT Linked Case(s): 2010-KA-01525-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 03-29-2012 Opinion Author: Pierce, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Grand larceny - Suppression of confession - URCCC 6.03 - Initial appearance - Waiver of rights - Sufficiency of evidence - Section 97-17-41(1) Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson and Dickinson, P.JJ., Randolph, Lamar, Kitchens, Chandler and King, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 07-08-2010 Appealed from: Neshoba County Circuit Court Judge: Marcus D. Gordon Disposition: Convicted Appellant of grand larceny and sentenced himt to ten (10) years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, as a habitual offender. District Attorney: Mark Sheldon Duncan Case Number: 10-CR-0004-NS-G |
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| Note: | Appellant's Letter - Request to Supplement Brief is denied. | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Tadise Seales a/k/a Tadise Raymanuel Seales |
EDMUND J. PHILLIPS, JR. |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: LISA LYNN BLOUNT SCOTT STUART |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Grand larceny - Suppression of confession - URCCC 6.03 - Initial appearance - Waiver of rights - Sufficiency of evidence - Section 97-17-41(1) |
| Summary of the Facts: | Tadise Seales was convicted of grand larceny. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Suppression of confession Seales argues that the trial court erred in not suppressing his confession, because he was incarcerated “without charges” for four days prior to giving his statement, and because his statement was coerced by the promise of a bail bond, which rendered his statement involuntary. URCCC 6.03 requires that every person in custody be taken, without unnecessary delay and within forty-eight hours of arrest, before a judicial officer or other person authorized by statute for an initial appearance. A violation of Rule 6.03 alone, however, will not result in the suppression of evidence or reversible error where the defendant was informed of his rights and made a knowing and voluntary waiver. Here, the record shows that Rule 6.03 was indeed violated. The record also illustrates, however, that evidence was presented at the suppression hearing that Seales had been informed of his Miranda rights and that Seales had expressly waived those rights by signing a written waiver immediately after his arrest on September 4. Seales was again read his rights and signed another waiver shortly prior to giving his statement on September 9. Thus, the record amply supports the trial court’s finding that Seales was informed of his rights and had made a knowing and voluntary waiver of those rights, without any threats or promises, prior to giving his statement. Issue 2: Sufficiency of evidence Seales argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence during its case-in-chief to convict him of grand larceny, as the State merely established that he had pawned a tiller and trailer, but failed to show he had taken the two items from the victim’s property. Section 97-17-41(1) defines grand larceny as taking and carrying away, feloniously, the personal property of another, of the value of $500 or more. Here, the evidence clearly established a crime of grand larceny. There is no dispute that the victim was the actual owner of the tiller and trailer pawned by Seales on August 19, or that the items were stolen from the victim’s property earlier that same day. Nor is there any argument challenging the evidence presented showing that the items’ aggregate market value on August 19 was at least $500. Two versions of the facts were presented at trial as to how Seales came into possession of the tiller and trailer. Seales told one version on direct examination and then admitted on cross-examination that he had told a different story to the police officer. The differing accounts simply presented a jury question. Any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the State had proven all the elements of the crime. |
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