Smith v. State


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Docket Number: 2010-CA-01951-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 03-27-2012
Opinion Author: Maxwell, J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Post-conviction relief - Waiver of indictment - Factual basis - Voluntariness of plea - Alford plea - Ineffective assistance of counsel
Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, Carlton, Russell and Fair, JJ.
Procedural History: PCR
Nature of the Case: PCR

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 10-19-2010
Appealed from: Pearl River County Circuit Court
Judge: Prentiss Harrell
Disposition: MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISMISSED
Case Number: 2010-0796H-PC

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Cedric Smith




JEANINE M. CARAFELLO M. JUDITH BARNETT



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief

  • Appellee: State of Mississippi LADONNA C. HOLLAND  

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    Topic: Post-conviction relief - Waiver of indictment - Factual basis - Voluntariness of plea - Alford plea - Ineffective assistance of counsel

    Summary of the Facts: Cedric Smith waived indictment and entered an Alford plea to a one-count bill of information charging him with statutory rape. The State agreed to a nonbinding recommendation that Smith serve five years’ imprisonment. But the circuit judge sentenced Smith to twenty years, with thirteen years suspended and seven to serve, followed by five years of post-release supervision. Smith filed a motion for post-conviction relief which the court dismissed. Smith appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Waiver of indictment Smith argues he did not voluntarily waive his right to be indicted by a grand jury. Smith does not dispute executing the waiver of indictment. Nor does he contend that he did not understand what he was signing or its contents. He instead claims the trial court should have further advised him during his plea colloquy of his right of presentment to a grand jury. While the trial judge should have covered this right with him, Smith’s recent challenge to the voluntariness of the waiver is merely conclusory and is contradicted by clear documentary evidence in the record. In signing the waiver, Smith acknowledged his attorney had fully advised him of his rights and that he was “freely and voluntarily executing this waiver[.]” Issue 2: Factual basis Smith argues his Alford plea is invalid because the State’s accompanying factual basis did not show the offense occurred in Pearl River County, allegedly depriving the court of jurisdiction. He also challenges the sufficiency of the factual basis, claiming it did not establish sexual “penetration,” as required by statute. A sufficient factual basis requires an evidentiary foundation in the record which is sufficiently specific to allow the court to determine that the defendant’s conduct was within the ambit of that defined as criminal. The bill of information charged that Smith committed statutory rape in Pearl River County. When waiving indictment, Smith also admitted he was charged with committing the offense in Pearl River County. During Smith’s plea colloquy, he acknowledged that by entering his Alford plea, he was waiving the right to a jury trial in Pearl River County. That the victim in this case would testify Smith “had sex” with her was itself specific enough to establish sexual intercourse. Issue 3: Voluntariness of plea Smith argues his plea was involuntary because the trial court did not explain the elements of statutory rape during his plea colloquy. A valid Alford plea must have been made after the defendant has knowingly and intelligently concluded that his best interests require entry of the guilty plea. Smith’s bill of information laid out the elements of statutory rape. Smith also swore in his waiver of indictment that defense counsel had explained to him the nature of the charged offense. In his quite detailed plea petition, Smith again acknowledged his attorney’s advice of the nature of the charge. And Smith attested during his plea colloquy that his attorney had explained the bill of information and crime charged. The constitutional prerequisites of a valid plea may be satisfied where the record accurately reflects that the nature of the charge and the elements of the crime were explained to the defendant by his own, competent counsel. These mandates were met through Smith’s attorney. Issue 4: Ineffective assistance of counsel Smith argues that his counsel was ineffective by failing to inform him of the elements of statutory rape; failing to explain the nature of an Alford plea; failing to explain what was meant when he waived indictment; erroneously advising him concerning the rape shield laws contained in M.R.E. 412(b)(2)(A); and erroneously advising Smith that the State had possession of hundreds of text messages between Smith and the victim. Smith’s allegations are not supported by any proof except his own affidavit. A PCR movant may not rely solely on his own affidavit and unsupported allegations in his brief. Because Smith’s first three allegations are contradicted by other documentary evidence in the record, including his plea petition, waiver of indictment, and plea hearing transcript, the circuit court properly disposed of them without a hearing. His fourth and fifth assignments must additionally fail because Smith did not plead them with the required specificity.


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